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NICUs is sparse. Using historical methodology to examine hospital archival data, oral history interviews,
and scholarly literature, this work examines the roles nurses played in the development of NICUs as
technological systems between 1955 and 1982 in the United States. By using the lenses of the history of
nursing, the history of technology, and the history of children's healthcare, this work contributes to our
understanding of the nuanced ways nurses participated in the formation of the NICU - a complex
technological system of care - for a vulnerable and medically complicated newborn patient population.
The value of newborns as a unique and valued medical population, seen as early the Progressive Era,
contributed to the formation of premature infant units and particular nursing care for premature newborns
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later neonatal intensive care units and the ways nurses cared for a broader cadre of sick newborns.
Hospitals valued the particular care they gave and made decisions about the dedication of spaces where
newborns could be grouped together to receive nursing care. Two case studies of east coast children's
hospitals - The Children's Hospital of Philadelphia and Boston Children's Medical Center - shed light on
how particular hospitals chose to allocate resources, group patients, and how they made those decisions
based on their value of specifically trained nursing staff. The history of NICUs speaks to broader
contemporary healthcare themes and issues as we ask questions about who should receive care and
precious healthcare resources.
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Mom told me you came in on your days off when I needed you. Dad told me you made sure to
remind them I was a ‘fighter.’ This work is dedicated to you Joan, and the amazing nurses who
worked in the NICU at Toronto’s Women’s College Hospital in September 1984.
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ABSTRACT

“WE WERE THE EYES AND EARS…”: NURSING AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
NEONATAL INTENSIVE CARE UNITS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1955-1982.

Briana Ralston, MS, RN
Julie Fairman, PhD, RN, FAAN

In the 1960s and 1970s, neonatal intensive care units (NICUs) became the standard of care for
critically ill newborns in hospitals across the United States. Though work has been done to
examine how nurses participated in the development of ICU’s for adult populations, scholarship
related to the formation of NICUs is sparse. Using historical methodology to examine hospital
archival data, oral history interviews, and scholarly literature, this work examines the roles nurses
played in the development of NICUs as technological systems between 1955 and 1982 in the
United States. By using the lenses of the history of nursing, the history of technology, and the
history of children’s healthcare, this work contributes to our understanding of the nuanced ways
nurses participated in the formation of the NICU - a complex technological system of care - for a
vulnerable and medically complicated newborn patient population. The value of newborns as a
unique and valued medical population, seen as early the Progressive Era, contributed to the
formation of premature infant units and particular nursing care for premature newborns during the
first half of the 20th century. This premature infant care in turn influenced the development of
later neonatal intensive care units and the ways nurses cared for a broader cadre of sick newborns.
Hospitals valued the particular care they gave and made decisions about the dedication of spaces
where newborns could be grouped together to receive nursing care. Two case studies of east coast
children’s hospitals – The Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia and Boston Children’s Medical
Center – shed light on how particular hospitals chose to allocate resources, group patients, and
how they made those decisions based on their value of specifically trained nursing staff. The
history of NICUs speaks to broader contemporary healthcare themes and issues as we ask
questions about who should receive care and precious healthcare resources.

	
  

vi	
  

TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER	
  1:	
  	
  
NURSING	
  AS	
  A	
  PART	
  OF	
  THE	
  TECHNOLOGICAL	
  SYSTEM	
  OF	
  NEONATAL	
  INTENSIVE	
  
CARE:	
  .........................................................................................................................................................	
  1	
  
INTRODUCTION,	
  THEORETICAL	
  FRAMEWORK,	
  AND	
  REVIEW	
  OF	
  LITERATURE	
  ..............	
  1	
  
TECHNOLOGY,	
  NEONATES,	
  AND	
  NURSING	
  HISTORY:	
  AN	
  ANALYTICAL	
  APPROACH	
  ........................................	
  9	
  
Technology	
  and	
  Technological	
  Systems	
  ....................................................................................................	
  10	
  
Nurses	
  and	
  the	
  Social	
  Construction	
  of	
  Technological	
  Systems	
  ........................................................	
  14	
  
PEDIATRICS	
  AND	
  AGE	
  AS	
  AN	
  ANALYTICAL	
  LENS	
  ...............................................................................................	
  22	
  
LITERATURE	
  REVIEW	
  OF	
  THE	
  HISTORIES	
  OF	
  NEONATAL	
  INTENSIVE	
  CARE	
  ................................................	
  26	
  
SIGNIFICANCE	
  OF	
  THIS	
  WORK	
  ................................................................................................................................	
  34	
  
A	
  TALE	
  OF	
  TWO	
  UNITS	
  ..........................................................................................................................................	
  35	
  
PUNY	
  WAIFS	
  AS	
  UNTOLD	
  TREASURES:	
  ........................................................................................	
  37	
  
THE	
  VALUE	
  OF	
  NEWBORN	
  PATIENT	
  POPULATIONS	
  AS	
  A	
  CONCEPTUAL	
  FOUNDATION
	
  ...................................................................................................................................................................	
  37	
  
NEWBORNS	
  ARE	
  NEEDED:	
  THE	
  VALUE	
  OF	
  NEWBORNS	
  AND	
  THE	
  PROGRESSIVE	
  ERA	
  MOVEMENT	
  ...........	
  39	
  
NEWBORNS	
  AS	
  “NATIONAL	
  ASSETS”:	
  THE	
  WAR	
  YEARS	
  AND	
  INFANT	
  MORTALITY	
  ...................................	
  45	
  
“Child-‐saving”:	
  Premature	
  infants	
  as	
  a	
  focal	
  point	
  ...............................................................................	
  47	
  
A	
  PERFECT	
  STORM:	
  CHILD-‐SAVING	
  REFORM,	
  TECHNOLOGY,	
  HOSPITALS,	
  AND	
  PREMATURE	
  BIRTH	
  ........	
  48	
  
SICK	
  NEWBORNS	
  AND	
  THE	
  ERA	
  OF	
  THE	
  ‘BABY	
  BOOM	
  IDEOLOGY’	
  ...................................................................	
  53	
  
“A	
  child	
  centered	
  character:”	
  The	
  social	
  value	
  of	
  the	
  newborn	
  population	
  ..............................	
  54	
  
Nuanced	
  value:	
  Premature	
  infants,	
  the	
  American	
  family,	
  and	
  medical	
  advances	
  ..................	
  57	
  
CONCLUSION	
  .............................................................................................................................................................	
  59	
  
”THE	
  NURSE	
  STILL	
  HOLDS	
  AN	
  IMPORTANT	
  POSITION”:	
  ........................................................	
  62	
  
NURSING	
  AND	
  THE	
  DEVELOPMENT	
  OF	
  NEONATAL	
  INTENSIVE	
  CARE	
  UNITS	
  ..................	
  62	
  
PREMATURE	
  INFANT	
  UNITS:	
  STANDARDS	
  OF	
  CARE	
  ..........................................................................................	
  64	
  
Nursing	
  the	
  premature	
  infant:	
  The	
  role	
  nurses	
  played	
  in	
  premature	
  infant	
  units	
  .................	
  66	
  
Basic	
  Newborn	
  needs	
  .........................................................................................................................................	
  68	
  
Charting	
  and	
  communication	
  ........................................................................................................................	
  70	
  
Nursing,	
  research	
  and	
  knowledge	
  development	
  ....................................................................................	
  74	
  
“WE	
  WERE	
  THE	
  EYES	
  AND	
  EARS…”:	
  NURSING	
  IN	
  EARLY	
  NICUS	
  ....................................................................	
  77	
  
“We	
  didn’t	
  know	
  what	
  we	
  know	
  today.”:	
  Nursing	
  and	
  the	
  importance	
  of	
  families	
  ................	
  78	
  
Highly	
  skilled	
  professionals:	
  Collaboration	
  and	
  trust	
  in	
  the	
  NICU	
  ................................................	
  83	
  
“So	
  we	
  would	
  MacGyver	
  things”:	
  Making	
  the	
  system	
  work	
  for	
  their	
  tiny	
  patients	
  .................	
  85	
  
KEEP	
  THEM	
  BREATHING:	
  MECHANICAL	
  VENTILATION	
  AND	
  NURSING	
  CARE.	
  .............................................	
  88	
  
Respiratory	
  Distress:	
  Its	
  definition	
  and	
  treatment.	
  ..............................................................................	
  90	
  
Respiratory	
  treatments:	
  Attempts	
  to	
  provide	
  respiratory	
  support	
  ...............................................	
  93	
  
“You	
  would	
  know…you	
  could	
  feel.”:	
  Nursing’s	
  role	
  in	
  respiratory	
  support	
  ................................	
  95	
  
Mechanical	
  ventilation:	
  Did	
  it	
  work	
  for	
  newborns?	
  .............................................................................	
  97	
  
The	
  Baby	
  Bird	
  Ventilator	
  ...............................................................................................................................	
  102	
  
	
  

vii	
  
EXPENSES	
  AND	
  COST-‐EFFECTIVENESS:	
  FINANCIAL	
  CHALLENGES	
  OF	
  A	
  NEW	
  TECHNOLOGICAL	
  SYSTEM111	
  
CONCLUSION	
  ...........................................................................................................................................................	
  114	
  
“WE	
  NEEDED	
  A	
  PLACE	
  TO	
  PUT	
  THE	
  BABIES…”:	
  ......................................................................	
  116	
  
INFANT	
  INTENSIVE	
  CARE	
  AND	
  THE	
  CHILDREN’S	
  HOSPITAL	
  OF	
  PHILADELPHIA	
  ........	
  116	
  
A	
  CITY,	
  A	
  HOSPITAL,	
  AND	
  THE	
  DEVELOPMENT	
  OF	
  A	
  SURGICAL	
  DEPARTMENT	
  ...........................................	
  119	
  
THE	
  GREAT	
  MIGRATION:	
  THE	
  CHANGING	
  FACE	
  OF	
  PHILADELPHIA	
  AND	
  THE	
  HEALTH	
  OF	
  IT’S	
  SMALLEST
	
  ..................................................................................................................................................................................	
  122	
  
Pediatric	
  surgery	
  and	
  neonates	
  at	
  CHOP	
  ................................................................................................	
  124	
  
Dr.	
  C.	
  Everett	
  Koop:	
  Bringing	
  newborn	
  surgery	
  to	
  CHOP	
  ................................................................	
  129	
  
Koop’s	
  vision	
  and	
  a	
  strong	
  nursing	
  workforce.	
  ....................................................................................	
  135	
  
“WE	
  NEEDED	
  A	
  PLACE	
  TO	
  PUT	
  THE	
  BABIES!”:	
  THE	
  IICU	
  AT	
  THE	
  CHILDREN’S	
  HOSPITAL	
  OF	
  
PHILADELPHIA	
  .......................................................................................................................................................	
  139	
  
NURSING	
  CARE	
  IN	
  BLACK	
  AND	
  WHITE:	
  CHOP’S	
  IMAGES	
  OF	
  THEIR	
  IICU	
  AND	
  GOOD	
  NURSING	
  CARE	
  .....	
  142	
  
GROWING	
  AND	
  CHANGING	
  ...................................................................................................................................	
  145	
  
BEYOND	
  THE	
  IICU’S	
  WALLS:	
  THE	
  NICU	
  AS	
  A	
  FOCAL	
  POINT	
  FOR	
  A	
  REGIONALIZED	
  SYSTEM	
  OF	
  CARE.	
  ..	
  148	
  
“KEEPING	
  INFANTS	
  ALIVE	
  IS	
  ONLY	
  HALF	
  THE	
  BATTLE…”:	
  .............................................................................	
  153	
  
VENTILATOR-‐DEPENDENT	
  PEDIATRIC	
  PATIENTS	
  AND	
  THE	
  CHRONICITY	
  OF	
  UNINTENDED	
  CONSEQUENCES
	
  ..................................................................................................................................................................................	
  153	
  
CONCLUSION:	
  .........................................................................................................................................................	
  163	
  
COMPLEX	
  ROOTS	
  OF	
  INFLUENCE:	
  ...............................................................................................	
  166	
  
NURSING	
  AND	
  THE	
  NICU	
  AT	
  BOSTON	
  CHILDREN’S	
  HOSPITAL	
  ..........................................	
  166	
  
BOSTON,	
  PREMATURE	
  NEWBORNS,	
  AND	
  THE	
  SHARED	
  MISSION	
  OF	
  TWO	
  HOSPITALS	
  ...............................	
  169	
  
A	
  Premature	
  Infant	
  Unit	
  .................................................................................................................................	
  170	
  
Infection	
  Issues:	
  ..................................................................................................................................................	
  174	
  
An	
  expensive	
  unit	
  to	
  run…	
  .............................................................................................................................	
  180	
  
“INCUBATOR	
  PATIENTS”	
  AND	
  A	
  BROADER	
  NEWBORN	
  POPULATION:	
  IDEAS	
  FOR	
  A	
  NEWBORN	
  NURSERY
	
  ..................................................................................................................................................................................	
  183	
  
A	
  Time	
  of	
  Transition	
  to	
  the	
  Newborn	
  Nursery	
  .....................................................................................	
  186	
  
DIVING	
  BABIES:	
  CRITICAL	
  CARE	
  AND	
  HYPERBARIC	
  TREATMENTS	
  ..............................................................	
  194	
  
Hyperbaric	
  Medicine	
  and	
  newborn	
  physiology	
  ....................................................................................	
  197	
  
“ONE	
  NURSERY	
  IN	
  THREE	
  LOCATIONS”:	
  A	
  JOINT	
  NEONATOLOGY	
  PROGRAM	
  ...........................................	
  203	
  
CONCLUSION	
  ...........................................................................................................................................................	
  211	
  
CONCLUSION	
  ......................................................................................................................................	
  214	
  
A	
  NUANCED	
  VIEW	
  OF	
  THE	
  DEVELOPMENT	
  OF	
  INTENSIVE	
  CARE:	
  ..................................................................	
  217	
  
ALTERNATIVE	
  POSSIBILITIES:	
  .............................................................................................................................	
  218	
  
LIMITATIONS	
  TO	
  THIS	
  STUDY:	
  .............................................................................................................................	
  219	
  
FUTURE	
  WORK	
  TO	
  BE	
  DONE:	
  ...............................................................................................................................	
  220	
  
INFORMING	
  OUR	
  CURRENT	
  UNDERSTANDING:	
  .................................................................................................	
  221	
  
BIBLIOGRAPHY	
  .................................................................................................................................	
  225	
  

	
  

1	
  

Chapter 1:

Nursing as a part of the Technological System of Neonatal Intensive Care:
Introduction, theoretical framework, and review of literature
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Nursing as a part of the Technological System of Neonatal Intensive Care
Leigh weighed 960 grams at birth. Born prematurely, she spent the first three
months of her life in a neonatal intensive care unit (NICU). She was placed on a
ventilator and given intravenous fluids and medications. Machines to monitor her heart
rate and blood oxygen levels were attached to probes placed on her skin in addition to a
probe that measured her skin temperature. She was fed through a tube placed into her
stomach. Nurses took her vital signs, including heart rate, respiratory rate, and blood
pressures every few hours. The isolette that provided the warm and slightly humid
environment she needed was carefully monitored by the physicians and nurses who
worked in the NICU. Her mother remembered: “We were taken to the neonatal intensive
care unit to see our little girl. She was so tiny and hooked up to a lot of machines –
frightening in a way but at least we got to touch her….Elizabeth (the nurse on duty
Monday and Tuesday) was great. She explained each tube, medication, and treatment.”1
The nurses played a crucial role in the way this infant’s family experienced and
remembered their experience with the NICU. Neonatal intensive care units, as Leigh’s
mother remembered, can be incredibly complex and intimidating places where machines
can seem to dominate and good nursing care of the patient is directly associated with
tubes, medications, and treatments.
Babies, like Leigh, required intensely complex systems of care to survive the
effects of prematurity, but they also required nurses who had the skills and knowledge to
expertly observe, navigate highly technological medical environments, and incorporate a
1

	
  

Carol Ralston. Diary kept by the author: September-October 1984. (unpublished manuscript in the
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plethora of tools and technologies in the process of delivering care to patients and their
families. Though the development of neonatal intensive care involved a constantly
evolving network, nurses practiced at the bedside made this increasingly complex system
work for their patients through their unique role in patient care. Nurses monitored the
patients, knew when some method of treatment did or did not work, communicated with
other healthcare providers, and when necessary improvised oversized equipment to fit
their small patients. Historians must examine how nurses practiced and delivered care
between 1955 and 1982, during the transition from premature infant units into the early
years of the neonatal intensive care units. The story of the development of the NICU and
care delivered there challenges us to better understand how clinicians, specifically nurses,
participated in the dynamically changing system of care and provided critical skills that
made these systems work. This analysis will also inform our appreciation of the intended
and unintended consequences of these systems and the complex decisions and outcomes
involved.
Premature infants have been clustered together in premature infant units in
hospitals since the 1920s, but it was not until the 1960s that hospitals transitioned from
these premature infant units to NICUs; these new NICUs served as reorganized spaces
where hospitals grouped together critically ill newborns to receive very specific care
unique to their medical, nursing, and developmental needs. The push for better surgical
treatments and care of newborn congenital conditions as well as better understanding of
newborn medical problems meant a growing number of sick newborns needed a place to
receive the intensive care premature infants had been privileged to receive for decades.
	
  

4	
  

Premature infants, grouped together generally by gestational age or weight,
formed the dominant patient populations in the early premature infant units; NICUs
patient populations included a broader cadre of sick neonates born both prematurely and
full term in need of medical and surgical care.2 NICUs incorporated a framework of
intensive nursing care previously seen in premature infant care that incorporated
increasingly complex and new medical equipment, treatments and procedures for
different populations.3 Hospitals formed neonatal intensive care units as the need for a
special group of nurses to care for these increasingly complex babies, to understand and
better treat dominant causes of infant mortality, and attempts to allocate resources for
critically ill newborns merged.
These units reflected a growing need for hospitals and healthcare providers to
medically define an increasingly vulnerable patient population, a strong desire to
decrease infant mortality within a post-war social context that valued children as central
to the American dream4 as the new norm, and a growing fascination fueled by a vastly
2

While this statement is true speaking broadly of NICUs, each hospital and unit did have its own patient
makeup influenced by a number of factors including community needs and resources, whether or
not the hospital had a surgical team on site, and the personalities and strengths of the hospital
administration, physicians, and nurses involved in the unit.

3

I recognize that while broader impacts on children’s health absolutely affected the changing nature of the
need to address infant mortality and the creative ways healthcare workers and activists sought to
do so. Many things tangentially impacted newborn medicine – the story is complicated! New
funding streams for hospitals in the post-war era, the baby boom that many scholars argue
influenced the post-war “child-centered” society, and the creating of medical subspecialties all
impacted newborn medicine and the developments of units where sick newborns received care. I
will speak more to this in chapter 2. For now, I will seek to formulate a framework that, while
taking children’s healthcare into account, will situate neonates and the nurses that cared for them
in particular times and places as forms of technology.

4

Elaine Tyler May. Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era (New York, NY: Basic
Books, 2008).; Steven Mintz. Huck’s Raft: A History of American Childhood (Cambridge: The
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004).
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expanding post-war technological boom that included new and more complex medical
equipment.5 Analysis of the story of neonatal intensive care units in the United States is
important to consider as we continue to face many similar themes today: vulnerable
patient populations, increasingly sick patients, and questions concerning limited resource
allocation relating to finances, space, and healthcare workforce. In order to fully
understand the story, we must understand the role nurses played as they practiced at the
bedside with a changing scenario of medical therapeutics, public expectations and the
reality of resource allocation; this story is not told in current scholarly literature. We must
ask these questions as this analysis will form and influence how we think about current
issues in healthcare today.

I raise three particular questions:
1. What was the particular social, medical and nursing context that supported the
transition from premature infant units to the establishment and development of
neonatal intensive care units?
2. What needs did these NICUs meet that necessitated the establishment of
intensive care particularly for neonates?
3. What role did nurses play in the formation and shaping of the NICUs, the

5

	
  

William Silverman. Retrolental Fibroplasia: A Modern Parable (New York: Grune & Stratton, 1980).;
Thomas Cone. History of the Care and Feeding of the Premature Infant (Boston: Little, Brown
and Company, 1985).; Murdina MacFarquhar Desmond. Newborn Medicine and Society:
European Background and American Practice (1750-1975) (Austin: Eakin Press, 1998).
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services and care provided there, and their subsequent early development?

In this study I analyze historical data that sits at the intersection of the history of
nursing, the history of children’s health particularly as it played out for neonates, and the
history of technology. By examining the NICU and considering the neonatal population
specifically through the lenses of a history of technology and nursing, I am able to ask
broader questions in relation to technology and care, how systems of care develop for
particular populations and how nurses play a role in the success and failure of
technologies and methods of healthcare delivery; but this story is about more than what
worked and what did not, but looks to the underlying political, economic, and cultural
context in which decisions about care for particular populations are made.
The historical story will explore how nurses contributed to the development of
technological systems in particular times and places. The Institute of Medicine’s report
on the Future of Nursing emphasizes the need to analyze the ways in which technologies
are implemented by nursing staff in patient care, and the processes by which those
technologies are tested, developed, and adopted into practice.6 To adequately address
these research recommendations as we move forward, historical analysis is a critical path
6

	
  

Committee on the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Initiative on the Future of Nursing, at the Institute of
Medicine, Institute of Medicine. "7 Recommendations and Research Priorities." The Future of
Nursing: Leading Change, Advancing Health. (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press,
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for understanding how nurses have been involved in the adoption, standardization, and
use of technologies across time and place. This historical work challenges us, within the
context of current clinical research priorities, to think about the ways in which nurses are
involved/situated in the development of healthcare systems in the United States today,
and how the systems, in turn, shape our understanding of the use of technology as well as
the value of those whose lives depend upon it.
For the purposes of this study, and to provide clarity for why technology is an
important lens, I consider technology to be more than a particular machine, but will use a
broader systems approach; I consider technology to be the system of both object and user
as well as the social, cultural, and political influences that converge to produce a
particular result.7 With this framework, I propose the neonatal intensive care unit as a
technology system, even a technology itself, in which the nurse, the machines and tools
she used, as well as the medical environment, resources, social values, and cultural
approach to newborn care are components of the user context.
I begin by using the comparative analysis of two specific hospital case studies, the
Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia and the Children’s Hospital of Boston. These
hospitals are two of the major children’s hospitals in the northeast that formed NICUs to
meet particular needs of newborn care. The political and social environments in which
each hospital established its unit will allow for a nuanced study of why units and spaces
are created for particular patient populations. The unit at the Children’s Hospital of
7
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Philadelphia was established with state and federal grant money specifically for the study
of neonatal surgical care. Thus, this unit had a post-operative surgical focus spearheaded
by influential surgeon and former Surgeon General C.E. Koop. Boston’s unit was more
focused on a medical patient population that arose out of traditional premature infant care
and institutional funding rather than federally funding.8 By choosing these two places that
have many similarities and discontinuities, we see how politics, hospital culture and
specific personalities played roles in the development of these units. Each had a unique
medical, cultural and political flavor that was revealed in how neonatal therapeutics
developed within each institution.9
My study will include the time frame of 1955 to 1982. By beginning in 1955, I
will capture the transition from the premature infant units to neonatal intensive care units.
An analysis of this transition is critical because it will broadly illustrate the development
of a subspecialty as it related to a particular patient population. This time frame will also
shed light on how care delivered in NICUs was differentiated into a particularized
specialty that met the needs of critically ill newborns during this time. My time period of
interest ends in 1982, when both local and national media began to grapple with cases
such as Baby Doe as they raised ethical questions concerning the consequences – both
positive as well as unintended – of the care developed in NICUs and the social
8

These two units were early units, and I acknowledge that units opened across the country during this time
period and existed with unique and nuanced contexts. These two units share many similarities that
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expectations that accompanied progressions in such technology.10, 11 During this time
period, major challenges and issues in neonatal medicine prompted debates about the
development and use of technology.12 National organizations related to neonatal nursing
and medical care also emerged in the 1980s and reflected a progression and shift in
neonatal medicine beyond the scope of this work.
Technology, Neonates, and Nursing History: An analytical approach
To properly examine the role nurses played in the development of neonatal
intensive care units, data analysis must occur at the point where the lenses of the history
of nursing and the history of technology intersect with a particular focus on the neonatal
patient population. In this analysis, technology is more than just a machine, but framed as
a complex system encompassing tools and the people who use them, and also the social,
political, economic, racial, and gendered context in which the worker uses the tool.13 A

10

The surgeon general at the time, C. E. Koop, condemned the failure to treat a newborn infant with
Down’s syndrome in this case. The case prompted legislation that was passed in 1984, known as
the Baby Doe Law that dictates specific criteria and guidelines for the treatment of seriously ill
newborns.

11

C. Everett Koop, Koop: The Memoirs of America’s Family Doctor (New York: Harper Collins, 1993).;
n.a., “Charges Weighed for Parents Who Let Baby Die Untreated.” The New York Times. New
York, April 17, 1982, sec. 1: Baby Doe was a baby born in Bloomington, Indiana in 1982 with
Down’s Syndrome, esophageal atresia and a tracheoespohageal fistula. The latter two conditions
could be fixed via surgery that was withheld due to the judgment that the quality of life for an
infant with Down’s Syndrome did not warrant the correction of the life threatening congenital
conditions. Without the surgery, the infant died. The case eventually reached governmental
officials, particularly the Surgeon General at the time, C.E. Koop, and began national debate over
withholding lifesaving interventions and who could make those decisions. The case and
subsequent legislation is still controversial today.
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system is more complex than just the tool; we must ask questions of the social and
political influences that have an impact on why a worker/user makes decisions regarding
the tools he or she uses. This approach is derived from the secondary literature (addressed
below) in the history of technology, and offers a broader analysis beyond the machine
and user to understand wider socio-medical implications regarding the formation of
neonatal intensive care units and ultimately healthcare and nursing practice.
Technology and Technological Systems
When we speak of technology, we find ourselves faced with complex and diverse
understandings of the concept. Newspapers such as The New York Times include sections
on technology, and typically conceptualize it as machines and tools humans use such as
smartphones, computer software, and online social media sites.14 We use technological
terms to describe human characteristics when we describe friends, coworkers, and
colleagues - ‘She’s hardwired that way!’ Companies sell phones, cars, refrigerators, and
even clothing to us based on the unique technological qualities of each. Even scholars
vary in their nuanced approaches to the definitions and conceptualizations of what the
term ‘technology’ might mean and imply.
So how then do we approach technology? What exactly does it mean for
equipment when referencing the various tools that clinicians used in the healthcare setting. I
understand the concept is much broader and the term potentially limiting, but necessary for
consistency and flow for my audience.
14
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technology to be developed, changed, adopted, and used within societies and within
particular contexts? Historians of technology Weibe Bijker and John Law postulate, “Our
technologies mirror our societies. They reproduce and embody the complex interplay of
professional, technical, economic, and political factors.”15 Technology must not be
reduced to the artifact itself for it is always bound up in decisions; political, economic,
aesthetic, and theoretic decisions all impact why some artifacts become stable parts of
systems and others do not. In other words, technologies are shaped. The artifacts, as
much as the professional, economic, technical, and political contexts in which they are a
part, are the product of the decisions humans make for an infinite number of reasons.
Thus, to study the social history of a technology is to use the history of technology as a
lens to study why humans organize societies the ways they do. In order to do this,
decisions must be made to focus on particular key players (for example human actors as
well as contextual factors) in the story and we must be open to who those players might
be.16
Historians of technology Wiebe Bijker, Thomas Hughes, and Trevor Pinch
instituted a layered understanding of the conceptualization of technology that is rooted in

15

Wiebe E. Bijker and John Law, eds., Shaping Technology / Building Society: Studies in Sociotechnical
Change (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1994), 3.
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Wiebe E Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes, and Trevor Pinch, eds., The Social Construction of Technological
Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology (Cambridge, MA: The MIT
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Wajcman, eds., The Social Shaping of Technology, (New York: McGraw Hill Education/Open
University, 1999).
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contextual and social constructions of meaning.17 They began with the physical object or
artifact but built on the mere tool by recognizing the process of using a tool to create
something within social contexts. The tool requires knowledge regarding how to use it
and for what purpose. The user also utilizes the tool within a system of many tools and
ways of adopting and making decisions regarding the use of tools.18 Historian Thomas
Hughes suggested technology might also be understood broadly as both artifact and icon.
Its tangible characteristics symbolize larger constructs of social value and creativity.19 He
argued that we must understand it appropriately in a multifaceted way, and within the
context of the people and societies that shape and use it.20
As historian of technology Ruth Cowan suggested, this analysis can be very
complicated. Many different actors can be part of the process of technological
development and they can change over time.21 Each actor may even enter the process at
multiple points under different guises. This complication led her to suggest that the
historian view any study of technology from the vantage point of the user as a consumer

17

Ibid. Bijker, Hughes and Pinch, eds., The Social Construction of Technological Systems. Bijker, Hughes,
and Pinch are social historians of technology and each in his own right have written extensively on
the understanding of technology within the context of the societies and cultures that shaped it.
These authors collectively argued that technology was not an external source that exerts power to
shape people, but that technology is socially shaped by humans who participate in decisions based
on politics, economics, and culture.
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University of Chicago Press, 2005).

20

Ruth Schwartz Cowan, A Social History of American Technology (New York: Oxford University Press,
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– at what she labeled the consumption junction.22 But she was also careful to remind her
readers that within this multitude of possible actors, there may be important actors that
are silent and not obvious in the current consideration. The nurse, as an actor who is
generally overlooked in the secondary literature regarding the development of neonatal
intensive care units between 1955 and 1982, is a non-obvious user that we must consider
at the consumption junction where decisions about technology use are made. As Cowan
specified, the user can be present at multiple points in the process of technological
innovation, adoption, and change and this allows us to consider the nurse not only as a
user of the tools but also as a developer of the systems in which those tools were used.23
Historian of technology Harry Braverman urged other historians to consider that
“the technical is never considered purely in its internal relations, but in relation to the
worker.”24 Braverman used the model of machinery within a capitalist mode of
production that centralizes on the creation of a static product by a labor force. Insofar as a
22

The consumption junction is the point at which a user, in this case a consumer, interacts with a piece of
technology. She asserts that the process of contextualizing a piece of technology can be a very
complicated process. Many people are involved in a complex matrix of decisions. Her model, the
consumption junction, allows for a focal point around which to understand how to build the
system that contextualizes a piece of technology by focusing on the consumer and decisions that
are made at the point of use. She gives the example of the development of the stove and how
innovations in home building and social expectations of use affected the stove as people invented,
innovated, and used the object in everyday life. By focusing on how the stove was used by
consumers, she addresses the system from a particular vantage point.
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historian might consider technology to have a social role, that historian must carefully
consider the labor force that includes the worker. Braverman’s ideas about applying the
same notions to professional work as to factory work make sense in healthcare settings,
though differ from his model in key areas. For the purposes of my work, I will consider
Braverman’s “production system of linked machines to be conceived and redesigned as a
single, massive, integrated whole” to be a system of machines and tools used in intensive
care to be integrated into a single, massive, integrated intensive care unit.25 The nurse
works within this integrated technology, the unit itself, and both physically uses the
artifacts as well as contributes to the function and development of the technological
system known as the neonatal intensive care unit.26
Nurses and the Social Construction of Technological Systems
Nurses are key actors in the understanding of healthcare and technology because
they not only use the technologies but are also developers of the systems in which they
25

Ibid. Braverman. Labor and Monopoly Capital. 192.
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Braverman made the assumption that the machines are used in a continuous categorical process, namely
assembly lines, to produce consistent and static objects in large quantities. Braverman’s concept
fails to transfer to the nursing model in healthcare when we examine differences in the nature of
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and others use the tools. When considering the development of healthcare delivery and
the spaces in which that care is delivered, there are multiple approaches to placing the
nurse within the understanding of the broader context of the story. The discourse
between historians of nursing Margarete Sandelowski and Julie Fairman provides a point
of reference to begin questioning how nurses might be considered actors in the social
construction of technology. One way to frame the nurse as an actor is to understand her
within the nurse-machine dyad. Sandelowski argued that nurses used technology and
made decisions regarding its adoption and adaptation. 27, 28 The nurse-technology dyad
focuses on the nurse’s use of tools. Sandelowski defined technology as the “use of
material objects to achieve human ends.”29 Like David Edgerton, she framed her
approach to technology as the consideration of the everyday use of seemingly mundane
things.30 For Edgerton, the consideration of technology as ‘thing’ avoids the
consideration of technology as an independent force and refutes the idea of technological
determinism.31 Bijker, Hughes, Pinch, Cowan, and Fairman are correct that this idea is

27

Margaret Sandelowski, “‘Making the Best of Things’: Technology in American Nursing 1870-1940,”
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2000).
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too reductionist to appropriately examine technology historically; the relationships that
societies have with their technologies is a dynamic relationship in which people make
decisions regarding the use of technologies and are in turn affected by the technologies
they use. The street runs both ways.
Nurses should be considered key actors and Sandelowski correctly placed them as
users of tools in the historical study of medical technology; the relationship between
nursing and the artifacts they used to care for patients was dynamic. A simple tool did not
mean a simple way of performing a task with that tool; nurses adapted and creatively
used the tools at their disposal. But Sandelowski’s model was limited in its scope and,
through its own assumptions, undermined the creativity and ingenuity she ultimately
credited nurses with practicing. Her understanding of a user with only a limited tacit
relationship to her tools did not fully engage the layered understanding Bijker, Hughes,
Pinch, and Cowan formulated where the tool and user function within a system and
broader context.32 By limiting technological consideration to a nurse and the artifact,
Sandelowski lacked a multifaceted approach to the way nurses used and developed tools.
This approach failed to allow for exploration of social construction of technologies, the
consideration of the technological systems in which an artifact is a part, and the
possibility that nurses might use technologies to assert autonomy within a changing
socio-medical environment.33
Household Technology From The Open Hearth To The Microwave (New York: Basic Books,
1985).
32
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In contrast to Sandelowski’s focus on the functionality of the tools nurses use,
Fairman took a much broader approach to the consideration of the nurse-technology
relationship.34 Fairman agreed that nurses were users of artifacts, but she took
Sandelowski’s model one step further by asserting that, as users, the nurses had an impact
on the systems where they used their tools; thus in this way, the nurses became
developers of the systems. Fairman’s approach allowed for more complex questions and
investigation of nursing relationships to technology. She encouraged the exploration of
context focusing on the social construction of technologies and the multiple processes
that converge to understand why some technologies become stable parts of systems while
others do not. Fairman also suggested historians incorporate nurses into the
understanding of the development of the current technologically oriented system of
healthcare. According to Fairman, technology must be defined within the systems
approach. Technology is, at its simplest conception, a tool; but it also must be understood
as part of “a political, social, and economic process, influenced by gender, and
encompassing more than the individual nurse and a particular machine.” 35
Ruth Cowan’s analysis of household work demonstrated this idea well when she
assumed the need for contextualization in her analysis of the adoption of the household
utility system of indoor plumbing.36 The system itself was made up of more than just
running water, or a toilet, or even an indoor tub. Communities and their decisions
34

Julie Fairman. “Alternative Visions: The Nurse-Technology Relationship in the Context of the History of
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regarding the construction of houses, the development of sewer systems, the production
of sanitary fixtures, and the implementation of indoor plumbing inside the home required
social changes on a vast scale beyond the mere addition of one or two new ‘bathroom
tools.’ The understanding of technologies must acknowledge a complex matrix of
relationships are foundational to their definition – economic relationships, interpersonal
power relationships, political relationships, and ultimately the decisions bound up in
these relationships. Ethnographer and philosopher Annemarie Mol concisely stated this
point in her discussion of the analysis of symbolic interactionism in the social
interpretation of events. Like sociologists who analyze symbolic interactionism,
historians must “show that the thing doesn’t exist by itself, but depends on something
else…your object doesn’t rest on sure foundations...”37 but on the complex relationships
and decisions that are made around it.
In his examination of cardiac pacing, historian and cardiologist Jeffrey Kirk
reminded us that the development of this technology was about the process of pacing the
heart rather than on about the pacemaker itself. He focused on the tool only within an
understanding of what it could do for the patient when applied within knowledge and
social systems such as medical device manufacturing, governmental policies, and medical
understanding of cardiac disease and dysrhythmia.38 For Kirk, the study of pacemaker
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technology required a broad approach in which to consider how the tool was developed,
introduced for use, given social meaning, and eventually emerged as the pivotal tool in
the subspecialty of cardiac pacing. In order to approach such a broad consideration, Kirk
contextualized the physicians’ and surgeons’ decisions within the definitions of cardiac
diseases and the value of pharmacologic and electric treatment modalities that influenced
the process of pacing and ultimately the tool itself. By broadening his study of the
pacemaker within the study of a process of pacing, he addressed a complex group of
users and the ways their decisions converged to influence the development of the artifact.
By contrasting how the United States and France used incubators in the care of
premature infants between 1880 and 1922, physician and historian Jeffrey Baker aptly
showed how two medical and social cultures interpreted the same machine and made
decisions about its development and use based on their own cultural assumptions and
medical approaches to treatment. 39 He did not address how nurses specifically used the
machines or were involved in their development, but he framed the physicians as the
leading users and decision makers in this technological development. Based on their
medical assessments of premature infants, French obstetricians developed the machine to
prevent fatal hypothermia. In the United States pediatricians were the dominant physician
group making decisions about these machines and their use in caring for premature
infants in the United States. Based on their own medical and social values, American
pediatricians, together with nurses, used the incubator to treat hypothermia in premature
39
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infants who were brought to them after delivery and already suffering from severely low
body temperatures. The American pediatricians used the machine as a treatment device
rather than a prophylactic tool and did not have the same successes their French
counterparts did and thus the incubator fell out of favor in American medical circles for a
time.40
Baker argued that medical values combined with social approaches to newborn
infant care resulted in differing uses of the machines, and thus, though the two countries
used the machines with the same patient population and the same goal of saving lives,
their uses produced different results which in turn affected how they valued the machine
and continued to use it. By addressing the social, medical, and political contexts that
influenced the use of the incubator within each culture, Baker demonstrated the
complexity and interpretive flexibility we should apply when studying the history of
technology.
Baker did not directly address the nurse’s role in his analysis, but hints at the
nurse’s importance in the conclusion to his work. He briefly implied the nurse might not
necessarily have been at odds with the machine. He stated, “Nurses consolidated control
of the premature infant nursery. Their rise to power within this institution was notable,”
and he proceeded to suggest further research needs to be done.41 While his work is an
important example of the ways historians may analyze technologies and their change over
time, he limited his actors to the masculine physicians, and thus indirectly institutes a
40
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gendered approach in his work. Ultimately, the social construction of the technology
centers on the connection between technology and its user that is also affected by
gendered, racial, and class based understandings of who used the tool. Baker seemed to
suggest it was men who used the incubators and does not address the female nurses who
cared for the infants. If we are to write nurses into the history of technology and the
system of neonatal intensive care, what role should they play?42
Medical historian Charles Rosenberg argued that nurses made the hospitals and
medical practices possible, but historians and nurses Julie Fairman and Pat D’Antonio
took Rosenberg’s conclusions one step farther. They argued nursing should not be a
subset of medical history but a lens in and of itself; by using nursing as a lens, historians
can shed new light on “personal, political, public, and private activities that constitute
medical experiences.”43 For D’Antonio and Fairman, examining history by considering
nurses as key participants in systems of care provides a different story. This lens allows
for the possibility of patient experience as critical to the narrative, the consideration of
what it took to make new technologies work for the patients, and keeps what D’Antonio
and Fairman call the ‘human element’ part of the story.44 By telling the story of the
development of NICUs from the point of intersection of the history of nursing,
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technology, and children’s healthcare, a different story – perhaps a previously untold
story – might unfold.
Pediatrics and Age as an Analytical Lens
In this study I will place age as an important lens of analysis. Historians
Alexandra Minna and Howard Markel suggest “whether revered or reviled, those who
have provided medical care to children have always been involved in social, political, and
cultural questions beyond the domain of the sickbed, clinic, and hospital.”45 For Stern and
Markel, the history of children is a means to examine American society and analyze
broader social and cultural concepts, institutions, and medical advances; thus age must be
a lens by which we engage the historical data.
Historians Cynthia Connolly, Janet Golden, and Benjamin Schneider argued that
we must differentiate between adult and pediatric medical history to adequately analyze
changes in the development and delivery of healthcare over time. These authors
examined the introduction of sulfonamides using Syndenham Hospital as a case study to
illustrate how the development of pharmaceutical sulfa drugs affected children’s
healthcare. They argued that the development and provision of treatment for
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meningococcal meningitis and bacterial pneumonia included challenges to both
physicians and nurses that were unique to the patient populations they served.46
Their analysis challenged the assumption that nurses worked the same way with
different patient populations, were involved in the same ways with the development of
systems of care, and played the same rolls across healthcare populations. Julie Fairman
and Joan Lynaugh thoroughly demonstrated an analysis of the ways in which nurses
actively participated in the development of the technological systems of intensive care,
but they focused on analysis on nurses who cared for adult populations. 47 In my work, I
will consider age as an analytical lens through which I might discover the ways in which
nurses who worked with pediatric patients, specifically with the neonatal patient
population, might have faced unique challenges in their involvement of technological
systems to care for their patients. This will challenge the current literature to think about
nurses and technological systems more specifically, as my work will focus on ways in
which nurses work with particular patient populations categorized by age.
In her work A Sound Mind for the Child’s Body: The mental health of children
and youth, Kathleen Jones used the history of children’s healthcare as a way to examine
how society viewed mental health, structured a system to deliver care to mental health
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patients, and how we define and place value on particular diseases. 48 Jones used age as a
lens to show how social and medical definitions of mental illness were a product of
culture in particular times and places. By looking specifically at children, she argued that
we know more about children’s minds and their emotional needs now than we did in the
past and that we often fail to consider how our social structures and cultural values affect
our definitions of mental disorders in children. Jones could only make the claims she did
by examining children as a particular patient population and recognizing how children,
their health, and their history might be different from their adult counterparts; this type of
analysis broadens the kinds of questions we can ask of the data and gives us a better
picture of the unique ways care is delivered to particular patient populations.
Historian Heather Munro Prescott gave a window into historical analysis of
healthcare delivery to a particular population in her work on the history of adolescent
medicine.49 Prescott argued that the history and sociology of adolescent medicine as a
specialty reflected its parent specialty, pediatrics. The existence of adolescent medicine
as a specialty devoted to an age group, rather than a medical disease process or particular
technology, set it apart with a low degree of ‘functional autonomy’ insofar as it existed
without encroachment on or by other medical specialties. She analyzed the changing
approaches to adolescents as an age group and the subsequent orientations and growth of
adolescent medicine reflected changing perceptions about adolescents throughout the 20th
48
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century. Prescott demonstrated how adolescent medicine has been and continues to be
shaped by adult attitudes toward adolescents and the roles they play in American
society.50 Her recognition of the unique qualities of age-related sub-specialization within
pediatrics allowed for much more nuanced analysis of particular healthcare and social
trends. As historians move forward with studying children’s healthcare, these kinds of
nuances and more complex understandings of precisely who we are talking about when
we use terminology related to childhood need to be applied.
I propose to center my work considering age an important aspect to my data
analysis. While Connolly, Markel and Stern, and Jones made an excellent case for the
need to consider children as an analytical category to approach differentiating age groups,
they group all children together without acknowledging the ways that children might be
broken down into more nuanced groups. We should consider our analysis of infants the
same ways Prescott considers adolescents. In what ways might these age groups, both
pediatric subsets, be similar, and in what ways might our analysis of these groups need to
differ? Historians such as Martin Pernick and Elizabeth Ann Reedy, who write about
infants exclusively, did not contextualize the patient populations within the larger context
of pediatric history in the same ways other historians who deal with children do. Their
method may be for much more complex reasons than simply age, but does suggests that
analysis of newborns historically may require the same kind of unique considerations that
historians of children argue differentiate histories of adults versus children. Newborns, or
neonates, are considered to be children in many ways and broadly speaking, but they do
50
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differ drastically from their older counterparts.51 As both the data and scholarly literature
delineate the newborn from the general pediatric population, my work will take into
account how this separation might be important considering them as overlapping, but in
some cases distinct, categories. Thus, my work will not necessarily provide a complete
context of the neonatal population within the broader history of pediatrics, but I will
position my analysis to a certain extent in relation to the nuanced ways newborns
benefitted from broader trends in children’s healthcare but remained unique.52
Literature Review of the Histories of Neonatal Intensive Care
Historians of nursing focus on the ways in which nurses adapted and negotiated
their roles and skills within the changing environments of hospitals and healthcare in the
United States. Julie Fairman and Joan Lynaugh argued that nurses adopted new
knowledge and technologies into their practice during the development of adult intensive
care units (ICUs) in the 1950s and 1960s.53 Nurses actively adapted to a changing
healthcare environment, changes in expectations of ability to address more complex
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needs, and the need for more knowledgeable and skilled clinicians.54 Fairman and
Lynaugh argued nurses functioned in intensive care units and played a role in the
definition and form of care they delivered, but Fairman and Lynaugh’s work focused on
nurses who worked with adult patient populations leaving a gap in the consideration of
the ways the role of neonatal nurses might have been similar or different to their adult
counterparts.
Physician historians comprise the majority of authors who have written about the
development of neonatal medicine, intensive care, and the units where it was delivered.
Some histories generally present the development of newborn intensive care as a
chronological history while others focus on technological advances and disease
processes. Thomas Cone who wrote The History of the Care and Feeding of the
Premature Infant combined the two approaches by breaking down his historical analysis
into general time periods; he then focused on specific diseases and medical issues as well
as technological advances predominantly between 1945 and the late 1970s.55 While his
analysis was broad in scope, he focused on events and machines. Cone ignored the social
contexts and healthcare providers who played key roles in the development and
advancement of newborn medicine. While his work is important to understanding an
overall arch in the trends of what would eventually be labeled neonatal medicine and the
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development of intensive care during the 20th century, it did not address the units as
systems in which decisions were made by individuals within social and medical contexts
to develop and progress the subspecialty of neonatology.
In contrast, historian and physician Murdina Desmond utilized a social history in
her work Newborn Medicine and Society.56 Her history focused on a similar time period
as Cone, but she contextualized the development of neonatal intensive care within the
social trends and cultural frameworks of American society and medicine. She oriented
her work on the physician as a contributing force in the early units, but did not address
the nurse in her analysis as a potential actor within a changing healthcare system and
increasingly technological environments. In one sense she addressed the social context in
which the neonatal intensive care unit as a system could be examined, but overlooked a
key factor by omitting the nurses and their role in the stabilization of the unit as a system.
Using yet another approach, William Silverman wove a thorough and fascinating
account of a particular period in the development of neonatal care by focusing on a
particular disease. He focused on the epidemic of Retrolental Fibroplasia in his work
Retrolental Fibroplasia: A Modern Parable.57 Silverman showed how the focus on a
particular disease contributed to a shift in focus on research, changes in medical care, the
development of clinical trials, the power and autonomy of those who delivered care to
premature infants, and the organization of units themselves between 1950 and the 1970s.
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He considered the social influences and examined a wide range of decisions that were
made by many different actors in the process of technological development in respiratory
care and changes to medical treatment during this time period. Silverman’s approach
allowed for a complex web of actors, decisions, and possibilities, but he was a physician
during this time period and consequently his history was physician centric. Though he
commented occasionally on the presence of nurses, his work did not consider the nurses
as important specifically to the adoption of technologies and the development of the units
where newborn critical care developed. He shaped his analysis as a physician who
participated in the events and his time period of analysis.
Authors such as Anne Jorgenson58 and Alistair Philip59 authored articles that
organized the general information regarding the progression of newborn medicine and the
development of intensive care for neonates in the United States. While their articles are
highly informative, they lack a deeper analysis of social trends, examinations of how
gender, race, and class might have played out in the larger story of neonatal medicine.
They do not address nursing and the complex and varied decisions and events that might
be examined through a more historic methodology rather than a clinical timeline
approach.
Physician historians with years of clinical background generally focused on the
mistakes and and times in which technological developments and orientations to patient
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care proved to do more harm than good. 60 While we currently continue to ask questions
about how we should use technology and knowledge in patient care, this is a question we
can specifically ask of neonatal medical history. It is worth discussion, but this approach
must only be a piece of a larger examination of neonatal history. Authors such as
historian Alex Robertson and historian and physician Jeffrey Baker published histories
that focused on the mistakes that have been made and the lessons that need to be learned
from failures over the past century. They spoke of the ways that technology, such as the
incubator, was not associated with decreases in infant mortality as anticipated by its
initial users; Robertson and Baker suggested the possible dangers of changing practice
guidelines in tandem with advances in technology without understanding the possible
adverse consequences that might later arise.61 This is an important function of history,
but fails to acknowledge more holistically the aspects of the system that did work, and
how we might understand both the ‘errors’ and the successes as we seek to make
decisions and move forward with neonatal intensive care policy and practice.
Robertson authored a series of articles that addressed how approaches to care of
sick newborns during the 20th changed: the ‘hands-off’ years, the heroic years, and the
60
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experienced years.62 These categorizations seem progressive, but his work highlighted the
ways newborn medicine experienced unintentional, and perhaps unavoidable, errors that
were influenced by historical developments in medicine and technology; he suggested
that the errors are a way of examining unique points in medical history.
These histories focused on definitive understandings of success and failure and
ignore the voices of nurses. The experiences of nurses who delivered round-the-clock
care to the families and their infants provide a glimpse into the NICU story not accessible
via other lenses. By examining what these nurses did, how they provided care, and the
roles they played in the process, we can see the relationships between disease process,
machines, and their broader contexts in different ways. The story of neonatal intensive
care must be more comprehensive than machines and diseases. It must also encompass
larger social, political, and economic frameworks. Historical analysis must allow for the
nurses to be considered key actors in the decisions regarding the formation of the units as
well as identify them as both individuals and a group of people who had dynamic
relationships with the technologies, healthcare systems, and ultimately the nursing care
they delivered to the patients and their families.
Perhaps the most relevant literature to the nursing role in the development of
neonatal intensive care has been written by nursing historian Elizabeth Anne Reedy. Her
dissertation described the development of premature infant care between 1920 and 1940.
She persuasively argued that nurses were involved in the use of the machines and
62
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technologies used on premature infant care during this time period and that nurses were
necessary to the care of the premature infant population as that care developed during the
early decades of the 20th century. For Reedy nurses participated in theses new premature
infant units, but she did not include them as influencers of the system themselves. While
her work took a different angle and time period of focus than I propose, it is important for
understanding in what ways nurses were involved in the care of premature infants in early
premature infant units. I will take her research a step further by expanding, not only on
her approach to the data, but also in the time frame by examining the decades following
her time period of interest. Her work predates the development of NICUs and, though it
is groundbreaking, I will show how her argument regarding the importance of nursing in
the development of premature infant care also holds true beyond her time period of focus.
The kind of influence nursing had on premature infant units and the development of
premature infant care extended into the context of the development of the specialty of
neonatal medicine and neonatal intensive care units in the 1960s and 1970s.63
Overall, what these historical analyses lack is a focus on the nurse as an important
actor in the development of a larger system of acute medical care for the newborn infant,
or neonatal population. Many of these authors, physicians who lived through some of the
time periods of analysis, highlighted the mistakes and failures that occurred in each
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period.64 Others failed to tie the broader picture together and see how the early years of
the 20th century provide a very poignant foundation for the care that developed in the
1950s and 1960s; these histories are written to communicate the big moments and
important events and people over the course of time but fail to examine the development
of neonatal intensive care as a specific and complex technological system. They lack an
in-depth analysis of the kinds of healthcare providers that developed the care given, and
whose roles were developed within the system that arose as a result of social and
technological advances.
Physicians wrote histories through their own lenses and thus put themselves as
key actors, failing to consider how nurses might have played important roles in the
development of NICUs in the United States during the 20th century. This is one way of
examining NICU history. In many ways this approach limits their analysis but it also
provides insight regarding how they viewed the development of this specialty and their
role in it, as well as how they viewed other important historical actors and the dominance
of medicine and science. Their work can be considered data that becomes both a primary
as well as a secondary source depending on how we choose to engage it. While their
accounts should be critiqued as secondary sources that give accounts and analysis of a
particular historical event, their work may also be analyzed as primary sources written by
people who wish to communicate a story based on how they remember a story or event.
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Significance of this work
Nurses’ accounts need to be combined with the analysis we already have to
reframe the and enrich our understanding of how NICUs developed. While the history of
the development of neonatal intensive care units is scarce in the scholarly literature, this
narrative is important for us to understand as we continue to progress in with neonatal
intensive care. This story informs more than just our considerations for acute care for
newborns. This work is significant because it speaks to our understanding of how and
why we allocate resources to particular patient populations and how we develop and
adopt technologies for those populations that we value. This work is significant because
we continue to invest incredible financial resources in newborn medicine and intensive
are amidst current debates surrounding high healthcare expenditures today; this work is
an excellent example of how hospitals and local governments allocated resources and
organized care to provide highly costly care to highly valued newborns. The ways nurses
participated in the formation of NICUs in the 1960s and 1970s is an excellent case study
to challenge how we currently think about nurses today who comprise the largest single
workforce in our contemporary healthcare system. Thus, my questions particularly focus
on nursing’s role in the development of NICUs and their transition from previous models
of care, developed in premature infant units, helps us understand broader themes
regarding healthcare, nursing and technology, and resource allocation for particular
populations.
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A Tale of Two Units
As there has been little work done examining the development of neonatal intensive care
in the United States this work must begin more particularized before I broaden scope. For
the purposes of this dissertation, I have chosen to develop a case study comparison
between two particular hospitals that have many similarities and developed around the
same time period. Using hospital archives, oral histories, and newspapers and city
publications from the Children’s Hospital of Boston and the Children’s Hospital of
Philadelphia, I will tell the story of these two units who shared characteristics as well
differed in key points. By comparing and contrasting these two units, my analysis will
note similarities and differences and begin to formulate themes as I construct the story
within a broader national context of sick newborn healthcare and developing trends
related to resource allocation and social values.
The use of case studies in the historical research allows for in depth examination
of change over time in a particular time period and place. While this approach might not
allow for broad generalizations, it does allow for in depth analysis. Historians build the
answers to their questions by discovering, and perhaps creating, context and developing
an understanding of how that context shapes particular understandings of growth and
development in a focused way. By using these separate institutions, I am able to dive into
particular cases as well as push this work forward and understand further possible
trajectories that will be pursued as I grow and expand this research. This dissertation is
only the beginning and requires definite boundaries.
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I will start by outlining the ways newborns were delineated as a unique patient
population in need of resources tracing that progression from the Progressive Era through
the post war years when premature infant units, and later NICUs, were established. I will
then argue that the social value and medical understanding of the newborn as a unique
patient in need of particular resources and care influenced the formation of spaces where
that care could be delivered. My third chapter will focus on the ways NICU nurses
functioned in the early NICUs and participated in the care of newborns requiring
advanced ventilator support before and during a time when mechanical ventilation was
still being developed. I begin by articulating briefly some of the aspects of care nurses
who practiced in premature infant units as a foundation for understanding how NICU
nurses built on those models of care (as well as others) in their practice.
The fourth and fifth chapters hone in on two units that formed at the Children’s
Hospital of Philadelphia and the Children’s Hospital of Boston. The stories of these units
illustrate the importance of recognizing how these units did not form out nowhere, but
were built on established models of care, and how hospital administrators and leaders
specifically made decisions too allocate resources for sick newborns, and how the early
units met the needs of broader newborn populations than just premature infants as nurses
continued to work at the bedside and participate in patient care. My last chapter will bring
this context and these stories together for synthetic analysis. I will also suggest both
limitations to this research as well as suggestions regarding how this work has provided a
foundation to move forward as a scholar.
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Chapter 2:

Puny waifs as untold treasures:
The value of newborn patient populations as a conceptual foundation
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Puny waifs as untold treasures:
The value of newborn patient populations as a conceptual foundation
Newborns, or neonates, are considered to be children in many ways, but they do
differ drastically from their older counterparts and thus must be understood as unique in
order to understand the nuanced ways the consideration of newborns as unique influences
how we analyze nurses’ role in the formation of technological systems. I will use the lens
adopted by historians of children’s healthcare to consider newborns as a subset of the
pediatric population. Over the course of the 20th century, the delineation of newborns as a
distinctive patient population allowed for the rise of premature infants as a subset of sick
newborns that, in turn, laid important foundations for the ways newborns broadly
speaking received care in the early neonatal intensive care units.
Newborns as unique patients valued by society and in need for particularized
medical and nursing care is a constant theme throughout the 20th century, but how
newborns are valued changes in nuanced ways between the Progressive Era into the early
1960s when NICUs begin to appear in hospitals. The newborn emerges as a unique and
separate entity from children at the turn of the century and into the heyday of the
Progressive Era’s child saving oriented years. By the 1920s, premature infants were
considered a particular subset of newborns for whom mortality rates continued to remain
high despite decreases in infant mortality related to other causes. By the post-WWII years
premature infants constituted a population with their own units and nursing staff. Such
recognition of newborns (and subsequently premature infants) reflected particular
nuances in the ways the child saving mentalities begun in the Progressive Era grew and
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changed throughout the 20th century. In this chapter, I will provide a context for the
delineation of newborns as a particular population of children affected by the foci on
‘child saving’ begun during the Progressive Era. I argue that beginning in the Progressive
Era, newborns emerged as a unique population for whom social value manifested in
Progressive Era activism that impacted the reduction of infant mortality rates. Amidst the
decreases in infant mortality statistics, premature infants emerged as a subset of
newborns that required additional resources and social and medical infrastructures to
reduce mortality rates unique to them. Out of the framework of care for premature infants
arose practices and policies that were later adapted for newborns broadly, including
surgical newborn patients and newborns requiring intensive skilled care.
Newborns are needed: The value of newborns and the Progressive Era movement
Premature infants did not suddenly emerge as a unique patient population. “Child
saving” programs were established as early as the 1850s, and Progressive Era reform
continued focusing such programs (as part of broader child welfare programming) with
initiatives that pinpointed newborns as a valued population worthy of investment and
resources. Progressive Era reformers incorporated their efforts into a series of campaigns
aimed at improving health, education, and urban living conditions more broadly as
impetus for child saving programs grew.65 Historian Richard Meckel argues Progressive
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Era reformers recognized that a healthy and functioning society required healthy children
to grow into functioning and contributing adults. 66 During this time, “children became
the symbol of a resurgent reform spirit, the magnet that pulled a diverse collection of
causes and their champions into a loose, informal – but very effective – coalition.”67
While children’s health and welfare became highly valued and the focal point for many
aspects of social change at the turn of the century, some reformers and activists chose to
focus particularly on the plight of newborns as a further extension of the child saving
programs of the time. Though statistics did not carry the reliability they have today due to
incomplete reporting and even lack of reporting in areas of the country, infant mortality
was high and the reformers knew they needed to decrease the numbers of infants and
newborns dying.
Attendees at the American Association for the Study and Prevention of Infant
Mortality’s (AASPIM) first meeting in 1910 recognized the need to focus on newborns
specifically. Dr. Abraham Jacobi, the father of American Pediatrics, addressed his fellow
physicians:
The watchfulness of a parent over a child is not more justified than the
watchfulness of society over its members…I want no…newborn babies to be lost
Public Health Reform and the Prevention of Infant Mortality, 1850-1929 (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1990).
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that can be saved, And many, most of them, can now be saved. To give up on the
newborn baby merely because it seems feeble and uncompromising is
preposterous. Kant, Goeth, and Helmholtz were puny waifs whose lives were
despaired of. Being saved, they added untold treasures to the intellectual capital of
the human race.68,69
Jacobi’s address followed an opening session entitled “Duty of a Nation to its Potential
Citizens” that identified newborns, especially those born requiring extra support, as
citizens worthy of resources and investment. While children grew to be healthy adults,
healthy babies were needed to grow healthy children and garnered their own focus and
value as potential citizens should they survive the newborn period that some considered
the most dangerous period of life.70
The first president of the AASPIM, physician J.H. Mason Knox, initially
proposed the collection of accurate data as the first step to attaining preventative welfare
to decrease infant mortality. The data pointed to infantile diarrhea, death due to disease
and poor hygiene, and prematurity as some of the highest causes of mortality. During the
organization’s early years, the AASPIM advised that reform activity focus on addressing
68
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infantile diarrhea, hygiene, and disease prevention as they believed they could make a
difference in these areas though they ended up pointing to infants and children rather than
neonates.
While improving children’s health stood as a major rallying point for Progressive
activists, Jacobi urged the medical community to remember the unique place newborn
infants occupied in medicine and social value: “Your dealings are not with children but
with infants; not with infants only but with the newborn that is just terminating his
embryonic and fetal development…”71 Newborn infant mortality72 did overlap with
broader children’s issues and reaped the rewards of the Progressive activists’ milk
campaigns and maternal education programs,73 but newborns within the first few weeks
of life existed as another subset of the general pediatric population. Healthy newborns
that survived the first few weeks of life became a litmus test for national strength and,
“conservation of natural resources naturally [began] with the protection of infancy.”74
Most of the attention on curbing infant mortality stressed maternal education and
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environmental sanitation75 and newborn issues drew the focus of a few important
reformers and activists such as Jacobi.
As the AASIM began their quest to determine the scope of the problem of infant
mortality in 1910, The Children’s Bureau began by needing to attain appropriate and
reliable statistics of newborn and infant mortality rates. As the medical community and
activists shifted their efforts to address prematurity as a significant contributor to
mortality rates the need to define and attain reliable statistics became a significant issue.
Prematurity needed to be more precisely defined for the national reported numbers to be
trusted. Though both national statistics (as they were reported)76 and social publications
at the turn of the century recognized prematurity as a cause of infant mortality, it was far
less understood than other major causes of death in newborns and infants.77 Physicians
and public health activists did not yet readily understand prematurity – it’s causes and
complications - and thus standards of practice and consistent ways to measure the
numbers of premature infants did not exist at that time.78 Some physicians began to
observe infants in tandem with the new incubator technology introduced to the United
States in the late 19th century, but these doctors and their published observations were the
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exception at this time, not the norm.79 Incubator technology had yet to be used to greatest
effect in the United States and very little progress was made for premature newborns
during this time period.80 By 1910, infant mortality related to prematurity had yet to gain
significant footing, as the focus remained strong on children and post-neonatal infants
into the war years; but even though premature infants as a subset of newborns might not
have yet been center-stage, the recognition of a need to focus on the newborn separately
from older infants and children broadly speaking was ingrained into medical and social
values in the years leading to the First World War.
With the invention of the incubator and subsequent incubator baby stations that
appeared in World’s Fairs during the early years of the 20th century, both social
fascination and hope in the changing survival rates of premature infants when they
received particular care strengthened the hope that these infants could be saved.
According to historian Jeffrey Baker, incubator technology in the United States did not
immediately change medical outcomes for infants as American physicians did not use
them as they had been intended to be used, but medical fervor surrounding incubator
technology still continued to progress and gained traction in later years leading up to
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1920.81 From as early as the 1908 national statistics analysis, experts estimated that 40
out of every 100 deaths related to premature births could be prevented thus reflecting a
significant hope that death rates related to prematurity could be significantly changed.
Though hope might have been present, healthcare workers and the medical community
still had a great deal to learn about prematurity, its causes, and how to treat common
complications that occurred when babies entered the world too soon.
Newborns as “National Assets”: The War Years and Infant Mortality
During the early years of the 20th century, social activists, healthcare workers, and
government leaders banded together to decrease the incredibly high infant mortality rates
that plagued the nation.82 As the country entered World War I, the nation’s focus on
curbing infant mortality became even more important as broad social movements
reflected more intensified value of newborns, infants, and children. In his book, Save the
Babies, historian Richard Meckel argued that the casualties of World War I heightened
American concern for the high infant mortality rates. By 1920, the reported neonatal
mortality rate was 41.5 per 1000 live births, a number considered deplorable by
government and healthcare leaders.83 The value of infants was reinforced when, in 1921,
President Warren G. Harding signed the Sheppard Towner Maternal and Infancy
81
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Protection Act (known as the Sheppard-Towner Act) that allocated federal funds to states
for maternal-child health activities dedicated to lowering the incredibly high mortality
rates. Though states’ rights and government intrusion in private medical practices
permeated debate over the law, the Act nonetheless proved to be a major landmark in the
American infant welfare movement. With the passing of the Sheppard-Towner Act, the
government became actively involved in maternal and infant care.84
Like the initiatives of the AASPIM just a decade earlier, this piece of legislation
chose to focus more intensely on maternal education and access to healthcare for mothers
and infants. The Act provided public health care in the form of public primary care
clinics and encouraged education for mothers about how to best care for their babies and
children. Nursing historian Beth Anne Reedy notes that though the Sheppard-Towner Act
contributed great strides in reducing infant mortality it did not directly affect the plight of
premature infants. The Act’s programs lowered many post-neonatal causes of infant
mortality and illuminated the reported higher rates of prematurity, as those rates changed
far less drastically during this time period.85
Nonetheless infant mortality did decline quite rapidly due to better sanitation,
widespread milk campaigns, and maternal education.86 General newborn mortality rates
did drop making the slower or stagnant mortality rates of premature infants more
compelling. While infant mortality overall decreased, premature births and the need for
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intense care for those infants born prematurely declined at a much less drastic rate. The
Children’s Bureau, one of the fastest growing federal public health agencies during the
first half of the 20th century, administered federal matching grants for maternal and child
health as part of the initiative to decrease infant mortality rates as part of Social Security
Act’s Title V passed in 1935.87 With a significant decreases in mortality related to
infantile diarrhea and better nutrition for infants, prematurity moved up the list as
reformers and healthcare activists shifted to allocate resources to premature infants. The
Children’s Bureau’s grant matching contributed to local initiatives to open units where
premature infants could receive care in hospitals as early as the 1920s.88 Units called
premature infant units opened in many hospitals across the country as larger, betterfunded hospitals could establish them.
“Child-saving”: Premature infants as a focal point
As reform movements related to maternal, infant, and children’s health continued
to improve quality of life for women and children across the country, newborns did
benefitted from such generalized efforts. But reform movements were not the only
driving force behind the recognition of premature infants as a particular patient
population; the intersection of child saving reforms, the shift from giving birth at home to
giving birth in hospitals, increase trust in and use of incubator technology, and the quest
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for a clearer understanding of the scope of prematurity contributed to the premature
infant as a distinct patient population for whom the formation of specialized care and the
creation of unique spaces where that care could be delivered formed.89
A perfect storm: Child-saving reform, technology, hospitals, and premature birth
Premature infants gained a footing as a medically unique newborn patient
population in need of particularized care and resources by the mid-1930s.90 Nursing
historian Elizabeth Ann Reedy argues that premature infants received increased attention
medically because of a combination of technological advances and public awareness of
the number of premature births. While other causes of infant mortality decreased, infant
mortality related to prematurity remained constant and became more of a focal point.
Reedy shows how the lay press contributed to increased interest in the premature infant
by publishing articles that described the premature infant and lauded the types of hospital
based care given during the time. Premature infants emerged as a particular facet of a
continued and nuanced value of children and newborns. The emergence of incubator
technology, increased public awareness, the shift to in hospital birthing processes, and the
push to develop national definitions of prematurity all coincided with the creation of
premature infant units as spaces and thus to the focus on premature infants as a separate
patient population of newborns in need of such space and particularized care.
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Meckel argued the infant mortality movement during the early decades of the 20th
century was in reality a white middle-class infant mortality movement.1 While
prematurity did not take center stage in the Progressive Era activists movements to lower
infant morality, any push to curb newborn deaths, including those related to prematurity,
would likely have also been a push to save elite white middle class newborns infants as
well. Those who could not afford or did not have access to incubator technology or
specialized care, such as the poor or those who fell into certain racial groups, probably
followed early traditional care techniques related to keeping the infants warm and hoping
for the best.
Perhaps one of the biggest medical shifts of the 20th century was the transition of
the birthing process from home settings into hospitals that began in the 1920s. With this
transference of the mother and her baby into the hospital for delivery came a much higher
population of newborns in hospitals. This also meant that newborns requiring extra
support and attention were already at the hospital among physicians and nurses who had
the potential to deliver such care. Certain larger hospitals grouped premature infants
together in separate units from their general newborn nurseries. As early as 1902,
physician Joseph DeLee published general care guidelines already in place at the Chicago
Lying-In Hospital. Such gathering of patients constituted the first time American
hospitals had delineated spaces for sick infants separate from newborn nurseries where
healthy babies received care.91 During this time period units in hospitals were rare. While
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DeLee’s guidelines reflect a vein of medical discourse surrounding premature infant care,
premature infant units did not become widespread for another two decades, until the shift
of birth into the hospital setting.
Premature infant care involved more than just more mothers and premature
infants in the hospital setting. The incubator’s invention and subsequent adoption into use
drastically affected the premature infant survival rates. Historian Jeffrey Baker identifies
the incubator as a technology that aided physicians and nurses in keeping premature
infants warm and, when used appropriately, was an invaluable tool. Though the
equipment did not initially find favor with American pediatricians, the dominant medical
group initially using the incubator in this country, physicians worked diligently to
determine how to incorporate incubator technology into general practice and eventually
learned to use it effectively.92
While premature infant units created spaces where any infant born prematurely
could receive care, the concept of prematurity and who was classified to receive care in
these units changed and developed over the following decades as premature infants
garnered increasing attention from both public and medical circles. Debates related to the
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classification of prematurity reflected continuity in the value of infants and children and
the search for a better understanding of the scope of prematurity.
By 1935, the reported statistics for morbidity and mortality related to prematurity
showed a decrease as reported at the fifth annual meeting for the American Academy of
Pediatrics.93 Though these findings initially seemed encouraging, physicians such as
premature infant specialist Ethel Dunham remained skeptical. Other experts present such
as physicians Julius Hess, Clifford Stewart, and Emmett Holt understood the dangers to
infants that came with prematurity. Dunham believed that better delineation of the
definition of prematurity could provide more accurate statistics that could thus be used to
better define and describe the scope of this pressing problem, and ultimately be used to
combat the high mortality rates associated with these specific newborns.94 Dunham
presented her concern,
…we are not all really aware of what a problem [prematurity] is. The reduction of
mortality from prematurity is of the utmost importance in the reduction of the
high rate of neonatal mortality…reports from hospitals…differ widely. The
differences may be attributed in part to variability in criteria for the diagnosis of
prematurity, in part to the differences in the periods of observation at the end of
which the report is made, and in part to the numbers of infants in high or low
weight groups.95
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The concept of prematurity did not hinge on gestation as the defining point for all
physicians, and weight was the most generally used delineation for premature infant care
prior to the 1940s and a focal point for debate among physicians and researchers.
Dunham referenced a report published by a German researcher Dr. A. Ylppo in 1919 that
delineated prematurity as any infant weighing <2500 grams, and suggested this
classification be established for their purposes of definition.96 Not all physicians in the
United States used weight. Physicians such as Joseph DeLee and Julius Hess published
definitions of prematurity in the early 1920s that used gestational age to delineate
premature infants from full term infants97 citing premature infants as those, “born three
weeks or more before the usual termination of pregnancy.”98 While many physicians
accepted Hess and DeLee’s definitions, not all of them considered gestation as sound as
the ability to scientifically determine gestation resulted in the reliance on maternal
reporting. Some physicians and researchers used physical examination as well as weight
as considerations for grouping of premature infants at a time when no national universal
definition was available. Overall, the parameters of prematurity varied drastically, but at
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their fifth annual conference the American Academy of Pediatrics passed a resolution to
define prematurity by weight in attempts to gather better morbidity and mortality data.99
During the Progressive Era the foundation for the newborn as a separate patient
population arose as one facet of the ‘child saving’ mentality as the push for healthy
children garnered incredible focus and resources from activists and healthcare reformers.
The value of children, and particularly newborns, continued into the post-war years.
While premature infants began to receive particular attention prior to World War II,
interest in this population group gained significant momentum with the advances in
technology and medicine after the war. By the post-WWII era, premature infants were a
focal point in the application of technology and medicine and the ways families valued
saving sick newborns as an extension of continued child-saving values. These childsaving values continued past the Progressive Era and into the post-war years, but
presented in different ways as the value of newborns and children changed in nuanced
ways.
Sick newborns and the era of the ‘baby boom ideology’
The prosperity of post-war American society and the focus on healthy families
and subsequently health children to combat the threat of communism continued to
provide a fertile context for a more focused attempt to continue to save the babies. Like
the call to concentrate on newborns as a particular patient population who needed support
and resources begun during the Progressive Era, premature infants also garnered
99
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significant attention in the post-war era. While Jacobi and Progressive Era reformers
chose to focus on newborns particularly, they lacked the medical knowledge and
equipment to significantly change mortality rates of premature infants. As children
became the focal point for the post-war nuclear family, physicians and public health
workers in the 1950s chose to continue to focus on premature infants as a particular
newborn patient population.
“A child centered character:” The social value of the newborn population
With the end of World War II in 1945, American soldiers returned home to the
United States, their wives, and their families. Subsequently the American birth rate
increased during the post war years eventually resulting in what would later be labeled as
the great ‘baby boom.’ The birth rate not only rose in all social groups, but it rose across
all ages of women. According to historian Elaine Tyler May, “what made the baby boom
happen was that everyone was doing it [having babies] – and at the same time.“100 The
rising birthrate was more than a demographic phenomenon; it reflected the widespread
social belief that having children led to personal fulfillment and that parenthood and
healthy children were the route to happiness and personal fulfillment as a social and
nationalistic ideology. Historian Marilyn Irvin Holt argues the importance of child health
reform and that, “having children was an affirmation of life after the terrible destruction
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of the war.”101 What May refers to as the ‘baby boom ideology’ permeated Hollywood,
political culture, and prescriptive literature. The baby boom ideology combined with the
post war victory to contribute a sense that America was making great technological
strides coming out of the world wars. The general prosperity contributed to a
reorientation back on the focus of saving babies, and thus producing healthy children and
eventually healthy and robust American adults. Thus the concept of the ‘nuclear family’
as a bulwark against Communism became a foundation to the American psyche.
The maternal child and infant bond became a more intense focus in both child
rearing and medical diagnosis, as reflected in popular publications such as Dr. Spock’s
Common Sense Book of Baby and Child Care.102, 103 Hollywood reflected society’s value
of family and the importance of children in films such as Cheaper by the Dozen
(1950),104 a story of a family who faces the adventures of life in a house with twelve
children, Disney’s tale of a young boy who was torn between never growing up and the
need for a mother (family) in Peter Pan (1953),105 and Bob Hope’s classic about a
widowed father who incorporates his seven children into his vaudeville act to keep the
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family together in The Seven Little Foys (1955).106 The importance of family reflected in
Hollywood also played out in the drastic changes taking place in healthcare. Families
then needed to bear healthy newborns who survived the neonatal period.
The 1950s and 1960s were a prosperous post-war time as well as a time that also
encompassed much turmoil and social frustration. The Cold and Vietnam wars, civil
rights struggles, changes in nuclear family norms, and assassination of American leaders
contributed to a chaotic social order that coincided with a technologic revolution and an
international space race. According to historian Steven Mintz, the era between World
War II and the 1960s can be defined in part as having a child-centered character that
reflected deeply ingrained hardships of the Depression years, wartime upheavals, and the
insecurities of a nation locked in the Cold War.107
Suburbs grew, contributing to the isolation of families in their individual housing
surrounded with grassy yards separating them with their neighbors. As part of the
increase in federal funding for healthcare and hospital construction, Hill-Burton funds
generously flowed to subsidize the expansion of community hospitals in suburbs.108 With
hospitals expanding, new medical advances changing survival rates for many Americans,
and the technology boom drastically overlapping with medical care, families had higher
hopes for their children’s medical care, situated as they were within a social system that
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placed the family at the center of a meaningful American life and as a bulwark against
communism.
Nuanced value: Premature infants, the American family, and medical advances
The focus on the ways progress in technology and medicine could impact survival
for newborns who needed particular care reflected the social value of children as the
center of the nuclear family during the post-war years. According to medical historian
Paul Starr, the eradication of polio, more than any other disease, poignantly highlights the
post war acceptance of the scientific method and the willingness of the public to
participate in scientific and medical trials. Such confidence in medical trials also boosted
the faith in American medicine. Between 1955 and 1960 congressional support increased
funding for the medical and research institution, the National Institute of Health (NIH),
from $81 million to over $400 million.109 With immense funding, researchers developed
a vaccine to combat polio, a potentially fatal disease for children, and drastically
decreased morbidity and mortality rates related to the disease.
Americans had faith that research, technology, and better medicine could
eradicate any number of diseases and medical conditions. In the midst of these leaps of
faith, premature infants and their medical and nursing care appeared in popular
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magazines aimed at parents and families.110 For example, in 1955 Parents Magazine
published a spread complete with photographs of a Premature Infant Unit in Chicago.
The article and photographs described the care physicians and nurses gave, showed the
unit, and boasted of the vast array of shiny new equipment used in the unit. With
photographs of parents and their small infants lining the magazine’s pages,111 the hope of
the miraculous stories of survival that occurred in the premature infant units was
reinforced by the importance of the work done there to support the value of the family.
Parents both read about the new techniques and saw photographs of the nurses working
with small infants and the complex technological equipment used on the unit. This kind
of article would have contributed to the optimistic hopes in medicine and technology that
permeated the post war era in general.
Historian Marian Irvin Holt stated that as the nation headed into the Cold War
years, the need for psychologically healthy children and teenagers was vital to what
Truman called the, “struggle between freedom and communist slavery.”112 This was
reflected in expansion of dialogue beyond just the survival of premature infants, but their
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ability to function as intact members of society. For example, the ‘blindness epidemics’
of the 1950s commonly appeared in the popular magazine Time.113
Throughout the 1950s, premature infants maintained a solid footing in American
medicine. In 1959, premature infant nurse pioneer Evelyn Lundeen referred to changes in
premature infant care due to ‘increased interest’ in the premature infant.114 She noted the
many articles published in scholarly medical and nursing journals by physicians and
nurses relating to the care of premature infants and addressing medical conditions,
research studies specifically related to premature infant physiology and medicine, and
nursing care. Lundeen reflected that premature infants garnered increased attention, and
with that attention came a narrowed focus on how to define the premature infant,
standardize models of care, and the creation of spaces where that care could be given.
Conclusion
The consideration of newborns as a unique patient population, that began during
the Progressive Era and progressed in nuanced ways through the post-war years,
influenced a social context that valued newborns and sought to apply the particular
models of care developed for premature infants as sub population of sick newborns to a
broader newborn population. By the turn of the century, newborns emerged as a patient
113
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population separate from children in ways that required particular intervention to
decrease mortality rates. Though the Progressive reformers addressed some of the most
common causes of infant mortality, prematurity did not receive the same attention
infantile diarrhea and disease garnered. By the 1920s, premature infants received
particular attention separate from sick newborns in general as infants for whom further
child-saving efforts might be beneficial. Having made significant impact on decreasing
mortality rates due to infantile diarrhea and disease related to poor hygiene, the medical
community shifted their attention to the high mortality rates related to prematurity
believing overall infant mortality rates could be further decreased. The first step in
determining the scope of the problem of prematurity was defining the disease and the
recognition that experts needed to have a constant definition (and thus way to report)
prematurity. While infants in the neonatal period became the first subpopulation of
children to gain recognition, premature infants then arose as a group of newborns that
needed unique focus and resources to further decrease mortality. Through the 1940s and
1950s, premature infants became the largest subpopulation of newborns for whom unique
advances in technology and medical and nursing models of care were created.
While the story of neonatal intensive care is not limited to premature infants,
historians must understand the recognition of premature infants as a patient population
and the care thy received to inform how we understand the formation for intensive care
for newborns differed from the development of their adult counterparts. As premature
infants garnered attention as a unique population, the search began to determine how to
best care for them and for their particular needs. In conjunction with the recognized need
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to focus on premature infants, premature infant units arose in hospitals as spaces where
these infants could receive highly specialized care. As physicians and nurses grouped
premature infants together in hospital units beginning in the 1920s, nurses delivered
much of the care these infants needed and models of care specifically for premature
infants emerged. By the mid-1950s, hospital administrators realized that the nursing care
applied to premature infants could be applied to newborns in general. These realizations
provided the impetus for a decrease in premature infant units and the establishment of
neonatal intensive care units beginning in the early 1960s. Other technological, financial,
and medical factors contributed to this shift as well. In the next chapter, I will outline the
roles nurses played in premature infant units as they formed during the first half of the
20th century. I will then analyze the roles nurses played in early neonatal intensive care
units and consider the ways models of care established in premature infant units
influenced the types of care given to newborns more broadly speaking in ICUs.
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”The nurse still holds an important position”:
Nursing and the development of neonatal intensive care units
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”The nurse still holds an important position”:
Nursing and the development of neonatal intensive care units
As of 1967, she would be known as a flying nun when she became involved in
helicopter transport of premature infants, but just a few years earlier she had come by
ambulance accompanied only by the ambulance driver. Carrying her portable incubator
and a small bag of supplies, nurse Shannon Perry, then Sister M. Andre, walked into a
small hospital to pick up the premature infant waiting for her and transport him back to
the premature infant center at St Francis Hospital in Peoria, Illinois. Her uniform, a long
white dress and jacket with a veil, distinguished her as a Franciscan Sister. A doctor
stood waiting for her, protectively guarding a small baby in an incubator. She
remembered observing his stance knowing he had been standing guard so no one would
touch the prematurely born infant until she got there. Only then and to only nurse Perry
would he relinquish the tiny baby.115 After assessing that the baby was stable for
transport, Perry then transferred the newborn into her transport incubator for the ride
home. Once back at the premature infant unit, a cadre of nurses would take over care and
constantly assess and care for the patient.116
The doctor relinquished care only to Perry. He trusted her even though she arrived
alone without any physician to oversee her. She assessed the patient, knew how to care
for this premature infant, and independently provided care all the way back to her unit.
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Such ingenuity and autonomy were hallmarks of the nurse who worked in the premature
infant unit. These skills and qualities would later be found in NICU nurses who built on
the models of care established by Perry and other premature infant nurses.
In this chapter, I argue that NICU nurses functioned with expertise, made tools
work for their small patients, and integrated constantly changing equipment in their units
to provide intensive care to a broad range of sick newborns. Such care coincided with the
development of intensive care for adults, but also built on the work of nurses who worked
in premature infant units. Nurses like Shannon Perry created and worked within the
systems of premature infant care that laid the foundation for the establishment and
development of NICUs and the care delivered there. I will outline the themes pertinent to
the roles nurses played in premature infant units and then analyze how they laid
foundations for the way nurses influenced the formation and models of care in NICUs of
the 1960s and 1970s.
Premature Infant Units: Standards of care
The changing social landscape of the first half of the 20th century resulted in shifts
in in how newborns were considered a particular patient population who required unique
resources and space to receive medical and nursing care. While specialists sought to
define prematurity and understand more accurately the scope of the problem, hospitals
opened premature infant units to care specifically for the premature infants they received.
Nurses influenced the establishment of spaces where they delivered care as well as the
models of care given sick newborns. Both premature infant unit nurses and NICU nurses
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provided round-the-clock care, worked with patients grouped by severity of illness or
need for additional care, practiced with great skill, and learned from and collaborated
with physicians to deliver the best care possible. As equipment and medical knowledge
changed, these nurses kept pace by incorporating new knowledge and skills into their
practice and participating in research to expand that knowledge. They participated in
important ways that made the intensive care model work as members of a new cadre of
intensive care nurses forming in hospitals beginning in the 1950s.
Adult intensive care units opened in the 1950s as nurses grouped their sickest
together and worked closely with physicians and each other to provide care for
increasingly medically complex patients.117 According to nursing historians Julie
Fairman and Joan Lynaugh, adult intensive care units (ICU’s), though built on similar
principles as recovery rooms, “emerged as distinctly organized, innovative patient care
area[s].”118 Adult ICUs were often make-shift spaces that developed organically in
hospitals where patients received care regardless of gender, class or race. The adult units
did not initially boast significantly new or complex technology, but Fairman and
Lynaugh argue they did have technology. They used the same tools and equipment found
on the general units and functioned on the concept of intensive monitoring of vital signs,
intake and output, the patient’s level of consciousness and “the nurse’s sense of hearing,
sight, touch, smell, and sometimes her intuition.”119 Nurses working in new adult ICUs
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learned skills related to intensive patient monitoring, developed intensive relationships
with physicians while each taught the other important skills, and learned how to group
and care for sick patients requiring round-the-clock care from specially trained nursing
personnel.
While the newborn population followed the adults in their occupation of formally
labeled ‘intensive care units,’ the models of care delivered by nurses to NICU babies also
developed out of premature infant units that predated the NICUs by almost 40 years.
Nurses in the early premature infant units established care models and units that
resembled what Fairman and Lynaugh would later define as intensive care. To best
understand the context that provided the foundation for NICU care in the 1960s,
historians must first understand the role nurses played in the premature infant units as
early as the 1920s.
Nursing the premature infant: The role nurses played in premature infant units
Premature infant units, often sequestered from other patient areas to minimize
cross infection, provided places where nurses practiced with authority and expertise.
While many larger hospitals did allocate space for separate premature infant units, other
hospitals set aside space in their newborn nurseries where they cared for the sickest
patients, a practice that reflected the ways Fairman and Lynaugh nurses organized
patients in adult wards while delivering early ICU care.120 Without the presence of
parents or physicians, the nurses provided the care for infants and inhabited the units
120

	
  

Ibid. Fairman and Lynaugh. Critical Care Nursing.

67	
  

making decisions regarding patient management. Dr. William Silverman, a pediatrician
who specialized in neonatology during the 1950s, remembered the “skilled, highly
opinionated nurses [that] dominated the scene in hospital [premature] nurseries…the
specialized nurses [made] detailed minute-by-minute decisions concerning clinical
management.”121 These nurses gave care in these units, utilized the incubators, scales,
feeding apparatus, and crude respiratory support. They made executive decisions; the
units themselves were places where nurses claimed the authority to make decisions in a
medical environment where physicians “played a minor role.”122 Such descriptions of the
units draw attention to the nurses as unique in a world where the gendered hierarchy and
physician-nurse relationships traditionally placed the nurse as the one who carried out
orders and had little diagnostic and treatment autonomy.
Even as hospitals changed, the nurses continued to hold an important position in
patient care and the development and implementation of models of care for acutely ill
patients in the premature infant units. The care nurses gave in premature infant units
encompassed a wide variety of skills and knowledge as evidenced by textbooks, journal
articles, and publications of the time.123 These nurses worked in a world where hospitals
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had grown and were expanding, sicker patients stayed in the hospital for longer amounts
of time, and new technologies and equipment were constantly introduced. Premature
infant nurse Evelyn Lundeen argued, “The nurse, however, still holds an important
position, as she [was] relied upon to establish and maintain aseptic technique in order to
prevent infections… observe carefully, assist in research projects, and help simplify all
technics and procedures so that handling of the infant be kept at a minimum.”124 These
nurses needed to know how to care for basic newborn needs, the intricacies of charting
and communicating with physicians regarding changes in patient condition, and some
participated in research and knowledge development that reflected their commitment to
growing knowledge base in good nursing care of the premature infant.
Basic Newborn needs
Nurses’ knowledge related to the care of premature infants required the nurse to
understand thermoregulation (maintaining an adequate body temperature), infection
control, and nutrition. Once the premature infant is born, one of its first needs is
maintenance of body temperature.125 By the 1920s, incubators became a standard way to
assist a small infant to maintain his body temperature. Incubators came in different
models and types, but the primary premise involved monitoring the patient’s body
temperature and making adjustments to the temperature of his immediate environment
within the incubator to aid the infant in keeping his body temperature warm enough.
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Nurses were expected to know how to take temperatures, provide bathing and weigh the
babies while not allowing their body temperatures to fall too low, and to understand the
basic mechanisms used to keep the infant warm.126 Many hospitals used special
incubators for infants; by the 1930s, a variety of incubators were on the market including
(but not limited to) Hess beds, Chapple incubators, and the Isolette incubator was also
developed in the 1930s.127 While some hospitals used individual incubators for babies,
others built what were called, ‘cabinet cubicles’ consisting of a completely enclosed
cubicle containing an individual air supply for the infant inside that could be heated and
humidified as desired.128 Such rooms combined maintenance of thermoregulation with
the need for infection control.129 Nurses needed to know how this equipment worked,
how to use it effectively, and how to assess the patient to know if the incubators were
indeed keeping the patient warm enough.
While full term newborns are susceptible to infection, their preterm counterparts
have an even greater risk for severe infection due to underdeveloped organ and immune
systems. Infection control remained an important aspect of appropriate premature infant
126
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care. In their 1941 textbook on premature infant care, Hess and Lundeen listed “special
training with a thorough understanding of aseptic nursing,” as their first requirement for
successful nursing in any premature infant nursery.130 Many premature infant units
included areas at the front where healthcare personnel and visitors were required perform
extensive hand washing before entering the unit.131
Feeding and general care also fell under the responsibilities of the nurse. While
some premature infants could receive milk – breast milk or early types of formulas –
from a bottle or the breast, others did not have the energy or stamina to feed that way.
Apparatus such as special feeding spoons and tubing that would be inserted into the
baby’s stomach directly were involved in feeding in premature infant units. Nurses used
the feeding apparatus when necessary, recorded the type and amounts of food
administered, and how well the patient tolerated the feeds.
Charting and communication
Nurse’s charting for premature infants included documentation of vital signs –
temperature, heart rate, and respiratory rate – as well as intake and output. Not only did
the nurses need to record the temperature of their patients but the temperature inside the
incubator as well. Stool amounts, consistency, color and any other abnormal findings
130
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related to stool or urine output were also meticulously documented, every milliliter
accounted for.
Nurses also participated in research and the development of charting records at
some hospitals as ways of collecting data on their patients. Nurse Rita Petruska who
worked as nursing supervisor in the premature infant nursery at Mount Sanai Hospital in
New York City, developed her own nursing form with all the essential information
needed for her nurses to chart patient data and assessment. She later published the form in
The American Journal of Nursing in 1963 with elaborate particulars as to the definition of
each section and how the form should be filled out. Such initiation of the development of
tools, and thus technology, for patient care shows ingenuity and autonomy many nurses
experienced in premature infant units. Historian of technology, Joel Howell, argued that
the development of forms of data reflected who cared for the patient as well as changes in
organization of hospitals and medical education. Such tools for recording patient
assessment, medication administration, as well as other details related to the patient’s stay
allowed for consistent data collection and served as an important piece of technology.132
Nurses began to publish articles themselves outlining newborn physiology and
issues related to more in depth knowledge of the newborn infant – premature and full
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term.133 Nurses at Colorado General Hospital’s Premature Infant Center decided that their
ability to assess the patient and notice when something ‘wasn’t quite right’ needed to be
better articulated. They shifted from reporting ‘a poor night’ to reporting more detailed
observations to articulate what they previously considered their impressions.134
The nurse’s ability to observe small changes that can indicate a pending
significant change in condition is one of the hallmarks of premature infant nursing. The
nurses and physicians realized that this type of assessment reporting and communication
contributed greatly to the overall care, earlier diagnosis, and better treatment when the
patient’s condition changed. “When the nurses in the Colorado General Hospital nursery
realized how important articulating their observations were to improving patient care and
how much responsibility was theirs, they became eager to define these vague
impressions.”135 While nurses elsewhere in hospitals reported these kinds of in depth
patient findings, nurses of premature infants learned to communicate the incredibly
nuanced changes in patient condition to physicians that textbooks and articles generally
did not address related to particular assessment communication. The nurses learned to
articulate what had become second nature in their expertise, what might have been
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otherwise referred to as intuition, and functioned with physicians and other healthcare
providers to use their observational skill to improve diagnosis and treatment.
Nurses became recognized by physicians in the literature as the gatekeepers to
their patients as individuals who monitored all aspects of thermoregulation, fed the
infants multiple times during the day and night, and played key roles in infection control.
These memories echo similar reflections of physicians and nurses who worked together
in premature infant units. Such statements coincide with a statement made by physician
Kenneth Winters to his pediatric residents, “When a premature nursery nurse says a baby
doesn’t look right, cry right, eat right, or act right, don’t ignore her…Check that baby
thoroughly because you will usually find something wrong.”136 Another nurse who
worked in a premature infant unit remembered a bedside encounter where she reported an
inguinal hernia to the acting resident. Upon arriving at the bedside the resident could not
find the hernia. When the attending physician arrived, he turned to his resident and stated,
“…you listen to [the nurse], she knows what she is doing.”137
One premature infant textbook specifically for physicians specified the
importance of the presence of an experienced nurse to,
…be in constant attendance to assist the physician, to carry out certain treatments,
and to observe the infant for any abnormal symptoms…The nurse should be given
instructions in regard to her procedure in case the infant has any of these
symptoms. A complete understanding between physician and nurse as to
procedures in case of emergency is essential. Optimal environmental temperature
and humidity should be maintained.138
136

Helen Callon. “The Premature Infant’s Nurse,” AJN 63, no. 2 (February 1963): 103–5.

137

Ibid. Perry, Oral History interview. 7.

138

Ethel Dunham. Premature Infants: A Manual for Physicians (New York, N.Y.: Hoeber-Harper, 1955).
104-105.

	
  

74	
  

Such instruction to physicians highlights the prominence of a nurse’s constant presence at
the bedside, the importance of good communication between the nurse and physician, and
an expectation that the nurse would be able to react to administer emergency care in the
immediate absence of the physician.
According to typical routines published in a textbook authored by physician Julius
Hess and nurse Evelyn Lundeen, nurses in these units did everything from bathe the
babies to hang feedings to clean the units. They maintained linens and administered some
medications. They were expected to document specific newborn patient care and constant
patient assessment and condition in addition to performing bedside tasks, unit
maintenance, medication administration, and training of other nursing personnel when
required.139 During a time when nurses often nursed all over the hospital with generalized
knowledge, this recognition of the nurse who could assess the patient and provide
specialized emergency care meant that these nurses had particular skills. The physician’s
role included working closely and communicating thoroughly with the premature infant’s
nurse.
Nursing, research and knowledge development
Some nurses collected and recorded in the patients’ charts data necessary for the
investigative projects and research, and worked closely with physicians and researchers
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to ensure any research procedures and equipment did not interfere with good care.140
While not common, one nurse developed a research protocol herself. For example, nurse
consultant with the National Department of Health, Education and Welfare Eileen
Hasselmeyer, published a research study in 1961 carried out between 1958 and 1960,
outlining a nurse run research project to study the relationship of nursing practice to
general improvement of infants in premature infant units.141 The goal of the study was to
standardize certain aspects of nursing care including patient clothing, temperature
assessment, techniques of gavage feeding, and skin care. The protocol included forms for
gathering data, complete screening tools, and charting instructions. The study resulted in
a general observation that the standards of nursing care in twelve premature infant
nurseries varied incredibly. While the actual results were important, the study was the
groundbreaking in that sought the scientific evidence behind what had long been
considered ‘excellent nursing care.’142
According to Hasselmeyer, her discussions with nurses in these units revealed a
desire to know more about specific aspects of good nursing care of the premature infant
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so that better care could be given. Hasselmeyer hoped this study would render solid data,
but also that it would encourage other nurses, physicians, hospital administrators, and
researchers to produce their own studies to answer the plethora of questions yet to be
addressed regarding better standards of premature infant care.143 These nurses knew how
to care for the basic newborn needs as well as unique needs of medically fragile
premature infants. These nurses gave constant care through patient assessment and sought
to communicate changes in patient condition with physicians. Many of these nurses
wanted more knowledge to provide better care and they actively contributed to shaping
what that knowledge looked like as they developed research questions, participated in
research, and contributed to the introduction of new protocols and treatments as
premature infant units continued to be unique spaces in hospitals well into the late 1950s.
No delineated break exists when all premature infant units closed and NICUs
became the standard of care for sick newborns, but hospitals stopped opening premature
infant units in the early 1960s and established “intensive care units” for newborns.
Throughout the 1960s premature units remained in some hospitals while hospitals with
financial and spatial resources opened intensive care unit for neonates. For a period of
time both existed in separate forms, but by the 1970s most premature infant units had
closed and NICUs became the standard in hospitals across the country that could afford
to give specialized care to newborn populations. Great advances were made in the ability
to combine newborns requiring additional care in the same space without experiencing
143
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the drastic spread of disease among all patients.144 Nurses who worked in premature
infant units understood particular tenets of sick newborn care that laid foundations for the
ways NICU nurses cared for sick newborns. NICU nurses still needed to know the
particulars of thermoregulation, infection control, and nutrition, but they also broadened
their knowledge base as they needed to know how to care for full term medically fragile
infants, and post-operative neonates, as well as the new methods of diagnosis and
treatment unique to newborns.
“We were the eyes and ears…”: Nursing in early NICUs
Nurses in neonatal intensive care units addressed the familiar issues of
thermoregulation, perinatal infection, and nutrition as they also incorporated equipment
related to electronic monitoring and respiratory support into their day-to-day care. With
the ability to surgically address congenital malformations, surgeons found there was no
place their tiny patients could receive the kind of care they needed from nurses who knew
their particular needs and medical conditions. NICUs opened not as ‘new’ places to care
for premature infants, but units where all newborns who needed a particular kind of care
could receive it. Prior to the 1960s, uninfected sick infants received treatment and care in
premature infant nurseries while infants with suspected infections were treated in
separate rooms if available. Post-operative neonates were sent to regular post-operative
floors where children and adults received care in beds right next to them.145 NICUs
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became places where newborns could be grouped together based on age and unique
medical needs rather than diagnosis. The importance of such grouping is that it allowed
for them to receive nursing care from specialized and trained nurses who knew the issues
these newborns faced. Nurses who worked in these units had incredible skills and
provided care in increasingly complex settings with constantly changing technologies and
medical practices. When interviewed, these nurses remembered particular aspects of what
these units looked like, what caring meant in these units, and how they interacted with
parents and physicians.
NICU nurses participated in drastically changing environments as hospitals
established these units and pushed the bounds to deliver care to increasingly sick and
complex populations of sick newborns. Nurses worked closely with families who often
were excluded from these environments in the early years of NICU care, they
collaborated with physicians, and participated in respiratory treatments for newborns.
“We didn’t know what we know today.”: Nursing and the importance of families
Though families were not often allowed in the early units, or their time there was
restricted, nurses worked hard to consider the parents and include them when possible.
The focus on the ways progress in technology and medicine could impact survival for
newborns who needed particular care reflected the social value of children as the center
of the nuclear family during the post-war years. Within the post-war conceptualization of
the nuclear family, the value of children and newborns supported a medical focus on
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ways to lower infant mortality and save sick newborns including premature infants.146 As
hospitals expanded and more critically ill patients survived in hospitals that evidenced the
post war technology boom, newborns and children also benefitted from the intersection
of social values and medical technology. Families valued the progression in technology
that changed treatment and improved survival rates for critically ill newborns and
children.
By the early 1960s scholarly literature reflected the importance of contextualizing
the newborn within his family. The American Journal of Nursing published articles in the
1960s and 1970s educating nurses who cared for and worked with families of sick
newborns.147 Two such articles published the early 1960s took a close look particularly at
the effects of separation on the family and their newborn during the infant’s hospital stay
as well as the nurse’s role in supporting parents throughout the process. While units took
individual approaches with their policies, these articles and textbooks148 concentrated on
educating nurses who worked with newborns to include the families and provide
empathetic care that fostered relationships between the parents and newborns despite
periods of separation.
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While the articles focused on educating and encouraging nursing staff to
empathetically care for newborns and their families, they also addressed tensions that
existed. Nurses functioned as caregivers often in the absence of parents. One article
encouraging nurses to understand the effects of separation told the story of one nurse’s
reaction after her patient’s mother called to say she could not take her baby home,
“Walking over to Kay’s crib, the nurse affectionately looked down at the infant…‘If your
mother had worked as hard as I did to keep you alive, she would rush right over here to
get you.’”149 Such sentiments would have contributed to complex attitudes regarding who
had the authority to make decisions regarding patient care. While any infant belongs to
his family, nurses who cared for these infants might have experienced attachments and
tensions when relating to families requiring the types of education made explicit in some
articles during the time.
For NICU nurses, the involvement of the parents was an important aspect of their
approach to care. The nurses who worked in these units all remembered different aspects
of working with families, but they all remembered working with them whether the
parents were present in the unit or communicated with the nurses over the phone. Nurses
reflected the importance of the family in how they spoke of their practice. One nurse
remembered how much she enjoyed educating the parents about their newborns. Nurse
Laura Mendell remembered the lack of resources for families back then. In her
discussions and involvement with families, Ms. Mendell assessed that these parents had
few resources outside the hospital for learning how to care for their infants and preparing
149
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to take them home. She remembered doing a great deal of teaching with the families and
working hard to fill in knowledge gaps for parents whether they came in for the day
classes or could only come at night. She spoke with intensity regarding the importance of
educating and including families as a critical aspect to the nursing care she gave.
The nurses learned to work with families who experienced separation from their
newborns during the early weeks of life, a period known to be incredibly important in
childhood development today. One nurse remembered, “We always worried about
parents who were disconnecting. That was just an informal thing we did.”150 While no
formal system was in place, the nurses noticed and monitored familial involvement even
though there may not have been any formal monitoring policy. Nurses interviewed
expressed feelings of empathy for parents who were not present to watch the progress
their babies made. Some nurses talked about wanting the parents to bond with their
newborns, and did what they could to encourage bonding despite the separation, the
stress of having a baby in the NICU, and struggles with the sometimes constantly
changing medical conditions of the patients. The nurses occasionally experienced
situations where they would not hear from parents for days at a time.151 In these cases, if
the hospital had adequate social work department, the nursing staff contacted social work
to get involved to provide support for families facing a range of challenges ranging from
financial to emotional and sometimes physical.
150

Jane Barnsteiner. Oral History interview by Briana Ralston, January 9, 2014.

151

Ibid. Barnsteiner. Oral History interview.; Laura Mendel. Oral History interview by Briana Ralston,
January 9, 2014.; Roxanne Geidel Oellrich. Oral History interview by Briana Ralston August 11,
2014.

	
  

82	
  

By the 1970s, textbooks included chapters on caring for families and evidenced a
focus on involvement with parents and a working to include them.152 While the concept
of family grew and changed by the 1970s, the necessity to focus on the newborn as part
of a family unit became more nuanced. In May 1974, an interdisciplinary group of
specialists met to discuss the current ethical issues in neonatal medicine and care. While
discussion focused on the decision making processes related to congenital malformations
and the resuscitation of extremely preterm infants, discourse came back to the ultimate
question of who had the authority to make those decisions and clarity about how to
navigate tensions when that authority was exercised.153 Nurses faced these tensions and
had to navigate their role within occasional ambiguity as to who had the authority to
make decisions about the babies.
The unique emphasis placed on the consideration of separation of patient from
family emerged as an important part of nursing care for the NICU nurses, an aspect not
considered with the same intensity in adult populations. Nurses consistently valued the
importance of the effects of separation that resulted in a focus on including the families
and seeking ways to ensure parents were able to bond with their children. They learned to
communicate with non-medical terms and took into consideration their patients’ medical
state and how that affected the family unit during a time referred to by historian Elaine
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Tyler May as a time with a greater focus on the nuclear family as an important post-war
concept. These nurses worked closely with the families and they also worked in close
collaboration with other nurses and physicians when decisions needed to be made
regarding patient treatment and day-to-day care.
Highly skilled professionals: Collaboration and trust in the NICU
During this time, there was no standard education tract for nurses who wanted to
work in the NICU. While some units allowed nursing students to observe and participate
in care in the late 1960s and early 1970s, not all nurses who worked in these units had
received any particular training beyond care of the healthy newborn prior to their first day
on the job.154 Similar to the nurses in adult ICUs, many nurses in the new ICUs learned
their skills from NICU nurses already experienced on the units as well as nurse
managers.155 By 1972, textbooks for the care of medically fragile newborn infants, such
as High Risk Newborn Infants: The basis for intensive nursing care, authored by Sheldon
Korones appeared for educational purposes.156 Training programs such as the continuing
education program at Michael Reese and in Denver did exist at this time and some nurses
would have attended. Overall, the nurses who either chose the NICU or were assigned
there needed to be able to learn quickly and creatively as they cared for the medically
unstable patients. They needed to work well with other nurses and with physicians on the
154
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units who also taught particular skills pertaining to patient assessment, treatment, and
equipment.
Collaboration among nurses, and between nurses and physicians played a crucial
role in the day-to-day happenings on the units. Nurses remembered being highly valued
members of the healthcare team. In interviews, they communicated, “The doctors always
valued your opinion,”157 and “They had to work with us as team members.”158 One nurse,
Roxanne Geidel Oellrich, who worked her way up to supervisor in her NICU in the
1970s, remembered what it was like to function as a “professional,” a term she associated
with feelings of being valued by her fellow nurses and the physicians who worked on the
unit. Ms. Oellrich remembered, “a lot of respect between the physicians and the
nurses.”159 She spoke of the incredible professionalism of the women she worked with.
Her story contrasts the old traditional nursing caps and hierarchical interactions of her
nursing school days to her experiences in the NICU where she and her nursing team were
considered the eyes and ears of the unit. They knew the condition of their patients. The
physicians recognized that, and both worked in intense collaboration.
One such physician, Dr. Don Null who worked in Texas at Wilford Hall,
Lackland Air Force Base credited the nurses with intense responsibility and dedication
during his NICU days in the 1960s and 1970s. To Dr. Null, the nurses always wanted to
see new equipment work for the patient and ultimately they wanted the unit to thrive. He
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remembered, “that is why we were successful because they put their time into it and
moved forward with it.” While the nurses would not have been the only factor that
ensured the success of the NICU – the story is far more complex than that – the
participation of the nurses and the relationships they had with physicians and other
healthcare staff ensured an environment where risks could be taken and research and new
methods of treatment and care attempted as these units grew and developed. Such
relationships were both influential for the patients as well as empowering for the nursing
staff. NICU nurses, like their premature infant unit predecessors, had expertise in patient
care and the physicians trusted the nurses to perform assessments and to know when their
patients’ conditions changed.
“So we would MacGyver160 things”: Making the system work for their tiny patients
Nurses who worked in these units in the 1960s and 1970s remember the
drastically changing equipment – monitors, IV set ups, respiratory technologies, and the
ways these resources coupled with what was considered more traditional equipment such
as the incubator and feeding tubes. For many, the new monitoring and respiratory
equipment found in the neonatal intensive care units were what made the units new,
different, and truly ICUs: “We truly became a NICU in that we had all the kids on

160

	
  

The term “MacGyver” references a 1980s TV show staring Richard Dean Anderson as a character
known only by his last name, MacGyver. He was a jack of all trades and was known not only for
getting himself out of sticky situations using his knowledge of biology, physics and chemistry, but
for doing it with everyday common tools such as rubber bands, tube socks, and his pocket knife.
The nurse’s use of the term “to MacGyver something” reflects the ways she remembered fixing
complex problems with her knowledge of the situation and the common tools she had on hand.

86	
  

ventilators, oxygen, etcetera.”161 The equipment stood out to them as influential to both
how they functioned in the space as well as how their care changed during their time in
the units.
Neonatal nursing required ingenuity and a constant learning curve for these
nurses. Many who worked in these units stepped into worlds where new equipment was
constantly integrated into practice, methods of diagnosis and treatment constantly
changed, and where they often lacked supplies appropriate in size for their patient
population. The 1960s were a time of rapid infusion of new machines and technologies as
well as incredible amounts of funding to expand and establish units. This meant these
nurses needed to be able to learn quickly, integrate new policies and knowledge into their
nursing practice fluidly, and make due with whatever equipment they had on hand. As
new treatments became available for patients, much of the equipment to deliver the new
interventions did not come in sizes small enough for newborns.
Nurses faced the challenges of trying to make equipment for children and adults
work for much smaller bodies. As medical equipment and treatment modalities
developed, companies did not initially produce the equipment in sizes and amounts small
enough for two to ten pound patients. This meant nurses sometimes needed to devise
ways to ensure tools, medications, and equipment made for adults worked for their tiny
infants. One nurse remembered beginning peritoneal dialysis on a neonatal patient using
adult supplies; she remembered having to measure out very small amounts of the dialysis
fluid and concocting her own tray system: “I just remember winging it…chest tubes and
161
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all that stuff wasn’t really made for the size of the babies. So you would MacGyver
things.”162 Another nurse described how she and her colleagues used to make their own
masks to deliver continuous positive airway pressure (CPAP)163 for the infants since they
did not come in sizes small enough. They took scalpels and sliced pediatric nasal
cannulas down adding stopcocks and tubing where needed to piece together the
equipment that would fit their patients. As the nurses constructed the facemasks, they
literally made their own CPAP setups.164 Such practices show how the nurses not only
mastered thermoregulation and nutrition, more traditional care practices by that point,
they tweaked and adapted new methods of treatment and the equipment to make those
treatments work for patients for whom the companies did not traditionally manufacture
the equipment. Another nurse remembered using red rubber urethral catheters for chest
tubes on the small infants as chest tubes for neonates could not be ordered from any
manufacturing company at the time. She attached the red rubber catheters to corrugated
oxygen tubing that she connected to a bottle of water with a carefully measured volume
of water needed to provide the appropriate water pressure for the system. The nurses did
not have what they needed, so they improvised.
Nurses were not the only ones who recognized that some of the equipment needed
to be altered for their patients. Throughout the 1960s, respiratory distress continued to be
a leading cause of death in premature and sick newborns and the ventilators
162
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manufactured for adults made no significant clinical differences when used with
newborns. With the establishment of these new neonatal intensive care units, more
aggressive treatment of newborn diseases and medical problems were used and nurses
played integral roles in that process as research progressed and researchers and
physicians sought better treatments for respiratory distress.
Keep them breathing: Mechanical Ventilation and Nursing Care.
Artificial ventilation for neonates was not a mid-20th century idea but took over a
century to become the standard of practice. Alexander Graham Bell’s 1889 invention, a
body-enclosing ventilator for newborn infants provided negative pressure ventilatory
support. He observed “many children, especially those prematurely born, die from
inability to expand their lungs sufficiently when they take their first breath…”165 The
American Association for the Advancement of Science did not accept Bell’s apparatus
(for reasons unstated in the literature) and the equipment ended up at a museum in
Baddeck, Nova Scotia.166, 167 Over the next century, physicians and researchers proposed
many methods of artificial ventilation. Throughout the 1960s, physicians and researchers
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continued to organize meetings with greater frequency to attempt to pool knowledge and
determine the issues at hand and the best steps to move forward. This led to the
utilization of many different forms of treatment and a broad range of research done in this
branch of medicine. While attempts to define and understand respiratory distress
syndrome continued to be the focus of collaboration, attempts to treat the disease
continued to be entrepreneurial and independent.
Clinicians tried many different means to curb the respiratory distress that plagued
premature infants. Physicians published in scholarly medical journals regarding their
work on inhaled aerosol mists,168 the Bloxsom Air Lock that altered the atmospheric
pressure within the incubator environment,169 negative pressure ventilation,170 and
metabolic intravenous compensation to address the results of insufficient ventilation.171
Among these approaches, continuous positive airway pressure emerged as the standard of
care by the mid 1970s.172 The developments required for positive pressure ventilation to
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emerge as standard included the invention and innovation of such parts as endotracheal
tubes and facemasks.173 These diverse attempts to treat the problem resulted in varying
success, but they all arose in tandem with general attempts to improve the administration
of positive pressure ventilation (PPV).
Respiratory Distress: Its definition and treatment.
We know today that respiratory distress syndrome (RDS) occurs when infants are
born before their lungs have fully developed in utero. Though respiratory distress can be
seen in full term infants, RDS predominantly occurs in infants born before 28 weeks
gestation.174 Normally developed lungs produce surfactant, a substance the lungs produce
to that protects the air sacs from collapsing and help the lungs inflate with air, but infants
who are born before the lungs begin to produce this substance suffer from difficulty
breathing. Today, treatments such as the administration of artificial surfactant, the use of
oxygen and ventilator support, and in severe cases extracorporeal membrane oxygenation
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(ECMO)175 may be used, but these treatments are relatively recent phenomena. Before
the early 1970s, RDS was associated with extremely high mortality rates.
Initially the administration of oxygen to infants showing signs of respiratory
distress became standard practice, as often the infants often showed great signs of clinical
improvement with this treatment.176 Oxygen was administered using various forms of
oxygen tents, adapted bassinets or incubators, or some form of chamber into which
oxygen would be pumped.177 Unfortunately, by the late 1940s, researchers and clinicians
noted unanticipated consequence of high oxygen administration called Retrolental
Fibroplasia (RLF). RLF affected the blood vessels of the eyes in prematurely born
infants who had received oxygen therapy in relation to respiratory distress.
Researchers and physicians sought to tease out the etiology and best practices for
treatment for infants suffering from respiratory issues without predisposing these infants
to blindness resulting from RLF. Beginning in the 1950s, published studies examining
hyaline membranes of infants who had died after exhibiting severe respiratory distress
outlined findings and sought to aid in potential pre-morbid diagnosis.178 Physicians and
175
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nurses were torn between the initial respiratory improvement in infants when given
oxygen and the possibility of eventual blindness later thought to be associated with high
levels of oxygen administration. Research began internationally and publications ensued
on the phenomena and how to prevent the blindness epidemic.179 Clearly respiratory
complications and the best ways to treat babies who suffered from distress also posed a
paramount threat to the care of prematurely born infants.
Researchers and clinicians collaborated and came together at conferences, through
scholarly communities, and via publication of their findings. At the 1951 M&R (Ross)
Pediatric Research Conference pulmonary hyaline membranes and RDS took center stage
with research and presentations focused on the issue. The same year a symposium,
Anoxia of the New-Born Infant, convened under The Council of International
Organizations of Medical Sciences (UNESCO and WHO).180 Researchers and clinicians
scrambled to find a way to curb the mortality rates and treat respiratory distress in sick
neonates. In 1959, physician Mary Ellen Avery published her groundbreaking research
on surfactant. Though surfactant treatment would not become part of standard treatment
until the 1980s, her pathological discovery introduced new dimensions to the
contemporary state of the science.
Avery’s work gave physicians and researchers a cause for RDS, and thus
contributed to how physicians thought about the problem as well as how research chose
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to study new treatments. South African Researchers Harrison, Heese, and Klein
discovered the benefits of “grunting “in infants who suffered from respiratory distress
and published findings in 1968.181 Grunting improved infants’ color and oxygenation.182
Physician George Gregory and his team built on Harrison et al’s research by applying
continuous positive airway pressure for intubated infants in an attempt to artificially
recreate the same affect that grunting created for the infants. The development of CPAP
applied either via a pressure tube or an endotracheal tube resulted in positive effects for
the infants in the trial.183
Respiratory treatments: Attempts to provide respiratory support
These new NICUs and the need for advances to treat RDS coincided with the
post-war increases in research funding, the technology boom, and major medical
discoveries and advances.184 American society became enamored of moon-landings,
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computer intelligence, and new understandings of human DNA. Medical discoveries
littered the evening news shows and popular magazines such as TIME displayed covers
that gave visual representation to the dynamically changing state of science, medicine,
and technology in the United States at that time. Even normal newborn nurseries took on
an altered look as hospitals changed and reconfigured. The development of ‘high tech’
diagnostic and therapeutic procedures for pregnant women and their infants changed the
landscape of labor and delivery and the hospital care newborns received.185, 186 Neonatal
intensive care units became places where parents could expect the fruit of American
ingenuity and medical science to save their infants who just decades before would have
died.
The physiologic changes NASA observed in their astronauts translated to
newborn infants as both astronauts and infants traversing the events of birth experienced
adaptations to gravity and the environment, alterations in blood pressure, blood counts,
and electrolyte balances, and fluid retention. Technologies used in space travel and
military realms also took on new applications with the neonatal population such as
Doppler detection of pulses in newborns and the use of sonar waves as ultrasounds
185
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became a standard of maternal care leading up to birth. Early forms of respiratory support
for fighter pilots became integrated into adult ventilators that were the foundation for
positive pressure ventilation in the newborn populations. These technologies made their
way into NICUs in the 1960s and 1970s when groups of researchers and clinicians
adapted these technologies to their smallest patient populations.

“You would know…you could feel.”: Nursing’s role in respiratory support
Positive pressure ventilators existed for adults, but required modification for the
smaller infant populations found in the NICUs. Ventilators used for adults often had tidal
volumes that approached up to 1000mL. A ten mL deviation for an adult might not have
drastic effects, but ten mL could be a dangerous deviation and damage the lung of a
three-pound neonate.187 Until physicians and nurses could depend on machines to deliver
consistently precise volumes of air, they did not fully trust the machines and many found
alternative ways to provide positive pressure respiratory support. As neonatologist Dr.
George Gregory remembered, “Because the available mechanical ventilators frequently
were ineffective, we and others [the nurses] sometimes ventilated neonates who had
HMD [hyaline membrane disease] by hand for 48 to 72 hours.”188 Other nurses remember
‘hand bagging,’ a term they used to describe the act of using an apparatus called an
187
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Ambu bag that is shaped like a balloon and when squeezed pushes the air into the patients
lungs and manually provides breaths for a patient. It took skills to constantly assess the
patient’s color and condition to know if you were ‘bagging’ correctly as monitors were
just becoming more commonplace in the units at this time. Nurse Roxanne Oellrich
remembered,
We would start bagging them until they went into that diuretic phase, where you
could feel that they started having increased urine output and you would not have
to bag as hard. You could feel the compliancy of their lungs change. You would
know when they were getting better. You could feel when they would blow a
pneumothorax, just from bagging.189
For Ms. Oellrich, ‘hand bagging’ did not only mean knowing how to work with the
Ambu bag, but also intimately knowing how that piece of equipment interacted with her
patient. Ultimately she had the skills and expertise to know how her patient’s condition
changed based on how she experienced using the Ambu bag. The attending physician on
the unit taught the nurses to bag, how much pressure to create with the way they bagged,
and the volume of air they could push into each infant’s small lungs. The nurses did not
have pulse oximeters to measure oxygen levels in the blood as today’s nurses do, so they
looked at the baby’s color and assessed the baby while bagging to know if they were
bagging well. Ms. Oellrich described how she learned to bag with one hand and write
nursing notes with the other. Medical students provided short breaks for nurses if needed,
but the nurses learned to prepare all medications and supplies they could anticipate prior
to starting their shift.
189
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Another nurse who started her career at a New York City hospital remembered
when ventilators were eventually introduced on her unit in the 1970s. On her unit, the
infants were placed on eight hour bagging shifts as the nurses bagged for a set amount of
time each hour. This meant after bagging for the majority of each hour as little as only
five to ten minutes out of every hour was left to hang feeds, take vital signs, and perform
hygiene tasks such as changing diapers. As time progressed, physicians began to
introduce ventilators to the units. One nurse remembered not necessarily accepting these
new tools without question:
[The fellow] began to introduce ventilators into more common practice, not as a
last resort. And we [the nurses] had to transition into learning…and at first I
didn’t like them [the ventilators] because I thought ‘That’s my job. I can do it
better.’190
These skills required the nurse to be incredibly vigilant, have expert assessment
skills, know how to bag well and whether or not how they bagged was working
for the patient, and be able to do other jobs accurately and efficiently. They took
ownership of the practice of bagging only handing it off when absolutely
necessary. Their ability to incorporate good respiratory support into other nursing
responsibilities, as Ms. Oellrich remembered bagging while writing notes, shows
their ingenuity and intense involvement in patient care in early NICUs.
Mechanical ventilation: Did it work for newborns?
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By the 1970s, hospitals began to adopt the ventilator machines in greater
numbers. During this process, nurses needed to have the skills to both ventilate the
infants by hand via bagging as well as the skill to use the ventilator machines adapted for
the neonatal population. Articles meant to educate nurses and physicians also began to
appear in medical and nursing journals in the 1960s and 1970s that discussed nursing care
of the ventilated neonate, and suggested the necessity of good nursing care to provide
appropriate respiratory care to this patient population. The American Journal of Nursing
published multiple articles addressing the advances in positive pressure ventilator
technologies and different methods of administering the respiratory support the premature
infants needed.191 Articles, published in other disciplinary journals addressed the pieces
of equipment needed to deliver the precise volumes of air and concentrations of oxygen
as well as the need for adequately trained nursing personnel. Dr. George Brumley, a
noted pediatrician, commented:
It is imperative that the physician responsible for such infants be informed as to
the competence of the [nursing] personnel and the specific coverage to be
provided for the infant in question. Lucey's assessment of the Intensive Care
Nursery as a place where "people care intensely" epitomizes this consideration
and appropriately relegates facilities and equipment to their proper, necessary, but
subordinate role.192
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Recognizing the need to make headway in treating respiratory distress in
newborns, leading experts in the field of neonatal care gathered at thee 1968 Ross
Conference on Pediatric Research.193 This seminal conference assembled the leading
physicians and researchers in the field as well as the latest research in neonatal medicine
within the changing scene of neonatal intensive care. The topics included a discussion of
the evidence that intensive care units changed survival rates, assessment of artificial
respiration, and evidence for monitoring of blood pressure, among other things. The use
of artificial ventilation for neonates took center stage at one moderated session as
physicians and researchers discussed whether or not ventilators used for newborns
actually did save lives.194, 195
Dr. Paul Swyer196 moderated a session focused on artificial ventilation for
critically ill newborns. Physicians present at the conference delineated the hazards,
193
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benefits, and ultimate assessment of the use of artificial respiration in the newborn.
Ultimately they concluded, in its current state, the use of artificial respiration for neonates
was relatively limited and did not provide lavish alterations in the mortality rates for
prematurely born neonates. When ventilators were used,
…the type of instrument has much less influence on the outcome than the
organization behind it. I say organization advisedly, because it is perfectly
obvious that the success of artificial ventilation in the newborn, even more than
the adult, depends on the service and skills of a team of nurses, physicians,
laboratory workers, and technicians applied unremittingly for 24 hours a day, 7
days a week.197
The experts assembled did not yet know the most effective methods of
implementing ventilator use with the newborn patient population, but they
recognized the machine was only a small piece of the puzzle. Provider after
provider highlighted the need for staffing the unit with skilled personnel that
included nurses. While he called the nurses out specifically, first in order, he also
affirmed the reality of a team of healthcare providers who worked with those
nurses each providing specific aspects of care.
– a unit that consisted of one small cubical referred to by some in the institution as “Swyer’s
Vegetable Garden” due to a combination of lack of belief that prematurely born infants could be
saved and the research Swyer was doing to try to save these infants. He went on to have a highly
successful career both in his medical practice – he trained hundreds of neonatal fellows, in
establishing and growing the NICU at Sick Kids, and contributing keystone knowledge through
his research in mechanical ventilator for newborns, premature infant nutrition, and neonatal
transport and regionalization for newborn services; CN Reese and J Reese. “Reflections on the
Early Years of Neonataology: Paul R. Swyer, The Beginnings of Canadian Neonatology a the
Hospital for Sick Children in Toronto and Reflections on His Early Career,” E-Journal of
Neonatology Research 3, no. 2 (Spring 2013): 47–57.
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Studies conducted with various methods of mechanical ventilation
between 1965 and 1968 presented at the 1968 Ross Conference on Pediatric
Research summarized the general conclusion, “the potential for salvage by
artificial ventilation [was] relatively limited.”198 According to the studies done at
that time, the ventilator with the best results in ventilation was a negativepressure ventilator.199 Even with comparison studies, the experts assembled did
not agree the data was solid; populations and studies varied broadly, as did the
way physicians used ventilators and the requirements for initiating ventilator
therapy. The studies simply highlighted a, “…general impression from going
over the literature is that it is not the machine that makes the difference – it is the
people that run it, and the organization behind it.”200 Up until this point, no piece
of ventilator equipment used by physicians and nurses had proven to be a
consistently effective tool.
Ventilators used at the time, initially developed for adults, did not
produce significant clinical results and helped only a handful of sick neonates.
While some used positive pressure ventilation, no universal standard of care
existed. Many used positive pressure ventilation as a last resort or continued to
research how to use it to greatest benefit to save lives, and many units had nurses
198
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hand bag the newborns they felt could benefit from such treatment and care.
Companies such as the Bourns Company produced ventilators they labeled for
sale as newborn ventilators, but they produced only a certain amount and did not
invest in the market as these machines were not in high demand due to unclear
impact on survival rates. The Bourns infant ventilators were cited in studies but
did not emerge as a leader in newborn ventilator equipment. NICUs continued to
open and were filled with infants requiring additional respiratory support;
physicians, researchers, and nurses knew too many infants died and one group, in
San Antonio, Texas, pushed the bounds to make newborn incubator technology
effective for infants.
The Baby Bird Ventilator
In 1969, a group of physicians and a respiratory therapist at Lackland Air Force
Base in San Antonio, Texas developed a pediatric volume ventilator they believed
addressed the need for an infant ventilator while taking into consideration the unique
physiologic issues researchers had identified and outlined over the course of the
preceding two decades. Under the direction of neonatologist Dr. Robert DeLemos,
respiratory therapist Jimmy Schultz, and anesthesiologist Dr. Robert Kirby worked
together on a prototype ventilator they would later call the Baby Bird Ventilator.
Working with a group of fellows, including Dr. Don Null, they decided to see what they
could do to address two key limitations of contemporary ventilators: limit of flow only
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during inspiratory cycle, and need for what we now know as positive end expiratory
pressure (PEEP).
During this time period the ventilators available for use only provided airflow
during inspiration of a preset cycle. When the patient breathed in, the ventilator would
provide a flow of oxygen-enriched air. What made this problematic for neonates is that
they breathe irregularly and would often end up breathing between breaths pre-set by the
ventilator. When the infants did this, they would simply rebreathe the carbon dioxide they
just exhaled thus impairing oxygenation and ventilation. In addition, the ventilators at this
time did not include PEEP 201 that keeps the alveoli from collapsing. In newborns without
the soap-like compound surfactant, their alveoli and consequently their lungs collapsed
every time they took a breath, causing trauma to already delicate lung tissue.202 Drs.
DeLemos and Kirby wanted a ventilator that had both constant airflow and PEEP, but
there was not one available.
Respiratory Therapist Jimmy Schultz, described by one of DeLemos’s fellows as
“innovative,” took apart an adult Bird ventilator, the Bird VIII, and reassembled it to the
specifications the physicians required. The men tried the new ventilator on a few cases
and it worked. After some initial research supporting the ventilator’s use, the team
approached The Bourns Company. Bourns, a major respiratory therapy company, already
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manufactured, marketed, and sold, a series of infant ventilators out at the time, but their
ventilators failed to provide PEEP and continuous positive pressure. The Bourns
Company rejected the team’s prototype device citing research they had done and
subsequent determination that there were enough infant ventilators on the market that
worked. The Company assumed that since the current devices out on the market worked
for the number of patients who needed them and reflected an absolute ceiling in the
ventilator’s usefulness in medical practice for neonates.203 Kirby, DeLee, and Shultz
refused to believe this was the case; they proved their machine worked for newborns and
they could save infants that previously did not survive when treated.
Eventually the team approached Dr. Forrest Bird, a bio-engineer for the United
States military who developed adult ventilators and had a long-standing history
developing medical apparatus with the military. Bird built them a machine that could be
more easily used on infants by medical personnel. He adapted knobs so they could be
more easily maneuvered. He repackaged the machine to be more accessible to someone
who had not built it themselves as Schultz had done for Kirby and his team.204 In 1972,
the team outlined their new infant ventilator in a groundbreaking publication, and called
the new device the Baby Bird Ventilator. According to Kirby’s team, the Baby Bird “cost
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less than $1,500 and was extremely simple to operate.”205 They believed their new
pediatric ventilator for use with neonates was an inspired solution to a drastic problem.
In the team’s article, they outlined the mechanical specifics to their prototype
going so far as to provide a list of parts required for assembly of the machine’s system
and where to obtain the parts.206 This footnote provides interesting insight into the team’s
perception of the emergency nature and need of the device. As Dr. Donald Null later
remembered, “if that baby was doing poorly [use of the Baby Bird prototype ventilator]
was considered a life saving treatment.”207 Babies died of respiratory distress every day,
and these men felt that if someone needed the machine before it could be made available
from the Bird Corporation, then that person should obtain the right to build it himself
using the same parts Jimmy Schultz used initially in 1969. The machine would not be
widely available for purchase by hospitals for another two years, and even then the cost
did remain high.
The prototype to the Baby Bird Ventilator initially incorporated the continuous
positive pressure ventilation suggested by Gregory in his 1971 article in the New England
Journal of Medicine. Gregory and his team built on previous observations that infants in
respiratory distress who exhibited grunting had higher oxygen levels.208 They concluded
205
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that continuous positive airway pressure, or CPAP, would be the answer to this problem.
Until the Baby Bird, no ventilator incorporated this aspect into the equipment. After
DeLemos, Kirby, and Schultz developed their ventilator with Dr. Bird they proceeded to
push the bounds of their work with the device, continuing research with their new
machine. In 1973, they published the results of their work detailing the importance of the
Baby Bird Ventilator arguing the Baby Bird was successful because it used PEEP and
CPAP to treat infants with RDS resulting in decreased mortality rates. Of paramount
importance to their work was their conclusion that PEEP should be individualized for
each patient in coordination with blood pressure monitoring, chest X-rays, and blood gas
measurements. All aspects of monitoring developed in tandem with the Baby Bird
allowing for optimal use of the ventilator.209 The adoption of the Baby Bird did not occur
without challenges and constant attempts to create better ways to monitor the patients and
use the ventilator in the most therapeutic ways for the newborns. This process was not a
linear march forward, but one where other types of tools emerged in tandem with the
ventilator.
As the Baby Bird developed, so did the assessment tools and machines that
contributed to assessment techniques related to whether or not the machine was being
used appropriately for the patient. One such example, developed by a fellow under
removed and the infants resumed crying; V.C. Harrison, H de V. Heese, and M. Klein. “The
Significance of Grunting in Hyaline Membrane Disease,” Pediatrics 41, no. 3 (March 1968): 549–
559.
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DeLemos during the development of the Baby Bird ventilator, tackled a tandem issue for
premature infant care: the inability to obtain noninvasive blood pressures. Nurses and
physicians could not measure blood pressure with the traditional stethoscope and
sphygmomanometer because newborn arteries were difficult to auscultate. Among larger
infants, and their adult counterparts, indwelling catheters could be placed, but the right
size catheter for very small premature infants did not exist. Dr. Gary McLaughlin
developed a Doppler ultrasound device to measure blood pressure indirectly.210 This noninvasive device provided more consistent blood pressure monitoring to determine basic
vital signs for critically ill ventilated neonates. The use of this measurement was critical
in understanding the changing intrathoracic pressure resulting from the PEEP of positive
pressure ventilation and its affects on cardiac output.211 Dr. deLemos recognized, using
this measurement combined with the blood gases and x-rays that more PEEP was not
always better and use of the machine needed to be coupled with intensive monitoring and
care. This is where the nursing staff continued to play important roles in the incorporation
of ventilators as well as providing continued highly valued patient care.
In an oral history interview with Dr. Null, he credited the physicians with
adjusting the parameters of the machine but he recognized the role the nurses played in
monitoring the patients. Blood pressure monitoring, blood work or blood gasses, and
general assessment of vital signs and patient condition was the role of the nurses. They
210
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gathered the data and knew how to combine that with the patient’s general assessment to
determine if the machine worked for the patient and to know when something was
wrong.212 Dr. Null remembered them as central members of the team of healthcare
providers that made the NICU and the development of the Baby Bird a success. He
asserted, “that’s why we were successful: because [the nurses] they put their time into it
and moved forward with it.”213 According to Dr. Null they participated in the changes to
patient care plans; their focus was on their tiny patients even when the machines came
and went and changed.214 Nurses continued to keep the patient at the center of a
whirlwind of medical research, expanding assessment practices, and changing machines.
While the Baby Bird Ventilator was not the only ventilator that was used,
practitioners who worked with the newborn population remember it as a turning point in
newborn respiratory care. While it did not have the monopoly, other manufacturers of
newborn ventilators such as the Bourns Company did not compete for the market and did
not feel, based on contemporary data, that there was a market for increased production of
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newborn ventilators.215 Many factors influenced why the Baby Bird became the standard
of care in the memories of so many practitioners, but its emergence required key
components. Based on a population of neonates who would benefit from such a machine,
a team of (in this case) men took the risk to invent the machine and find out if it worked.
Once they had garnered evidence collected by female nurses that their new invention did
work and influenced survival rates of neonates, they worked hard to find an engineer and
subsequently a company who would take the risk to mass produce it.
Even once the Baby Bird was produced and hospitals began to buy the machine,
not all nurses and physicians completely trusted it. One nurse expressed her memories of
the machines not always working well and a subsequent mistrust of them: “I remember
those Baby Birds…always being nervous about them malfunctioning. We knew how to
take them down and put them back together again, but we would learn how to do that and
often they were very persnickety…not functioning the way you wanted them to.” She
went on to talk about how they used to listen to certain noises the machines made and
then problem solve if they did not trust that the machine was working correctly.216 While
the Baby Birds did eventually become the most remembered neonatal ventilator, some
nurses remember them specifically as having glitches in the early years of their use.217
The Baby Bird’s rise to fame did not happen suddenly but over the course of years. There
is no evidence that the machine immediately became the “go to” ventilator for NICUs
215
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across the country, but nurses and physicians remember it while other models have not
been so resilient in the collective memory.218
The story of the Baby Bird Ventilator placed within the context of attempts to
battle respiratory distress in neonates provides an example of why nurses were so
important. They provided the critical assessment, communicated with physicians as team
members, and worked with drastically changing systems of equipment and personnel to
give the best possible care for their patients. The machines were game-changers, but only
when coupled with the intensive care delivered in these units by nurses who had the
knowledge and skills to make the machines work for the babies and to recognize and take
action when they were not working. Nurses were the ones providing the most intensive
care available. They provided a hub of communication and were a constant presence for
physicians and other healthcare providers. As they provided foundational and central
assessment skills to the rest of the healthcare team, they also tweaked and made the
equipment they had on hand work for their patients. They delivered the best care they
could with the resources available to patients who needed not only their skill and
ingenuity but their ability to determine minute yet significant changes in each patient’s
condition.
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Expenses and cost-effectiveness: Financial challenges of a new technological system
The equipment and manpower needed to run these units did not come without a
significant financial cost. Historian Rosemary Stevens argued the 1960s dawned on a
period in American medicine where the creation of private insurance as third-party payers
“encouraged hospitals to respond o the market incentives of increased demand by
providing more, more expensive, and better care, in areas that were most likely to be
reimbursed.”219 By 1960 Blue Cross and other insurance plans covered almost two thirds
of non-governmental hospital expenditures. By 1966, Medicaid roared into action, a form
of insurance that covered newborn in hospital care and proved to be incredibly expansive
as hospitals incurred increasing expenditures only to receive financial reimbursement
through the 1970s; in the face of what came to be considered as extensive spending in
hospitals, the system was eventually changed in the early 1980s as part of audits to
control increased spending.220
Within this expansion of hospital-based services and the financial restructuring of
American medicine, neonatal intensive care became a focal point for cost-effect analysis
as part of a medical system-wide analysis, Implication of Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of
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Medical Technology.221 This study identified neonatal intensive care as one of the most
expensive reasons for patient hospitalization exceeding neoplastic and circulatory
diseases as well as end-stage renal disease and coronary bypass surgery (all among the
most expensive adult in-patient areas). The report cited a range in NICU care from
$1,800 to $40,000 per patient with average determinable expenditures to fall around
$8,000 per patient. Such expenditures resulted in national expense of $1.5 billion in 1978
alone.222 The study’s authors to break down expenditures within hospitals due to the
changes in the ways hospitals charged insurance plans for patient care in the 1960s.223
Among studies that analyzed payment practices, third party payers (private and federal)
paid the highest percentage of costs, between 80-85%. Direct costs from individual
payers accounted for about 5% of payments received. The remaining 10-15% were
uncollectible. Of the fifteen percent of patients in NICUs on Medicaid, they accounted
for 51% of the uncollectible or write-off funds.224
The study cites challenges to determining actual cost per patient and per
procedures due to multiple factors. Though NICUs did function as unique units, they did
not function as separate cost centers when billing and charges were negotiated with the
costs often being reported in tandem with adult ICUs. In the rare cases when the NICUs
could be separated out, ancillary costs (laboratory tests, x-ray, and physician fees) were
221
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not included. Due to both formal and informal regionalization, hospitals often transferred
patients between institutions and thus complicated the billing process. While the details
were hard to tease out, three consistent findings emerged: 1) total costs for survivors are
higher than for non-survivors; 2) as birth weights decreased, costs increased; and 3) total
costs increased with complications such as hyaline membrane disease (HMD). 225 The
study cited the changes in hospital billing procedures such as “cross-subsidizing”226 and
changes in Medicaid and insurance reimbursement.
While specific challenges did create problems with breaking down particular
costs, the study ultimately reinforced NICU care as the most expensive type of care
delivered in hospitals by the early 1980s. The cost-effectiveness of using such an
expensive technological system to care for patients drew incredible scrutiny, particularly
as it related to issues of long term care for some of the neonates that survived but with
chronic medical conditions and some dependent on technologies such as ventilator
support. The financial cost could not be separated from the moral and ethical questions
regarding whether or not the ICU model of care should be used even at such an incredible
financial cost.
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Conclusion
Historians of technology consistently ask why one tool became the standard of
care while another possibility did not. An understanding of the role nurses played in
premature infant units provides us with insight as to why the units themselves, as
technological systems, formed and grew as they did. Premature infant units were a
dominant forerunner to the models of care we find in NICUs today and the nurses who
worked in these units provided very similar types of care their premature infant unit
nurses did before. Perhaps sick newborns could have been simply cared for grouped
together with well newborns, or premature infant units might have remained standard
throughout the latter half of the 20th century, but they did not. Neonatal intensive care
units became standard technological systems where sick newborns specifically received
care and had round-the-clock access to laboratory and diagnostic equipment. The
changing nature of increased social expectation of families to save their babies in the post
war society combined with changes in insurance and third-party payers found newborns
in the perfect place to reap the benefits of social value, medical tenacity, and
technological advances.
NICU nurses found themselves doing many of the same things their adult critical
care counterparts did, including developing close professional relationships with the
physicians and other members of the healthcare team, garnering greater responsibility as
sicker patients stayed longer in their units, and working with new equipment that became
commonplace in these units. They also built on skills that were central to the care nurses
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in premature infant units gave. As equipment changed and the physiological and
psychosocial needs of newborns (and their families) were better understood, NICU nurses
sometimes needed to make the tools and treatment devices work for their tiny patients as
it took time for manufacturing companies to produce equipment small enough for
newborns and then for hospitals to allocate financial resources to purchase such
equipment.
While neonatal intensive care units became the focal point for the intersection of
data collection and research, and new equipment for the treatment of disease, nurses
functioned as the hub of a complex system of patient care. Whether working at the
bedside assessing the patient and gathering data to document the patient’s condition,
working with the families and physicians, or making the equipment work to fit their
patients these nurses garnered a great deal of power. They became the center of a
complex and dynamic system where their observation skills, ingenuity, and knowledge
about the patient’s condition meant they were needed and valued. The physicians
recognized this and worked with these nurses to push the boundaries of NICU care.
The next two chapters will provide case studies of two particular neonatal
intensive care units and specific instances where these units were established and
developed. While this chapter has focused on the ways nurses worked in intensively
caring for sick newborns, the next two chapters will give particular examples of how
units formed and were influenced by particular contexts, people, and communities.
Understanding why these units formed where and when they did will also aid analysis of
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why alternative ways to care for sick neonates did not become standard and why NICUs
emerged as the spaces where care is delivered today.

Chapter 4:

“We needed a place to put the babies…”:
Infant Intensive Care and The Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia
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“We needed a place to put the babies…”: Infant Intensive Care and The Children’s
Hospital of Philadelphia
The eight person surgical team waited at the Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia
on the morning of August 27th, 1959 prepared to receive baby Anthony born just two days
earlier without a connection between his mouth and stomach, a condition known as
esophageal atresia. In order for Anthony to survive, he needed immediate surgery. The
team worked together to ensure their patient survived the surgery where his esophagus
would be reconstructed and the upper esophageal segment would be connected to the
lower segment allowing nutrients to enter the stomach when swallowed.227
After the surgery, Anthony’s diminished coughing reflexes and inability to clear
his own throat of mucus and secretions put him at increased risk for choking. He needed
someone else to help him keep his airway clear. The physicians saw Anthony on an
average of every 20 minutes, but the nurses took Anthony’s vital signs and stayed at his
bedside adjusting the temperature in his isolette around the clock, “minute by minute care
twenty four hours a day” for the next two weeks.228 The hospital released photographs of
baby Anthony at the end of his hospital stay in their 1959 annual report. In these
photographs, a nurse in her starched white uniform cradles tiny Anthony. He gazes up at
her and she, instead of looking at the camera, gazes back at him presenting him to the
audience with a Madonna and child-like aura. Infants like Anthony required constant
227
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nursing care and a space where that care could be given. While CHOP apparently
provided intensive nursing care to newborns prior to the establishment of a separate ICU
devoted to newborns specifically, hospital administrators, researchers, and healthcare
staff believed a unit needed to be formed as a place where such intensive nursing care
could be consistently given. This belief influenced the allocation of space, financial
resources, and research projects supported by visual representations of the new unit and
nursing workforce who worked there in hospital publications.
In this chapter, I argue the infant intensive care unit (IICU) at CHOP formed out
of the necessity for a distinct place where essential resources were allocated and
particularized nursing care could be given in tandem with the rise of the hospital’s
surgical department. Nurses contributed to the organization of the environments where
they practiced, supported by the trust and confidence of hospital administrators and
physicians, and they became a focal point in the visual representation of the unit that
communicated the human component of intensive care and the consistent presence of
nurses. CHOP’s public relations department and administration used the nurses as the
face of the infant intensive care unit, an increasingly complicated technological system
that included patient care, complicated equipment, and progressive surgical and medical
treatment. In an attempt to allocate precious intensive care resources, including good
nursing care, the unit at CHOP eventually functioned within a network of units that
reflects a complex technological system of care. By the early 1980s, the broader social
and medical dialogue relating to who should receive care and to what extent intensive
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care should be allocated became a focal point for IICU nurses and physicians reflecting
dialogue about unintended consequences of highly complex and skilled care.

A city, a hospital, and the development of a surgical department
Upon his 1842 visit to Philadelphia, famous author Charles Dickens remarked of
Philadelphia, “It is a handsome city, but distractingly regular…Philadelphia is most
bountifully provided with fresh water…[and] There are various public institutions.
Among them a most excellent hospital…”229 He spoke of Pennsylvania Hospital founded
by Benjamin Franklin in 1751. The hospital, considered the nation’s first hospital, was
just one of the many that emerged within the city limits as Philadelphia grew. Just years
after Dickens’ visit, the Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia was established in 1855 as
the nation’s first hospital devoted specifically to the care of children.
Francis W. Lewis, a physician at Pennsylvania Hospital, visited London’s
Hospital for Sick Children on Great Ormond Street during his travels abroad before
returning home to the city of Philadelphia where the mortality rates for infants and
children were abysmally high. With fellow physicians T. Hewson Bache and R.A.F.
Penrose, he campaigned and eventually established the Children’s Hospital of
Philadelphia that opened its doors in 1855, treating 63 patients in its first year. During its
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early years CHOP served the city of Philadelphia’s poor and impoverished children as
was standard of many hospitals during that time period. The charter specified that the
hospital opened for “…children suffering from Acute Diseases and Accidents” who
would receive care free of charge.230 The hospital’s first patient, James Boyle, came to
the hospital suffering from what was called ‘hip-joint discourse.’ The three-year-old boy
received the care he needed free of pay and was discharged home ‘cured.’231
Prior to the transformation of the hospital into what historian Rosemary Stevens
refers to as the “modern scientific institution,” many hospitals served only the poorest
populations who lacked the financial and family resources to receive in home care.232
With the post Civil War principles of scientific charity that held economic self-reliance as
the standard, particularly in hospitals, patients were expected to pay whatever they could
whenever possible. By 1879, the hospital administration expressed concern over the
appropriate usage of the institution and the abuse of its resources by what were labeled as
unworthy people. The January 1879 Manager’s Report echoed concern over the misuse of
the hospital’s resources by members of the community who were not poor enough, and
thus considered ‘unworthy’ to receive care paid for by the community, who consisted of
private citizens, donors, and businesses.233
230

The Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia in Perspective: 1855-1974 (Philadelphia, PA, 1974). Printed
for the dedication observance of the Children's Hospital and Guidance Center Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania May 6, 1974. Children's Hospital Of Philadelphia School of Nursing records,
Barbara Bates Center for The Study of The History of Nursing, University of Pennsylvania.

231

“World’s Famous Physicians Gather Here in 3-Day Meet,” Philadelphia Tribune. May 21, 1955.

232

Rosemary Stevens. In Sickness and in Wealth: American Hospitals in the Twentieth Century (Baltimore,
MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989). 17.

233

Ibid. The Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia in Perspective: 1855-1974.

	
  

121	
  

The first building to house CHOP, located on Blight Street (currently known as
Watts street), quickly proved to be too small and by 1866 the young hospital moved into
its second building on 22nd street between Walnut and Locust.234 Over the next few
decades, the hospital grew and expanded, adding a new physician residency program as
well as establishing the Ingersoll Training School for nurses by 1895. This program
became one of the most prominent nursing programs in the country for nurses
specifically interested in training for the care of children. By 1916, the hospital had again
outgorwn its facility and moved to a third building at 18th and Bainbridge Streets. Such
growth reflected the general trends in hospital expansion at the turn of the century as
hospitals grew and began to compete to attract patients within changing social
considerations of the role of hospitals at the time. The move also reflected the social
focus on health issues faced by children such as malnutrition, disease, and (as it related to
infants) clean milk supplies that would have impacted a focus on children’s healthcare
more broadly including hospital care for those who needed it.235 By 1917, the hospital
reflected the developing model of cleanliness, efficiency, and expertise valued at the time
and aimed at the care of children.236

234

“150th Celebration Timeline: The Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia,” Accessed December 11, 2013.
http://www.chop.edu/flash/150-year-timeline-2005.html.

235

For more see: Charles King. Children’s Health in America: A History (New York: Maxwell MacMillan
International, 1993).; Alexandra Stern and Howard Markel, eds. Formative Years: Children’s
Health in the United States 1880-2000 (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 2004).;
Richard Meckel. Classrooms and Clinics: Urban School and the Protection and Promotion of
Child Health, 1870-1930 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2013).

236

Ibid. Stevens. In Sickness and in Wealth.

	
  

122	
  

The great migration: The changing face of Philadelphia and the health of it’s smallest
By the 1920s, the “great migration” brought hundreds of thousands of southern
families – both white and black – who moved into northern cities in search of work. This
“Southern Diaspora,” as historian James Gregory calls it, transformed the American
social landscape across the country.237 Most obviously affected were the large cities of
the north like Philadelphia. By the 1950s, the transformation of the Philadelphia social
and economic landscape by these migrants positioned it as an important center for the
northern civil rights movement.
Between 1940 and 1950, the Black population in the city of Philadelphia
increased by 50%. In 1940, the city noted 251,000 Black residents, but by 1950 those
numbers had grown to over 376,000. Toward the end of World War II, the government
invested $131 million in the expansion of defense plants in Philadelphia that brought
thousands of jobs to the city. Philadelphia’s black workforce experienced all too common
discriminatory hiring practices. White workers still unofficially had greater opportunity
and held precedence when it came to filling the job market. Blacks also faced
discrimination in the housing markets and education opportunities.238 Inequality in civil
rights, labor, socio-economic status, education, and healthcare all affected access to care
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and health disparities. All strata of life – infants, children and adults-- faced the effects of
socio-economic and healthcare issues.239
Differences in infant mortality rates revealed unequal access and treatment not
only in Pennsylvania, but across the country as well. The national neonatal mortality rate
in 1960 hit 18.9%. Although mortality rates were high, Philadelphia’s white newborns
fared better than the national average with a mortality rate of 17.7%. Their non-white
counterparts240 experienced a higher, 29.5% mortality rate.241 Pennsylvania was one of
fourteen states that failed to show any decrease in neonatal mortality for either white or
nonwhite newborns between 1958 and 1961.242, 243 In 1961, in the US congenital
malformations, ranging from issues such esophageal atresia to cardiac malformations,
comprised almost 40% of neonatal deaths reported, second only to prematurity and
respiratory distress associated with premature birth.244 These numbers reinforced the need
to focus attention and resources on the development of better care for sick newborns,
particularly newborns needing surgical treatments for congenital malformations.
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Physicians in Philadelphia recognized the need to do more for infants born with complex
problems that required complex treatments.
Over the previous two decades, surgical treatments for some common congenital
malformations had been pioneered and physicians, such as C. Everett Koop at CHOP,
argued the importance of good pre- and post-operative care. Such advances coincided
with increased hope that infant mortality rates related to congenital malformations could
indeed decrease infant mortality rates further. The story of how pediatric surgery came to
CHOP and the particular ways surgical care for newborns developed at this institution
illustrates the hope that these mortality rates could be decreased.
Pediatric surgery and neonates at CHOP
The Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia (CHOP) responded to the need to lower
the mortality rate for infants born with congenital malformations by making changes in
the care of newborns who specifically required surgical intervention and subsequent
intensive care. The hospital proposed important and innovative changes as they further
expanded on good nursing care, and challenged current models of postoperative care
particularly for infants born with life threatening congenital malformations. Physicians
and hospital staff at CHOP sought to create adequate spaces where such care could be
given and the particular needs of post-operative and medically fragile infants could be
researched and better understood.
Prior to the innovation of better surgical technique and a better understanding of
neonatal post-operative needs, many infants born with malformations received what we
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would consider today as palliative care - physicians and nurses made the newborns as
comfortable as possible until they died.245 Prior to the development of particular surgical
methods to correct malformations, a thorough understanding of what constituted good
post-operative care, and units where post-operative newborns could receive care from
staff trained in newborn physiology and care needs, very little could be done to
consistently ensure better outcomes or change the mortality rates for infants born with
congenital malformations.
In the 1940s, pediatric surgery and training for physicians still remained in their
infancy. Boston Children’s Hospital, under the guidance of Dr. Robert Gross, shone as
the epicenter of pediatric surgical training in the US. Gross’s textbook The Surgery of
Infancy and Childhood, published in 1953, became the seminal training manual for
physicians interested in surgical interventions specifically related to children and infants.
It provided foundational knowledge on surgical treatment of problems such as esophageal
atresia, intestinal obstructions, surgery on premature infants, and new material on the
heart and great vessels. In 1953, Dr. Gross described the field of pediatric surgery as
having few delineated boundaries, lacking in appropriate training, and in need of
development and formation in the ways already seen in adult surgical specialties.246
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Needs for equipment that ‘fit’ the smaller patients became a primary challenge,
particularly for surgeons who operated on newborns.247 For example, the development of
intravenous catheters for smaller patients and better protocols for providing intravenous
fluids for infants needed to coincide with emerging surgical technique. Physicians and
nurses also demanded better ways to provide post operatively ventilator support for
infants. Equipment better suited for newborns needed to be developed in tandem with
education and development of assessment skills for the practitioners who cared for these
infants. Both the education and training lacked formal channels in organized programs,
and happened in a more apprenticeship fashion. Surgeons operated on their pediatric and
newborn patients in operative suites in hospitals across the country while they attempted
to determine the best surgical technique and care despite the fact that scholarly journals
devoted to the generation of new knowledge did not exist.248 These challenges did not
mean physicians and nurses failed to see the need for better surgical technique, care, and
tools. They did, and they attempted to meet those needs in innovative ways that included
pushing vehemently to change the current system when necessary.
Dr. C. Everett Koop, founder of the pediatric surgical department at CHOP,
credited nurses for bringing the pediatric surgical department to the Hospital of the
University of Pennsylvania and subsequently to CHOP. In an interview Koop recalled the
story of a child admitted to the Children’s Hospital by one of the hospital’s medical
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residents. The resident examined the child and determined his symptoms of abdominal
pain, distension, and bloody stools as evidence that the child suffered from
intussusception.249 He determined the child would need surgery, but like many early
children’s institutions, the Children’s Hospital had no surgical team. The resident called
the Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania’s surgeon on call. Despite repeated calls to
Penn’s surgical service, the surgeon on call did not arrive to CHOP to examine the child
until the next morning but by then, “the child had already died with a surgical problem
unattended by a surgeon on the wards of the oldest children’s hospital in America.”250
At the time, Ms. Francis Clyde was CHOP’s head nurse. She came to Philadelphia
from Boston Children’s Hospital and had worked in Boston’s operating room with the
physician considered the father of American Pediatric Surgery, William Ladd. According
to Koop, she was furious that the child had not received the surgical care he needed, care
she knew he could have received if he had been seen by a surgeon in a timely manner.
She went to Joseph Stokes, the Physician in Chief at the Children’s Hospital and the
Bennet professor of Pediatrics at the University of Pennsylvania, demanding that CHOP
take the steps necessary to install a pediatric surgical service. If he failed to do so, “…she
and her staff would leave and she further emphasized this by saying, ‘And when I say my
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staff, I mean all of us.’”251 Upon being presented with the ultimatum of losing his entire
nursing staff, Stokes took the matter to I.S. Ravdin, Chief of Surgery at the Hospital of
the University of Pennsylvania, and Joseph Stokes, Physician-in-chief of CHOP, who
determined that they needed to send a surgical resident to Boston for training and that this
could significantly contribute to a solution for their problem – a solution that required
both surgical knowledge and a system that enabled that knowledge to be put into practice;
in short, a surgical department at CHOP. Knowing Boston Children’s Hospital had a high
reputation for pediatric surgery, Stokes sent the only resident who would accept the
position, Koop, to Boston in 1946. There Koop studied under pediatric surgical pioneers
William Ladd and Robert Gross who had the sole training program for child surgery in
1946.252
Koop remembered that four other residents were offered the opportunity to go to
Boston to study with Ladd and Gross in return for a guaranteed position of chief of
surgery at CHOP upon their return. They all turned down the position as the
consideration of ‘limiting’ your surgical expertise only to children undermined their
training as general surgeons. Koop felt that knowing how to perform excellent surgery on
251
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the smallest patients would only make him a better adult surgeon if the position and long
term offer at CHOP fell through.253 While adult surgical skill was valued during this time,
the importance of trained surgeons who knew how to work with pediatric patients had yet
to become a widespread value among surgical circles.
Dr. C. Everett Koop: Bringing newborn surgery to CHOP
Upon his return to Philadelphia in 1946, now fully trained, stepped into his post
as the surgeon in chief at CHOP and head of what was then known as ‘child surgery’. He
considered his new specialty at CHOP pediatric surgery and began to call it such, though
he never claimed to invent the term. Pediatric surgery was not a recognized specialty at
the time and the Journal of Pediatric Surgery would not be published until 1967.
Despite his newly appointed position, skills, and desire to move pediatric surgery
forward, he encountered several challenges during the beginning years. Koop
remembered resistance to his new subspecialty and resistance of other physicians to
relinquish their patients to his service.254, 255 For example, Stokes made it very clear to
Koop on his first day back that he retained all diagnostic rights and would refer his
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patients only to the care of Koop for the surgery itself, after which the patient would
return to Stokes’s care. Koop insisted and mandated that he retain responsibility for
patients from diagnosis through follow-up care after discharge from CHOP. Stokes
agreed to Koop’s terms only after a call to Ravdin made it clear that he supported Koop’s
mandate.256 Other physicians in the hospital also resisted relinquishing their patients to
Koop and, as he remembered, made it very clear they neither desired his presence nor felt
he and the pediatric surgical department were needed.257 Resistance probably related to
financial loss as physicians were paid for the patients under their care, and to sign their
surgical patients over meant losing those payments. Koop was also a young and relatively
new physician who had yet to gain respect from the long-standing house staff at CHOP
(though he did eventually establish himself and garner such esteem).
After nine months as head of pediatric surgery at CHOP, Dr. Koop received an
office and moved into a small cubical found for him on the fifth floor (Koop’s first office
consisted of a table in the hospital library – no walls and no support staff).258 He shared a
waiting room and secretary with five other physicians. Koop’s lack of an office and
adequate support staff reflects the lack of focus on pediatric surgery from hospital
administration. Koop worked as surgeon-in-chief and accomplished the leg work for
starting his department without expansive support to achieve the goal with which he had
been tasked. Without established protocols, a scholarly community producing knowledge
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and research, basic administrative resources, or appropriate equipment physicians such as
Koop and his staff exhibited a great deal of tenacity and fortitude to push ahead
regardless and worked with what they had.
As Koop began to perform surgeries on smaller patients into the early 1950s, he
recognized many infants could be saved with surgical intervention made possible by his
training, the homemade equipment he and his team made, and good nursing care. Dr.
Koop placed increasing focus on newborns and their responses to surgery. Not only did
he lack administrative space and resources, he and his team lacked some of the necessary
pre-made equipment to perform their surgeries on their newborn patients. As mechanical
ventilation for newborns was not yet a standard practice, endotracheal tubes used with
mechanical ventilation would not have been easily on the market in the 1950s. Thus
Koop and his team needed to make such equipment for their smallest surgical patients:
There was no equipment to be bought; we made our own. The night before
surgery, we would fashion endotracheal tubes out of red rubber catheters, file the
edges with emery boards to prevent injury to the tracheal mucosa, boil them over
bent wire…and then begin to experiment with anesthetic gases as well as
preoperative medication.259
In the early 1950s, the pediatric surgical department at CHOP began at a time when few
resources existed. The lack of scholarly literature, textbooks, adequate training programs
for physicians, and major research programs all contributed to a fledgling beginning.
Programs to train nurses in the specific care of post-operative newborns also did not
exist. The ability to make some of their own tools solved one problem, but Dr. Koop
became convinced very early in the process that right-sized equipment was not enough 259
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he needed specialized nurses to care for these neonates. CHOP’s nurses, as was common
in other hospitals at this time, often cared for patients all over the hospital and traveled
through the wards on rotation where needed. Student nurses also provided much of the
nursing work supervised by graduate nurses at this time. The hospital hired private duty
nurses on occasion to care for some patients who needed more intensive care. Koop
pushed back on this idea. He believed that the best post-operative care could not save his
patients without the expertise of good nurses who knew how to assess the patients for
post-operative complications and use the home made equipment effectively.260 Koop and
his staff performed surgeries, refined the tools they needed, and worked to determine
what the best post-operative care looked like for their neonatal and pediatric patients.
While Koop was one of the early pediatric surgeons concerned with neonatal surgery, he
was not the only physician working in this area. Another surgical resident from England
spent time studying under Ladd and Gross training in the 1940s; his name was Peter P.
Rickham (also known as P.P. Rickham). 261
Following his five years of training in Boston, Rickham returned to his native
England to pursue the development of scientific approaches to the care of post-operative
surgical neonates. In 1953, he established a neonatal surgical intensive care unit at Alder
Hey Children’s Hospital in Liverpool, England where he operated and conducted the
research he needed to determine a scientific basis for newborn post-operative care. In
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1957, Rickham published a textbook on the metabolic responses of newborns to surgery.
He reflected on operative mortality and believed the declining operative mortality rates
could not, “be ascribed to improvements in the actual surgical technique, as there [were]
few technical advances during the last ten years. It should be credited, rather, to more
efficient pre- and post-operative management.”262 Nurses provided such pre and postoperative management to Rickham’s patients.
Rickham’s nursing staff oversaw patient assessment263 and worked with the
Oxygenaire surgical incubator.264 The nurses devised methods for urine collection, the
development of charting forms specifically for this research, intravenous and oral intake
methods, and the use of gastric suctioning. The nurses made the equipment work for the
patient and then organized the relevant data for doctors and nurses to use in decisions
related to the progression of care. Rickham acknowledged many members of the medical
laboratory staff regarding the study, but paid particular attention to the nursing staff,
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I should like, however, to mention with gratitude the devoted care given to the
patients by the nursing staff of the neonatal surgical unit of the hospital; without
their conscientious attention to detail in the pre- and post-operative treatment, this
investigation would have been impossible.265
While this was a hopeful time for newborn surgery, Rickham’s study highlighted the
continued need to differentiate newborns from their older counterparts – infants, children,
and adults. Growing scientific evidence noted newborns’ different physiology and
metabolic responses to the stresses surgery places on the body. Building on the work of
surgeons like William Ladd and Robert Gross who laid the foundation for pediatric
surgery, Rickham and other surgeons of the time gradually learned to respond to and
identify and respond to the unique needs of post-operative newborns.266
Rickham published his groundbreaking findings in an article in the Lancet in 1960
arguing the need for good nursing personnel as well as the need for broader infrastructure
that included pediatricians, anesthesiologists, lab workers, and researchers needed to
influence and grow the field – in short, he recognized the need for a system of support for
the unit itself. While Rickham acknowledged that surgical infants could receive good
care in general surgical wards, he argued these types of neonatal surgical intensive care
units provided a place to focus the research as well as train physicians and nurses to care
for these infants particularly. Koop would likely have known of the work done on
Rickham’s London unit.267 The groundbreaking article in the Lancet gave great detail
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about the type of care, necessities, and methods used in the unit by Rickham and his staff.
Koop’s assertion that highly skilled nurses and round-the-clock intensive care were
needed coincides with Rickham’s statements. While there is no evidence the two ever
spoke nor any tangible indication of the degree to which Rickham’s work influenced
Koop, both physicians shared common themes in the care of post-operative neonates
including the cornerstones of good nursing care, the need for proper equipment, and the
creation of separate spaces where this care could be focused and given.

Koop’s vision and a strong nursing workforce.
The forerunner to the formal infant intensive care unit at CHOP consisted of three
incubators set along a wall in one of the children’s units that were reserved for sick
infants. The hospital staffed these initial beds with private duty nurses hired by the
hospital to care for these infants.268 Koop believed there was a better way to provide
nursing care to this population. Beginning in 1956, Dr. Koop started to gather
preliminary data related to improving outcomes for post-op surgical neonates, and then
set out to obtain funding to continue his research and establish a separate space where he
known the current literature (in lieu of the lack literature) related to the surgical neonate. I believe
he would have, at some point, known of Rickham’s work as it only slightly pre-dated his own and
Rickham published as Koop was seeking funding, and would have been cutting edge at the time.
268
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could provide better care with specially trained nursing personnel.269 He spent a great
deal of time convincing the hospital administration to allow him specific specialized
nurses to provide specific care and arguing that he needed a designated space where his
post-operative neonatal patients could receive this care. He wrote three grant applications
before one was funded, finally allowing him to establish his neonatal surgical intensive
care unit and progress research. 270
With this funding, received from the United States Children’s Bureau in
Washington, D.C. as well as the Department of Public Health of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, CHOP launched a five-year pilot study beginning in 1957. This study271
was based on the premise that in ideal conditions the survival rates of newborns could be
improved with a focus on five particular types of surgery regarding congenital
malformations.272 The Children’s Hospital received $375,000 over a five-year period to
pay hospital costs associated with the demands of providing care, including nursing care,
for medically fragile post-operative newborns and to develop a prearranged formula to
determine staffing needs for nursing and for the hospital allocated nurses particular to this
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unit.273 The hospital labeled the unit their infant intensive care unit and it is also
commonly also referred to as CHOP’s neonatal surgical intensive care unit in the
literature today, as Dr. Koop used the terms interchangeably in subsequent publications
and interviews over the following years.274
Dr. Koop remembered “learn[ing] very early that the best surgery would
accomplish little without proper postoperative care…Great technical surgical skill would
come to nothing without the complete dedication of the nurses charged with the care of
our tiny patients.”275 In his memoir he fondly reminisced on his relationship with the
nurses who he credited as vital to his surgical work. He remembered one nurse in
particular, Erna Goulding, who would later work with him to establish the hospital’s
groundbreaking IICU as CHOP’s chief nursing officer at the time.
After an initial period, CHOP publically delineated particular characteristics to be
true of their IICU nursing staff: a consistent nursing staff – when nurses had no other
responsibilities elsewhere in the hospital and could devote themselves to the expertise of
this particular patient population, when the same nurses worked with the same patients
over the course of the patient’s stay, and when this exclusivity existed, the morale of the
healthcare team could be bolstered in allowing for interrelationships in which constant
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teaching and learning and comradery could occur. During this time nurses were more
generally staffed rather than being assigned to particular units, so having a specific
nursing staff would have been an important distinction in considering these IICU nurses
as a strength of the unit.276
Dr. Koop emphasized that post-operative care was just as important as good
surgical technique and echoed the assertions of earlier pioneers in newborn care such as
Julius Hess, Evelyn Lundeen and Geddes. All agreed that nurses were vital to good care
for critically ill newborns. In the midst of a time when the biggest and newest machines
and groundbreaking medical techniques were given great weight in changing American
medicine, these physicians never shied away from championing the foundational need for
good nursing care. Koop emphasized that nurses were able to ‘keep all the balls in the
air,’ in an environment where intense concentration was mandatory.277 As Koop and his
surgical residents performed the surgeries and followed up with their tiny patients, they
worked in close proximity with the nurses who constantly stayed at the bedside. Koop
based his care on consultation with the nursing staff and relied on them to physically
assess the patients, collect data, and manage the bedside equipment at all hours of the day
and night. In this way, the nurses participated in the data collection that determined care
for each patient. For physicians like Koop, the need for skilled nursing care informed and
influenced resource allocation of space, nurses, and the infrastructure of a separate unit.
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“We needed a place to put the babies!”278: The IICU at the Children’s Hospital of
Philadelphia
Dr. Koop performed many high profile surgeries and his desire to push the
boundaries and discover better models of care for newborns fit with CHOP’s longstanding focus on research that included nurses as an important part of a broader cadre of
healthcare personnel in conjunction with pediatricians, anesthesiologists, and respiratory
pathologists and therapists. Though the care providers were not limited to nurses and
physicians, these nurses served a unique function at the bedside that situated them as a
crucial component of the system necessary to intensive care.279 No one doubted the need
for nurses in patient care at this time, but this grant and the subsequent space it allocated
for a distinctive unit focused in on the foundation of good nursing care, the question of
what that meant for patients, and the expectation that these nurses were part of the team
in ways unique to intensive patient care at the time. No matter what the nurse staffing
was like elsewhere in the hospital, the grant provided that the unit’s nurse to patient ratio
would never fall below one nurse to four patients (with a higher nurse to patient ratio
when patient acuity increased in the unit).
Nurse Jane Barnsteiner remembered a typical day involved many components of
patient care, preparation and time management, and collaboration with other nurses and
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physicians. Before entering the unit, each nurse was required to scrub in280 and don an
isolation gown in an ante chamber outside the unit; this chamber provided a space where
those who were not involved in patient care were forbidden, and where physicians,
nurses, and (on rare occasions) family members could prepare for entering the unit.
Nurses read the charts and became familiar with their patients’ medications, gathered
supplies, and drew up any medications needed before receiving the patient report from
the previous nurse. Upon receiving report, each nurse performed a detailed patient
assessment that included assembling vital signs, daily weights, and general patient
condition, and then continued with needed surgical dressing changes, hanging any
intravenous fluids or medications, and assisting any physicians in procedures as
needed.281 This type of environment required consistent communication among the
nurses and physicians. Barnsteiner remembered, “Well, we really had to trust each other
and develop a level of respect.”282 Not only did the nurses work closely with each other
in the space, but they also worked closely with the physicians on a level that requird the
same high level of two-way communication. Nurse Jane Barnsteiner remembered that
physicians communicated with her and the nursing staff in a way that she felt was
different than elsewhere in the hospital:
They had to depend on us and they had to communicate. They had to work with
us as team members. So it set up a different kind of working relationship that I
280
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think…[was]a different kind than they might have had on a different unit…they
encouraged us to call them if anything came up…I know what they [pediatric
surgeons C.E. Koop and Harry Bishop] were like…they were not like that
working with us in the IICU. They treated us with the utmost respect and as
equals.283
Such working relationships, consistent with the oral history themes from newborn
intensive care nurses who practiced during this time (see chapter 3), supported both the
transfer of knowledge, the building of trust as the nurses were valued and continued to be
highly valued in the unit, and as such intensive and critical care emerged as uniquely
effective at CHOP.
When Dr. Koop opened the grant-funded unit in 1962, the neonatal surgical
intensive unit contained eight beds located in a large open room surrounded by windows,
with a smaller two bed isolation room off to the side. Infants with potentially contagious
diseases were cared for in a side room where they could be kept in isolation from the rest
of the newborns. The initial unit was ‘close quarters’ as one nurse remembered. The
patient beds, largely isolettes, were sometimes only a foot or two apart. She recalled the
ability to stand in the middle of the unit and be able to see all the babies, as well as the
ones in a small side room reserved for isolation cases.284 Such an allocation of resources,
particularly space - to neonatal surgical patients emphasizes the growing importance of
caring for sick newborns, and might also have been related to Koop’s success in the field
as well as his growing power in the institution as he obtained outside grant funding. At a
283
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time when hospitals were growing, subspecialties expanding, and bigger and more
complex medical equipment became more commonplace, the importance of creating a
space to care for vulnerable newborns carried a great deal of significance.
In 1962, when the unit opened, photographs released in hospital publications
reveal a room with a mixture of isolettes and bassinettes for infants at different stages of
recovery and with varying physiologic needs. While the impetus for the unit’s existence
in the 1950s was the need for better surgical care for newborns, medically fragile
newborns with a wide range of needs were also treated in the unit beginning in its early
days.285 The hospital portrayed this unit and the care nurses gave there in their annual
reports and hospital publications between 1955 and 1975.
Nursing care in black and white: CHOP’s images of their IICU and good nursing care
When the unit was opened in 1962, the hospital presented it to their funders,
patrons, and the medical community with a multi-page spread in that year’s annual report
showing the hospital’s pride in the unit and their value of these newborn patients. These
images would have been taken by a hired photographer and sanctioned by the public
relations department for publication. The photographs of the unit that opened in 1962 did
not reveal a room overtaken with machines as we often see in neonatal nurseries today.
Though nurses and physicians worked together and used isolettes and ventilators with
some of the patients, the early unit more closely resembled the well baby nurseries that
were commonplace in hospitals by 1960. The pictures of nurses in CHOP’s annual
285
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reports from the early 1960s were if woman who actively participated in developing a
system of care, shown in the spaces where that care was given, as they exercised
incredible skill and were part of a trusted team of healthcare providers. These women
were depicted as a vital part of a new technological system – a system we know as the
hospital’s infant intensive care unit. These nurses stand at the forefront of the many
points in healthcare where patient care and increasingly complex equipment intersected.
The hospital’s sanction and publication of images highlighting nurses in the infant
intensive care unit in their annual reports reinforce Koop’s assertions that the nurse
played an important role in this environment and the care given there. The way the nurses
are positioned indicate that the equipment was not the initial driving force behind the
establishment of the unit. Instead, the nurses represent a very human factor in the care of
newborns. Over time, the machines became a much more dominant aspect of the
photographs, as the hospital showed images of nurses working with larger and seemingly
more complex machines while delivering patient care. By the mid-1970s, the
photographs revealed nurses focusing on their tiny patients while manipulating the
machines – pumps, tubing, ventilators, and infant bed warmers – necessary for the care
they delivered. Even so, the machines do not overshadow the nurses in these images. The
nurses continue to be shown delivering patient care while working with the machines,
and they continue to be a dominant human presence in the increasingly mechanical and
technological system that makes up neonatal intensive care and the units where it was
delivered. Even as the machines and equipment became more complex, the mandatory
foundation is still good nursing care. The photographs visually build on the writings the
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hospital released at the time describing the everyday occurrences of the unit by
measuring and detailing how nurses specifically cared for the patients.
In one photograph of the unit, the audience looks over the nurse’s shoulder as she
walks into the unit. Your gaze cannot miss her starched white uniform and cap. Her arm
is outstretched both to hold open the door for you and lingers as if to remind you that you
may not dart around her into the environment beyond. She will lead you in. This is her
space. Beyond her you can see the isolettes lining the glass walls and a cluster of
bassinettes. Three nurses work diligently with their tiny patients – none of them seem to
be distracted by your entrance. The patients are their focus. In this particular photograph,
there are no physicians present, only the nurses. While this photograph might have been
only one snapshot of a point in time, it does reinforce the assertions of Dr. Koop and the
hospital administration: the nurses were vital to the care delivered in this space. The
administrators could have focused their visual portrayal on the machines – the incubators,
ventilators, and feeding tools – that would have been used in this unit. The PR
department could have shown the physicians and introduced their audience to the
architecture of the space. Though these tools and the physicians do appear in the
photographs, when they are taken as a whole we see nursing as a consistent presence and
the nurses as key figures in each image.286
That the nurses and their patients are the focal point of the photos and coincides
with Koop’s account of his value of the nursing personnel as well as what we know of the
286
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role nurses played in caring for critically ill and prematurely born infants in hospitals
across the country during the 1950s and 1960s. Though the unit only had a small
percentage of the total number of beds in the hospital, it reflected increasing resource
allocation devoted to newborns as a particular patient population in need of intensive care
given by specially trained nurses.
Growing and changing
Both the hospital and the infant intensive care unit continued to grow. By 1972,
CHOP was in the middle of preparations to move from their building on Bainbridge
streets to a new location, where the hospital still stands to this day, at 34th and Civic
Center Boulevard in the part of Philadelphia now known as University City. The new
building more than tripled the hospital’s space, increasing it from 240,000 square feet to a
spacious 800,000 square feet. Since WWII, subspecialties in medicine have grown at
incredible rates and specialists and subspecialties for children emerged as well. By the
mid 1970s, pediatric specialty certificates were available in cardiology, hematology,
oncology, nephrology, and neonatal and perinatal medicine.287 With advances in medical
treatments and technologies as well as broader trends in hospital organization, care for
children who required particular treatment in hospitals contributed to hospital expansion.
The new building, a mahogany toned glazed brick included bronze-tinted glass
and a twelve foot overhang protecting the front entrance. A spacious entry way and large
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landscaped courtyard reaching 134 feet to a glass enclosed roof provided a sunny and
luxurious atmosphere to children and their families entering through the front doors.
Teaching and research facilities increased greatly as did the numbers of beds across the
hospital. The move allowed for an additional 108 beds, bringing the hospital’s full
capacity to 262 beds.288 The infant intensive care unit also dramatically increased in size.
A new infant intensive care unit was built on the fourth floor adjacent to the surgical
suite. The old unit held 12 infants at full capacity, and averaged approximately 10
patients at a time, but the unit in the new hospital had space for up to 20 infants. 289 The
new unit included a waiting area that opened into a gowning room where visitors would
wash and apply gowns before entering. From the nursing station, all isolettes could be
seen in the ward-like single room.290
The infant intensive care unit also expanded as sicker patients occupied the
hospital beds. As more critically ill patients filled the units, the considerations for who
required the most intensive ICU care changed. Patients who might have been the sickest
just a decade earlier no longer held the delineation of the sickest and thus in need of the
most intensive care. CHOP created ‘step down’ units, where patients who still required
more intensive care than they would receive on general floors but were less medically
288
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fragile, might transition out of the IICU into a less critical part of the unit. This transition
and patient placement allowed for the IICU to function as a unit devoted only to the
sickest and most medically fragile patients.
The hospital changed how they billed their ICU patients in ways that coincided
with longer-term stays for previously acute patients who still needed to be in the hospital,
but might not need the ICU beds devoted to the sickest newborns. Historian Rosemary
Stevens argued that medical insurance impacted the ways hospitals billed patients and
removed considerations of cost constraints from the ways hospitals chose to bill based on
each patient.291 President Johnson signed the Medicaid legislation into action in 1965,
and the late 1960s and early 1970s witnessed an expansion of services and increasingly
long term in-patient hospital care that also occurred in step down units. CHOP’s creation
of step down units occurred at a time when they realized they needed to reserve their ICU
beds for their sickest patients, so they created step down units during the 1970s as places
where chronically ill patients could still receive more intensive (but not as intense)
nursing care that could be billed to insurance payers (government and private).
These patients in step down units did not require the nurse to patient ratios and
level of care the IICU had, and thus were staffed and managed accordingly. In this way,
the infant intensive care unit became a piece of a much larger system of care as some of
these infants became chronic patients and required both intensive and chronic care
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beyond the neonatal period.292 Infants needing greater levels of long term care such that
they could not be discharged home or to the general wards across the hospital,
necessitated the creation of different types of units where they could be cared for by
nurses and healthcare personnel trained to care for their specific needs. While the IICU
became the place for the sickest newborns in the hospital, it simultaneously became a part
of a broader inter-hospital system of intensive care units devoted to newborn care
throughout the city and local regions.

Beyond the IICU’s walls: The NICU as a focal point for a regionalized system of care.
Regionalization of newborn critical care became an important aspect of the
development of neonatal critical care and the units in which it was delivered. Since the
turn of the century physicians and hospital administrators struggled with the expense of
caring for sick newborns; these units were expensive as they were nurse intensive,
equipment intensive, and the beds were specific to a very niched group of patients such
that that overflow from other units where older children were cared for could not take
these IICU beds. To mitigate this, many smaller areas coordinated their own networks of
care in the 1940s and 1950s, transporting prematurely born infants from smaller
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community hospitals to larger ones that had centers for premature infant care.293 While
these attempts were grassroots in nature, the formalization of regionalized care was not a
revolutionary idea unique to sick newborn care. In 1965, the Regionalized Medical
Programs signed into law by President Lyndon B. Johnson, created funding for a system
of cooperative arrangements among medical schools, research institutions, and hospitals
to further education and patient care related to three key areas: heart disease, cancer, and
stroke. 294
Despite the history of more informal forms of regionalization for newborns, some
physicians and healthcare administrators were hesitant to make this practice widespread.
George A Little, a neonatologist in New Hampshire, remembered, “people needed to be
convinced about applying care in a regional fashion. It was not the way acute care was
practiced.”295 While some communities formed regional networks for premature infant
and acute newborn care complete with transportation systems, others expressed hesitancy
to formalize such an approach when facing new unfamiliar models of acute care and
uncertainty about who would pay for it.
In 1972, The Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia started an emergency
transportation system to move sick infants from outlying hospitals that did not have
293
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newborn ICU’s to meet the needs of their sickest patients. CHOP had long been one of
the largest children’s hospitals in the area and by 1973 had garnered recognition for their
expertise in the care of sick children and infants (though St. Christopher’s Hospital would
join CHOP within the next year as another local hospital devoted solely to the care of
children). Philadelphia pediatricians296 and the Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia met to
discuss the ways CHOP could help meet the needs of area children. Physicians at the
meeting identified the need for a regional transportation system so that newborns and
children at area hospitals could be transferred to CHOP for aid during the most acute
stage of illness when community hospitals were unable to provide the acute services
some newborns needed. CHOP worked with a local ambulance company to establish a
Regional Infant Intensive Care Program. This made CHOP’s unit the central hub in a
broader connection of hospitals that enabled all infants born in an eight county
concentration to have access to the level of acute care they needed. By 1974, St.
Christopher’s Hospital for children also had resource services to dispatch an ambulance
with equipment and personnel to transport sick newborns and receive them in their own
infant intensive care unit.
The general outline of the program consisted of three main pieces: the notification
process at CHOP for transfer, the equipment and tools needed to transport the newborn,
and the establishment of criterion for the need of this program. CHOP’s goal was to
transfer the infants for treatment at CHOP until their need for acute care had passed upon
296
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which they would be transferred back to their hospital of origin. The service covered
eight counties including Philadelphia, Chester, Bucks, Delaware, and Montgomery in
Pennsylvania and Burlington, Camden, and Gloucester in New Jersey.297
CHOP agreed to open their unit as the center and arrangements were made with
an ambulance company that transportation between outlying hospitals and CHOP would
be carried out. The ambulance would cost the parents a flat fee of $30 for hospitals within
the city limits, with out of city transports costing an additional $1.00 per mile. Upon
notification for need for transportation, the ambulance would drop by CHOP to pick up
the necessary equipment and the personnel needed: a physician and nurse team “prepared
for any contingency affecting the baby.”298 The physician and nurse worked together and
both would have needed to understand emergency resuscitation, how to run and
troubleshoot any problems with the equipment used during transport, as well as any
issues related to newborns that might arise due to medical complications. The nurse
would have been trained in the equipment and life-saving measure that might be needed
en route. The equipment loaded into the ambulance included an electrocardiogram
machine, resuscitation equipment, heart rate monitor, and an incubator designed for
emergency transport creating what CHOP referred to as the infant’s own carefully
regulated mini-environment. Infants suffering from ten different medical and surgical
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categories could be transferred including low birth weight infants, infants with respiratory
distress infants and infants with suspected surgical problems.299 The range of both
medical and surgical patients was broad, but their classification as neonates unified them
all.
After an initial pilot period of one year, St. Christopher’s Hospital joined the
partnership and served as another center where physicians, nurses and a transport team
would be located.300 Newspaper articles lauded the program as a solution to the problem
of scarce resources in the region for critical care for extremely sick neonates, labeling the
regional transport program as having incredible “life-saving potential.”301 This put the
infant intensive care unit at CHOP at the center of a broader matrix of hospitals and
patients who needed treatment and could be transferred to one of the city’s two children’s
hospital to receive it. Newborn critical care did not function as individual units in the
299
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separate hospitals. Physicians and hospital administration transferred sick newborns
between each location when neonates needed care that could not be given at a particular
institution. Thus NICU care became a system of care that was broader than just the
individual units, but functioned as a network of units that shared resources. Considered
one of three infant intensive care units in Philadelphia at this time, CHOP was poised as a
hospital with trained personnel, beds for the most critically ill, and advanced equipment
and technologies to care for these newborns
“Keeping infants alive is only half the battle…”302:
Ventilator-dependent pediatric patients and the chronicity of unintended consequences
By the late 1970s, both the accomplishments of intensive care for newborns as
well as unintended consequences emerged in tandem with increased attention on the costeffectiveness of such highly technological environments. While more critically ill
newborns survived, they did not always make full recoveries and some remained
dependent on certain technologies their entire lives. As physicians and nurses
progressively saved sicker patients, they contributed to the growing issues of chronicity
as these patients survived but, in some cases, never left the units. Wayne Hayman was
one of those children. Newspaper articles described him as a vibrant and special little
boy. Wayne was born with VATER syndrome (also known as VACTERL syndrome).303
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Little Wayne underwent 30 life-saving operations before turning three years old. He
never left the NICU, though he eventually graduated to the pediatric intensive care unit.
By his fourth birthday he had a tracheostomy, was ventilator dependent, had a colostomy,
and required a feeding tube to help him eat. Surgical intervention had saved Wayne’s life,
but he still required intensive medical and nursing care.
Wayne had no family to care for him, so he was made a ward of the state of
Pennsylvania and local newspaper columns describe the physicians, nurses, and social
workers that cared for him during his tenure at CHOP as “the closest thing he had to a
family.”304 Wayne’s chubby cheeks and bright eyes set him apart from the other patients
at CHOP, particularly when coupled with his spunky and joyful attitude. The nurses
remembered him as a bit of a jokester, stealing their supplies and playing tricks on them
when he could. Due to his tracheostomy, Wayne could not speak, but communicated
through American Sign Language and knew over 300 signs that he used to convey his
wants, emotions, and needs. Wayne was the longest continual patient CHOP had ever had
up until that point. The surgical and daily care over his short life totaled over $2 million
dollars, an unprecedented amount at that time for the children’s hospital. By his sixth
birthday, Wayne had become the focal point of a discussion about the worth of using
technology to save lives.
defects, anal atresia, cardiac defects, trachea-esophageal fistula, renal anomalies, and limb
abnormalities. Due to the nature of the congenital abnormalities, surgical intervention is almost
always required during infancy.
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The consequences of more invasive and intense medical interventions helped
newborns survive but left children dependent on ventilators for their entire lives. These
‘vent dependent’ kids became important aspects of the continual examination of the
ongoing care newborn ICU’s delivered. Such scrutiny was not confined to the United
States. Canada also experienced extensively long ICU stays as a result of better ability to
save the lives of sicker patients and deliver more intensive care. One such example was a
little boy named Kevin Keough, a nine year old who resided in the ICU at Winnipeg
General Hospital and was ventilator dependent and a quadriplegic.305, 306
The need to keep healthcare spending in check and ensure these units were costeffective rubbed up against the ethics of who could receive care, what kinds of treatment
were offered, and to what extent treatment could go to save a life. Koop organized a
national workshop in 1983 hosted by the Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia to discuss
national approaches to care for the growing number handicapped children, many of
whom would not have survived prior to the establishment of neonatal intensive care and
ICUs in hospitals.307 Though the workshop did not focus on NICU patients exclusively, it
created a dialogue that considered intensive care for infants and children to be part of a
multi-faceted approach to care, and it concentrated on vent-dependent children as an
avenue to approach broader fiscal and ethical issues in care. Dr. Koop invited over 170
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people, including healthcare providers, legislative aides, financial executives, and parents
and advocates from all over the country. Koop opened the meeting presenting a holistic
approach:
Our task at this Workshop is not an easy one. We are asking each other to deal
with very complex issues as we keep in mind the many levels of complexity: the
emotional and the moral, the medical and the technological, the social, the
psychological, and the financial… When we talk about "cost-effective lifesupport systems," we are implicitly putting some dollar value on a human life. So
the moral and the technological and the economic do come together, whether or
not we feel comfortable about it.308
Koop rightly acknowledged the complexity of making decisions regarding care and
allocation of resources. Medicaid spending had grown exponentially and by the 1980s
both private and governmental spending on healthcare had increased drastically. Many
aspects of healthcare spending came under scrutiny, including systems such as the
NICU.309 One such governmental report, framed as a series of case studies examined the
ethical considerations and cost-effectiveness of the NICU. The authors came to the
conclusion that with the inability to clearly determine, “factual information, clearer
concepts [of neonatal intensive care], and a firmer grasp of the values which public
policy does and should promote” were needed to determine more clearly any benefit
analysis of the NICU.310
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The concerns surrounding technology dependent patients were not unique to
Wayne Hayman nor to Philadelphia; it was a national debate that arose from a
recognition that, “the price to pay for the miracles in the intensive care unit turned out to
be simultaneous survival of a small number of infants and children who could not be
removed from medical technology.”311 The invention of respiratory ventilator therapies
for newborns contributed to increased survival rates, and some infants grew too old to
inhabit units for neonates. The CHOP IICU sent some patients to the hospital’s Pediatric
Intensive Care Unit (PICU) if required while sending others to step down units within the
hospital where physicians and nurses knew how to care for their unique needs. By the
mid-1980s, these units became places where families could be intricately involved in
patient care learning skills, participating in management decisions, and providing care to
their children with the possibility that if they chose to eventually take their child home,
they could. Thus the IICU environment changed as it responded to broader trends in
patient care. These units became places where the unintended consequences of saving
critically ill babies raise the ethical questions of how far to go.
Physicians and nurses and the team of specialists and hospital administrators
learned how to save these babies in Philadelphia and the surrounding region, but they did
not anticipate the continued dependence these infants might have on the technologies
used in their care. Public opinion and debate in Philadelphia swelled on both sides of the
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issue.312 Stances that chose to focus on the value of these newborns and the hope that
they could be saved and fully functional if they received excellent care lauded the units
and those who cared for the tiny patients.313 Other writers questioned the long term
effects on the newborns who could never successfully be weaned off the equipment and
thus required extensive financial and support services for their long-term care.314 By the
early 1980s, the unintentional consequences of a life-saving system of care became a new
key discussion point surrounding the use and continuing development of neonatal
intensive care and the associated commitment of resources. Whether or not the type of
intensive care that saved lives needed to be allocated so intensely became increasingly
scrutinized in the early 1980s, as the issue of technology dependent children became a
more dominant theme in pediatric healthcare.
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Dialogue particularly focused on how the technology was used, on whom
it should be used, when and for how long, and who paid for the expensive care
surrounding its use. Interestingly newspaper and scholarly articles collectively
speak to equipment, but they almost always contextualize it within the units, the
ways we choose to treat particular patients, and the broader implications for the
unintended consequences of how such care is delivered. Articles from
Philadelphia’s newspapers, and others from across the state focused on ventilator
dependent children but understood the ventilator as part of a broader approach to
care. In short, the debate surrounding the long term effects of extensive measures
to save newborns overlapped with a growing number of infants who survived
critical illness and were living longer lives as chronically ill older children who
were very expensive to maintain. This reflects the complexity of a the system of
neonatal intensive care, and is just another check point as the 20th century
progressed where society questioned their choices of intervention and investment
with sick infants who previously would not have survived.
The IICU at CHOP began as a unit that grew in tandem and, in some
ways, out of the development of a surgical specialty. As it grew, the unit became
part of a network of other hospitals and units that provided intensive care for
newborns though a regional transportation system. By the 1980s, the ethical
repercussions came into question for the newborns that grew into childhood and
continued to require costly treatment and support. Though beyond the scope of
this work, the unintended consequences of ICU care for newborns emerged in the
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literature and influenced the development of infrastructure as the need for step
down units and systems to support the care of some of these children in their
homes grew
In some ways, Wayne Hayman’s story at CHOP shows how costly intensive care
was for newborns and children, but Wayne was also in a unique place in the debates as he
lacked a family to care for him at home. The social workers at the Children’s Hospital
worked diligently to find Wayne a foster family that could handle his particular needs.
After months of searching, they finally found a retired practical nurse, Ms. Betty Lamar,
who would take in the little boy. The hospital staff felt it could be risky to send Wayne
into a Foster home, due to his distance from the hospital setting. But they knew he could
not stay in intensive care, so they agreed to train Ms. Lamar to handle his care. Though it
had taken a team of physicians and nurses to provide care to Wayne for five years, they
hoped he could have a better quality of life outside of the hospital setting. On December
5th, after a year living in foster care with Ms. Lamar, the tracheostomy tube through
which the little boy breathed clogged. Despite Ms. Lamar’s immediate instigation of
CPR, Wayne fell into a coma, and after six weeks died at a pediatric nursing home in
New Jersey. His case raised questions about the very personal nature of the growing
problem of chronically ill children who had survived the neonatal period to live life
dependent on complex and intense care. Wayne needed intense resources that, in his case,
highlighted the complexity of caring for children like him. A reporter for the Philadelphia
Inquirer posed the questions:
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Was it worth it – financially, emotionally and in terms of Wayne’s own suffering
– to keep him alive so much longer than we would have without medical
technology? Should the same be done for the Wayne’s of the future? No one
knows what Wayne would say, but those closest to the case clearly think so.315
Wayne’s life and death, the memories of this little boy, and the city’s financial
commitment to his care, brought meaning to this boy’s story for the city of
Philadelphia. CHOP founded their neonatal intensive care unit particularly to
care for post-operative infants, like Wayne, who received initial surgical care. As
Wayne grew, he became part of a growing population of children who survived
previously fatal congenital conditions only to become patients with chronic health
issues. Some children, like Wayne, became ventilator dependent never able to
fully be weaned off of the machines. His life and story raised questions about
ethics and newborn care as well as questions about the increasingly complex
system of support required to keep him alive.
While similar questions occurred in adult units, those who debated the
decisions of life and death in newborn intensive care units often had to do so
without any direct information about what the long-term consequences would be.
Newborns could have 60 to 70 years as productive members of society should
they survive intact, but unlike particular determinants for adults, including
knowing the wishes of the adult, there were no immediate measures to determine
quality or longevity of life for neonates. Until the Baby Doe case in 1981,
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government and legislative officials had largely left the decision-making process
regarding patient care and life support to physicians, nurses and the families. With
the introduction the Baby Doe cases in the early 1980s, the government passed a
law known as the Baby Doe law that began debates about who could and should
be saved and who decided what potentially lifesaving treatments to give.
The reality of the extent that neonates born with particular congenital
abnormalities or at very low birth weights could survive had been proven to some
extent in the NICUs of the 1960s and early 1970s. The Baby Doe cases became
the public and legal arena for debates about whether or not the newborns should
be saved and who made that decision.316 One Baby Doe in particular, a little boy
born in Indiana in 1982, greatly influenced the debates. Baby Doe was born with
Down’s Syndrome and a trachea-esophageal atresia. His parents, in conjunction
with their obstetrician, believed that even if the baby boy received lifesaving
surgical correction of the trachea-esophageal atresia, he would have little quality
of life and food; water and surgical intervention were withheld until death. The
baby died when he was six days old. Legal debates as to the degree that the
parents could decide to withhold ‘life saving treatments’ were initiated but not
completed prior to the infant’s death and eventually reached the Surgeon
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General’s office.317 This case, in conjunction with other legal cases heard at both
the state and federal levels throughout the 1970s and early 1980s placed the
intensive care units for newborns in the middle of intense and complicated
debates about who should receive care and who could make those decisions.318
Physicians, nurses, and families at CHOP, as one of 600 NICUs in the country,319
entered the 1980s facing these legal and ethical questions.
Conclusion:
As lifesaving medical and surgical techniques expanded for the newborn
population, so did the variety of healthcare professionals, equipment, and systems needed
to change the mortality rates. Koop knew he needed expert and skilled nurses to work
with his surgical patients, but Koop’s recognition of good nursing care would not have
been revolutionary in and of itself. He understood that these nurses could better care for
the babies if they were supported by creating a dedicated space, given consistent and
adequate staff, supplying appropriate tools, and giving them the authority to make
decisions and “do something” to protect and care for these infants. A highly technological
system developed that not only included pediatric surgery and a space to put the infants
post-operatively, it involved decisions that affirmed nursing care as central to patient
survival. This assumption of good nursing care, among other factors, fueled the creation
317
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of an infant intensive care unit where the sick and surgical newborn patients could
receive the care they needed. The Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia serves as an
example of the growth a neonatal ICU heavily influenced by the development of a
surgical specialty, and demonstrated the value of an infrastructure that supported good
nursing care and expertise. Regionalization of neonatal intensive care in the Philadelphia
area meant that the hospital and its healthcare staff transported and cared for infants from
around the region providing sophisticated care that many hospitals could not afford to
provide. Like their adult counterparts in adult ICUs, the neonatal nurses proved central to
the idea of intensive care as well as to the care these infants needed as they became
chronically ill.
The Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia highlights the ways nursing influenced
the need to establish an infrastructure for caring for a particularly vulnerable population.
Good nursing care was widely acknowledged as needed, but a dedicated space at CHOP
was implemented so that the nursing care could be optimized. Once the IICU was
established and grew, physicians and nurses began to discover that though many
newborns “graduated” from the unit without significant chronic impairment, a growing
population of ventilator dependent chronically ill children became part of the IICU
legacy. Society lacked resources for their long-term care and there were no long term
plans for paying for the extensive and expensive therapies these children needed. As the
early 1980s dawned, the use of highly complex treatments and technologies came under
scrutiny as the Baby Doe cases raised questions about the ethical use of machines and
technology.
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While CHOP clearly highlights the ways intensive care for newborns arose in one
hospital as a way to meet the need for surgical patients, the establishment and evolution
of newborn care at Boston Children’s Medical Center shows a very different story of how
their unit formed. In the next chapter, I will explore how another children’s hospital in a
large northeastern city met the need for particularized care for critically ill newborns.
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Chapter 5:

Complex roots of influence:
Nursing and the NICU at Boston Children’s Hospital
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Complex roots of influence: Newborn ICU care at Boston Children’s Hospital
On August 8, 1963 a cadre of presidential physicians and secret service personnel
rushed Jacqueline Kennedy to Otis Air Force Base where she gave birth to her second
son, Patrick, born five and a half weeks early.320 Immediately following his birth,
physicians diagnosed Patrick with respiratory distress syndrome and transferred him by
ambulance to Boston Children’s Medical Center (BCMC)321 for treatment. Chief of
Pediatrics at Boston Children’s Medical Center, Dr. James E Drorbaugh, accompanied
the baby for the one and a half hour ambulance ride.322 By the time Patrick arrived at
BCMC, the pediatrics team who transferred him knew something was seriously wrong.323
Physicians and nurses admitted him to the hospital’s newborn intensive care unit placing
him in an Isolette and providing intensive care and support.
Despite skilled care, Patrick’s condition did not improve, so the medical team
decided to offer him a new form of treatment known at the time as hyperbaric medicine.
They placed him in the hospital’s hyperbaric chamber where he experienced an
320
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atmospheric pressure environment up to four times greater than normal. The physicians
believed that this change in environmental pressure allowed for an increase in the
newborn’s tissue oxygen levels. Unfortunately the treatment did not work. Patrick
succumbed to respiratory distress and died the morning of August 9, 1963.324,325
The American people adored the Kennedy family. When the Kennedy’s second
son Patrick died, that admiration intensely focused the nation’s value of newborns, and
the need to improve mortality rates associated with respiratory distress. Patrick
Kennedy’s story resonates in the memories of many Americans as one of the major
events that drastically affected not only the Kennedy family but the nation. As previously
noted the post-war 1950s was built partly upon the framework of the importance of the
family; thus the grief and loss experienced by the President’s family resonated with all
families and reinforced the need to battle the devastating effects of RDS. BCMC chose to
offer a highly experimental form of treatment that few other babies experienced–
hyperbaric medicine - to baby Patrick, perhaps in an attempt to save the baby’s life when
nothing else worked. Though the chamber was located outside of the newborn intensive
care nursery, it was an extension of the desperate attempts to treat RDS and care for
medically fragile and prematurely born infants. The story painted a broader picture of
neonatal intensive care and its possibilities as a technical system beyond the unit as a
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focal point for care. In this chapter I will argue that newborn intensive care at Boston
Children’s Medical Center emerged because the hospital administration made decisions
to allocate space and nursing personnel based on the value of caring for all critically ill
newborns, and with the impact of emerging technology and therapeutics - particularly
skilled nursing care. These influences did not result in the immediate establishment of an
ICU at BCMC, but influenced the creation of units that over time laid the foundation for
what became the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit.
Boston, premature newborns, and the shared mission of two hospitals
BCMC’s neonatal intensive care unit grew out of the approach the hospital had
previously taken to care for sick newborns. Boston Children’s Medical Center had a
critical care unit for newborns by the 1960s, and the unit had roots deeply embedded in
the hospital’s premature infant nursery, established at their sister institution Infants’
Hospital, in the 1930s. Between BCMC’s1889 establishment and the 1950s, the hospital
did not care for infants less than two years of age. Eventually recognizing the need to
encompass newborns and young infants, the hospital chose to form a relationship with the
Infants’ Hospital in in 1922 in an attempt to share limited financial resources, skilled
manpower, and precious hospital space to extend hospital care to sick infants.326 To allow
for closer proximity and sharing of resources, Infants’ Hospital sold their original
property and moved into a new building adjacent to the Children’s Medical Center. The
326
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two hospitals shared nursing staff and administrative organization with the intention of
allowing Infants’ Hospital to function more economically, for BCMC to have access to
medical and nursing care for newborns and infants, and to improve efficiency for both
institutions.327
A Premature Infant Unit
As early as the 1930s BCMC and Infants’ Hospital recognized the need to group
prematurely born newborns together to provide specific care for them. According to
national and state census data for 1925, the mortality rate related to neonatal prematurity
was by far the highest cause of death for infants less than one year of age. More infants in
the state of Massachusetts died of prematurity than all the other causes of death in early
infancy combined.328 By this time, decreases had been made in many causes of death for
older infants, but prematurity did not experience a significant similar decrease in
mortality rates. In light of national attention on premature infants and a recognized need
to lower premature infant mortality (see chapter 2 for discussion of national trends)
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particularly within the state of Massachusetts, Boston Children’s Medical Center and the
Infants’ Hospital collaborated to open a Premature Infant Nursery in 1932.329
The Infants’ Hospital opened its unit just prior to the initiation of a broader public
health movement in 1937 aimed at creating an infrastructure to address the needs of
premature infants in the state of Massachusetts that included: establishment of premature
infant centers (units) in 48 hospitals across the state, the development of educational
materials for physicians and nurses (both premature infant unit nurses and public health
nurses), and the passing of a “Premature Infant Law” aimed at eliminating economic
barriers families might have faced in transferring their babies to the hospital.330 As part of
a push to get newborns born prematurely at home into hospitals for the care they needed,
Massachusetts created centers in hospitals that could receive and care for the newborns.
The state Board of Health developed educational materials for public health nurses
related to the appropriate care of premature infants prior to transfer and follow-up care
once the infant returned home, and created ‘institutes’ for the training of nurses by other
nurses. This program was not the only program of its kind in the United States at this
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time as other large cities such as Chicago and New York also published their attempts to
create citywide infrastructures to battle the problem of prematurity.331
In 1937, Massachusetts initiated their premature infant program due to their belief
that premature infants who received hospital care had higher survival rates that those
born and cared for at home. The program was based on the tenent of transferring
premature infants from home into the approximately 50 hospitals in the state to receive
care in these specialized premature infant units. Hospitals that opened these units
provided their own financial and spatial resources.332 Infant’s Hospital was one such
premature infant center, and most likely one of the largest.
Physician and historian Clement Smith333 described the premature infant unit of
the Infant’s Hospital as a separate unit enclosed within the larger hospital where both
mechanical complexity and the unit census grew steadily throughout the 1930s and into
the 1940s.334 The unit, distinct from the other areas of the hospital, organized care
primarily around prematurely born infants defined as “weighing less than 5 ½
pounds.”335, 336 As the hospital did not have a maternity service, all patients were
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transferred from homes or other hospitals, and nursing staff kept careful records upon
patient intake as to demographic data, from where the infant was transferred, diagnosis,
and referring physician.337
Both administration for Boston Children’s and the Infant’s Hospital weighed in
on the building of the premature infant unit. The hospital built the unit with a focus on
basic tenents of thermoregulation needed for newborn infants. The initial unit consisted
of two air-conditioned rooms one above the other. Kenneth Blackfan, Physician-in-Chief
of the Children’s Medical Center, believed air maintained at particular temperatures
would help with the temperature regulation critical to the care of premature infants, a
primary concern for nurses and physicians caring for prematurely born infants. Since the
unit was divided between two separate floors, nursing staff often had to walk through
other wards when traveling between the two parts of the unit, thus increasing potential for
bringing infection into the premature infant nursery. Dr. Stewart Clifford, head of the
premature infant service, remembered the unit’s arrangement was sound from a technical
point of view as it made the engineering of the space more efficient when considering the
process of pumping temperature controlled air into the unit; but he bemoaned the medical
repercussions as this arrangement did little to prevent the spread of infection, and perhaps
enhanced the spread, as the nurses and aids had to travel elsewhere through the hospital

336

As patient records are kept confidential and not accessible by the CHOB archives, I cannot comment on
race or class issues based on this data. I do know from where infants were transferred generally
speaking, and will comment on this phenomenon later in the chapter.

337

“Infants’ Hospital Patient Forms.” Infants Hospital (AC 3) Boston Children's Hospital Archives, Boston,
Massachusetts. Box 7, folder 92.

	
  

174	
  

should they need to enter the other half of the divided unit.338 As infection risk was one of
the most important considerations in the premature infant units, particularly because all
of their patients were admitted from other hospitals or home births, the control of
infection remained paramount to the prevention of the spread of disease.
Infection Issues:
Hospital-acquired infectious disease was a long-standing problem particularly for
maternal and newborn hospital wards. Outbreaks of staphylococcal infections in
hospitals, both in adult wards and in newborn nurseries - well baby nurseries and
premature infant units - arose as a major health problem. Hospital-acquired staph
infections manifested ranging from skin lesions filled with pus in areas where skin folds
occur to pneumonia and septicemia.339, 340 Many medical practitioners and researchers
tried to understand how to prevent the spread of disease among hospital patients,
particularly newborns, and their case studies and essays fill the disciplinary literature well
into the 1960s.341 Sulfonamides, and later antibiotics, for children and adults were
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developed and used throughout the 1930s and 1940s, but physicians did not have sound
guidelines for dosing children, much less sick newborns or premature infants.342 Even a
decade later into the late 1950s, reports and research focused on the prevention and
control (versus treatment) of infection when it appeared in newborn and premature infant
nurseries.343 According to historian and physician Clement Smith, The Infant’s Hospital
attempted to decrease infection rates by preventing the spread of infection. One way they
attempted to address this issue was to change the premature infant unit’s physical layout
to provide each patient with his own incubator. The hospital also changed policies
requiring nurses to put on special gowns before handling patients. Special gowns for
nurses and physicians who cared for premature infants had been used for years and
commonly appear in photographs of early premature infant units.344
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Dr. Clifford reported that in 1945, the unit had a mortality rate of 60% among the
premature infants admitted, with a large number of these deaths due to infection. Clifford
and Charles Janeway, Physician-in-Chief of the Infants’ Hospital, considered advising the
hospital trustees to close the unit all together due to the high mortality rates, believing
that these newborns could not be safely cared for together in one room. Malfunctioning
air conditioning equipment in 1946 forced the institution’s hand, and instead of repairing
it, the unit relocated to a larger unified (single room) nursery isolated from all other units.
With the addition of a steam autoclave and individually air-conditioned incubators, as
well as changing their gowning policies, the hospital implemented multiple strategies to
decrease their mortality rates.345
Initially, the hospital chose to prevent the spread of infection by reserving the
right to refuse admissions to premature infants who might have been an infection risk.
Almost all of the infants the hospital received were transferred from other institutions or
homes as the children’s hospital had no maternity service. The physicians originally
believed that some of these transfers from other hospitals or homes increased the risk of
introducing the healthy premature infants to potentially fatal infections and thus
complications. This issue was not just in the premature infant unit, but also seen across
the hospital wards as well. In an attempt to curb broader hospital problems with the
spread of infection, hospital policy mandated that all nursing personnel wear gowns over
their nursing uniforms. Hess and Lundeen outlined this gowning practice in great detail in
345
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their 1941 textbook, explaining the procedure for putting the gowns on and taking them
off; such education probably reflected either the belief that this practice should be
common, or that it already was common in newborn units around the country.346, 347 Each
gown was left next to each patient’s bedside under the belief that when gowns were worn,
infection could not be easily spread on the clothes of nurses and physicians. Not all
physicians were happy with the practices and pediatric surgeon, Robert Gross, weighed in
on the issue when he wrote to Dr. Clifford,
… the gowns which hang in the cubicles are the surest method of spreading
infection from one patient to another! I do not believe it is possible for a number
of individuals – nurses or doctors – to get in and out of a single gown without
getting everything pretty much smeared up with whatever germs are on the
gown... 348
The hospital changed their gowning policy and, effective June 1951, all nurses
wore simple aprons over their nursing uniforms when caring for patients coupled
with standard practice of rigorous hand-washing techniques. Within two years, the
infection rate had indeed decreased, proving to Clifford and Smith, head of
Infants Service at the Infant’s Hospital, that with careful attention and simple
protocol changes, and proper infectious control practices, newborns could be
cared for in wards together with other newborns without spreading infection
346
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rapidly among the patients.349 Such evidence reinforces the notion that highly
technological strategies, though absolutely profound, do not undermine or
overshadow the importance of faithful adherence to simple strategies and problem
solving.
Nurses played a role in this decrease in hospital-acquired infection rates as
they vigilantly worked at the bedside with the patients, providing care and critical
assessment and surveillance as well as monitoring who had access to the patients
and when. When nurses did not follow proper technique, they risked spreading
infectious disease throughout the units. In their textbook, published in 1942,
Julius Hess and Evelyn Lundeen350 credited the nursing personnel with, “the fact
that the responsibilities for infections occurring in the nursery rests with them.
They must constantly be alert for breaks in technique…the nursing standards must
be carried out during the entire 24 hours.” While the hospital documents do not
blame the nursing staff for issues in infection outbreak, they make it clear that
nurses functioned within broader policies and infrastructure to achieve and to
oversee proper infection control. Clifford and Smith sought to support the nursing
personnel and provide the best possible nursery arrangements (broadly speaking)
so that proper technique could be consistently practiced. Proper technique
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included vigorous hand washing351 before and after contact with the patient (or
donning the gown, as some hospitals still did), and included considerations about
when and where to care for a baby that might be infectious.352 Hess and Lundeen
did not consider keeping isolation patients in the same room as non-infectious
patients inappropriate as long as nurses were careful to follow technique. Proper
technique included wearing the appropriate protective gear such as gowns and
masks as well as washing hands, keeping the patients’ belongings and equipment
clean, and making sure each patient had his or her own supplies and equipment.353
Based on the hospital’s decrease in hospital-acquired infection, particularly in the
premature infant unit, Smith pushed back against the notion that infants with any
consideration of infection should be excluded; he argued that with good nursing care,
correct hand washing and appropriate use of anti-bacterial scrubbing agents, and careful
attention to unit policies that spelled out infection control, the spread of infection could
be avoided.354 The hospital’s ability to combine infectious and non-infectious patients in
351
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one unit proved to be critical to the future formation of spaces were all neonates could be
cared for in one unit.
An expensive unit to run…
As the units saved lives, costs also rose. Premature infant centers incurred great
costs for hospitals and the Infants’ Hospital unit was no exception. The increased costs of
equipment, such as incubators,355 rose in the years just after World War II and, coupled
with increases in wages for hospital employees, including nurses, combined to create one
of the most expensive units in the hospital, contributing heavily to deficits in the
hospital’s operating budget by the late 1940s. With hospital-wide costs increasing, the
incredible financial resources needed for the premature infant nursery became more
prominent in the hospital administrative records.
To help alleviate the cost of overall increased hospital overhead the ‘incubator
patients’ in the premature infant nursery were charged $15.00 per day, almost twice that
of the $8.00 per day patients in other areas of the hospital were charged. Hospital
Director Dr. Charles Branch referred to the disparity being due to, “the exceptional nature
of the care required and given in the Premature Nursery.”356 Such exceptional care
encompassed the particular nursing care required as well as the equipment such as
355
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oxygen systems, medications, and incubators needed for each newborn in the unit.
Financial costs related to the establishment of premature infant units encompassed the
initial cost of construction, the ongoing reservation of space for those beds when other
paying patients might fill them, and the cost to purchase and repair and equipment 357 in
addition to the 24 hour a day concentrated nursing care the patients received.
Dr. Smith commented, “Many hospitals held back from establishing adequate
nurseries for their premature infants because of the great cost to the hospital in providing
care for these infants…,” but he added, “…two factors have now made the hospital
willing to assume this risk.”358 These two factors addressed payment issues. The first
was the growing membership in Blue Cross Insurance group. Blue Cross plans were a
third party payment plan developed in the 1930s to address the increasing costs of
hospital care that the majority of patients were unable to afford. Such programs were
intended to alleviate financial stress on individuals and families in times of sickness and
fill the hospitals with more paying patients. Historian Rosemary Stevens particularizes
that such payment plans were not meant to provide hospital access to everyone, as
eligibility for obstetrics took one year to go into effect and the plans did not include
payment for mental health services.359 While more people were insured and the Blue
Cross programs did provide certain funding to pay for services, Massachusetts also
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enacted a law in 1949 that made the local Board of Health financially responsible for the
care of infants born below 4 ½ pounds.360 Such funding made the hospital administration
willing to keep the unit open because they believed they could cover the costs, but
reimbursement only came when patients were admitted to the unit.
During the 1950s, many smaller hospitals opened or expanded existing premature
infant units as premature infant care became more commonplace and Massachusetts
funding laws covered premature infant care. Dr. Clifford and his team determined that as
outlying hospitals opened premature infant units and were able to care for the less acutely
ill premature infants, they would only transfer the sickest, and most expensive to the
Infants’ Hospital premature unit. According to one report, fifty-two hospitals transferred
premature infants needing longer term and more critical care to Infants’ Hospital in 1954,
in addition to the premature infants received from home deliveries.361 Infants’ Hospital
became the main support for smaller community hospitals without the expensive
resources needed to care for smaller premature infants who developed complications. The
Infant’s Hospital was important not only to the city of Boston, but the provision of its
resources also reached beyond the city limits into four neighboring states.362 This also
meant that the more expensive patients requiring more complex care ended up at Infant’s
360
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Hospital thus saving the suburban hospitals the higher costs of patient care. Between
1951 and 1954, Infant’s Hospital census remained consistent at approximately 100
newborns admitted each year with a high patient acuity, meaning the hospital admitted
the sickest patients and provided the most intensive and expensive care to them.363 More
stable patients who would have been less expensive to care for remained in their hospitals
of birth; during the 1950s specialized training was becoming more common for
physicians and nursing staff and smaller hospitals would have been more likely to have
physicians and nurses who knew how to care for more stable premature infants as well as
sick full term infants.364 Despite the consistency of higher acuity patients admitted to the
Infant’s Hospital, the census remained too low to make the increasingly high cost of care
financially feasible for the hospital.
“Incubator patients” and a broader newborn population: Ideas for a newborn nursery
The Infant’s Hospital did not have the resources to continue allocating skilled
nursing personnel and precious hospital space with fewer beds filled on average; thus the
need to determine how best to provide particular care to premature infants became an
important issue for the administration who oversaw both BCMC and the Infant’s Hospital
(as they still shared administrators and staff). While the Infants’ Hospital boasted
successful care and decreased premature infant mortality during the early years of the
363
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1950s, both administrators at Infant’s Hospital and Boston Children’s Medical Center
recognized a dire lack of resources. As the Infant’s Hospital functioned at its capacity to
provide care to premature infants, they searched for a better solution to the high costs of
care.
The cost of nursing personnel was one of the highest costs in critical care units
during this time period. Unlike many of the general units, these intensive care facilities
required full graduate nursing personnel around the clock.365 While students might have
provided some care, they always needed to be supervised by a graduate nurse who
monitored their technique and practice very closely. Worried about the costs, Clement
Smith conducted a study to understand where the expenses were concentrated and
analyzed the arrangement of nursing personnel in respect to per capita occupancy. His
results showed that the premature infant unit required at least three graduate nursing
personnel - in addition to any nursing students assigned to the unit -for each 24 hour
period, and covered eight to twelve premature infants at any given time (though the
census rarely filled the 12 beds isolettes available). Smith identified the periods when
only a few babies occupied the premature infant nursery as time when the hospital
experienced “wastage of valuable nursing skill.”366 He considered the skill the premature
infant nurses demonstrated mandatory to premature infant care as well as beneficial to the
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broader neonatal population. These nurses were too precious a resource to use elsewhere
in the hospital.
Unlike elsewhere in the hospital, only nurses particularly trained to work in the
premature infant unit could work there, unlike the rest of the hospital where nurses
generally could work in any of the units as needed as patient census increased or
decreased. Clement Smith recognized, “a staff of nurses particularly skilled in the care of
premature (and, therefore newborn) infants must consistently be assigned to the
Children’s Hospital Premature Nursery.”367 On the one hand, nurses established in the
intensive and expert care required for premature infants had skills that enabled them to
provide quality care to a broader patient population of newborns; but this skill and
expertise also earmarked them as unique to this unit.
With the shortage of nurses and of space, and the inefficiency of operative far
below capacity, and with the technical improvements brought about principally by
the Isolette, the question arises whether the care of prematures in the Infants’
Hospital could not be consolidate with the care of sick infants so as to make more
effective use of space and manpower. A tentative proposal would be to place the
Isolettes on one side of Infants’ Upper and make this area for care of premature
and newborns infants.”368

The physicians and hospital administrators valued the ways the premature infant nurses
might meet broader demands throughout the hospital and, in an attempt to prevent
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wasting expensive and valuable nursing skill, responded with changes to their premature
infant unit. Ultimately the hospital reached an ingenious solution to their problem: they
recognized specialized skills in the premature infant nurses and enlarged the population
of the units thus broadening the types of patients for whom the nurses could provide care.
A Time of Transition to the Newborn Nursery
On June 29,1955, the hospital closed their premature nursery and opened a
“Newborn Nursery” with the purpose of providing more economical and practical
intensive patient coverage to all newborns, premature as well as full-term sick and
surgical neonates. 369 This occurred after a committee met and drafted a report to Dr.
David Rubenstein, head of department services that concluded the premature infant unit
was too costly to maintain. The committee, consisting of two physicians and one nurse,
recommended that the hospital reorganize their approach to newborn care to use limited
resources to the most efficient advantage. Sick newborns already occupied the premature
infant unit as well as filling beds throughout the rest of the hospital. Correspondence
between Smith and Rubenstein provides insight into the possible ways the hospital could
continue to provide specialized and skilled round-the-clock intensive care to their
newborn population.
The hospital admitted increasing numbers of sick and surgical newborns that
required intensive care beyond the more traditional premature infant care. Smith

369

	
  

“Subject: Neonatal Nursery. June 29, 1955” (AC 3) Boston Children’s Hospital Archives, Boston,
Massachusetts. Box 8, folder 107.3

187	
  

proposed the formation of a new nursery that could include any newborn patient who
needed a particular kind of intensive care. Smith believed that by combining both
premature infants and sick full-term infants, they could use their nursing staff more
efficiently and maximize precious space to keep costs down for the hospital. 370 Smith
articulated,
I have agreed that a change in our nursery arrangements would allow much more
efficient use of nurses’ time… An increasing proportion of the babies on these
wards are newborn ones, with erythroblastosis,371 respiratory distress syndrome,
congenital malformations, and so forth.372
While premature infants occupied a particular unit, newborns with congenital
malformations, blood disorders, and respiratory distress syndrome were admitted to other
parts of the hospital. By 1955, the surgical endeavors of Gross and Ladd on smaller
infants meant that occasionally surgical newborns would be shuffled off to post-operative
units elsewhere in the hospital as they initially would not have been considered
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candidates for beds in the premature infant unit (as they were not premature but surgical
infants).373
According to hospital memos, the new unit located in the Infants’ Hospital would
be a general newborn nursery that was set to occupy half of the second floor ward space
of the Infant’s Hospital. The nurses that occupied the positions in the premature unit
became the nucleus of the nursing staff on the new newborn unit. Nurses were added to
their numbers so that the nursing staff that worked in the newborn nursery did not have
responsibilities elsewhere in the hospital and other nurses would not need to be brought
in to cover during times of higher unit census.374 The hospital chose to use particular
nurses who had specialized skills to care for this now broadened patient population.
With the goal of keeping a census at approximately 12 infants (and more if
possible), the patient population encompassed any infant less than one month of age not
suffering from diarrhea.375 The four priority patient populations included (in order of
priority of admission): prematures, erythroblastotics,376 congenital heart disease,377 and
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non-infections medical cases. General priority for admission was given to infants with
more chronic conditions most likely with the intent that they ensured adequate census
(and thus filled the beds) and had higher survival rates than their more medically fragile
and ill counterparts.378 Interestingly, this consideration of who would be allowed into the
unit reflects both the recognition of who could be saved and the focus on who was
valued, but also took into consideration how the hospital would meet their census
requirements and remain financially viable.
A series of memos among hospital administration, physicians, and nursing staff,
established regulations and suggestions to shape the organization of the newborn
nursery.379 These matters of policy included the organization and assignment of space,
nursing practices, admission regulations, the use of various pieces of equipment
necessary to the medical care, and defining patient population. The committee developed
policies and protocols that restricted entrance to The Newborn Nursery to nursing and
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hospital staff assigned to the unit, effectively sealing off the unit to the curious, while
also establishing the particular domain of the realm of sick newborn care. House officers
and medical staff rounded on the newborn patients first before rounding on any other
hospital ward. Anyone wearing street clothes was required to don a hospital gown over
their clothing and adhere to vigorous hand washing protocols prior to entering the unit.380
The new nursery was located in the South Wing of the Infants’ Hospital and only
accessible via the set of small side doors past the sinks. A general sketch of the potential
set up of the unit reveals aspects of the unit that the committee considered important,
including Isolettes and oxygen setup, the unit’s strict entrance and exits, and the
possibility of rearrangement of space should the census exceed 12 patients at any given
time. The large double doors that were to remain closed distinctly separated the unit from
another area designated for procedures such as weighing, supply storage, and treatment
procedures as well as separating the unit from the rest of the hospital. The area itself was
46’ by 20’ for a total of 920 square feet. The side door where physicians and nurses
entered the unit opened to a separate small room with its own sink, presumably for the
hand washing procedures laid out in the committee’s initial report.381 This arrangement
provided flexibility of space arrangement, selected access, and the use of particular
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equipment and machinery including incubators and oxygen equipment for basic
respiratory support.
During the 1950s, hospital construction moved toward more private rooms or
smaller wards as patient privacy and hospital amenities became a bigger driving force
behind where patients chose to go for care. Elsewhere in the Infants’ Hospital, patients
occupied cubicles where each patient would have an area set apart. While this practice
reflected trends in broader hospital construction, it also contributed to the hospitals’
attempts to prevent infection by separating patients from each other. The Newborn
Nursery had a ward layout where the nurses could see all of the patients throughout the
room at any given time, as it still does today. According to the hospital’s plans for the
newborn nursery, the Infants’ Hospital did not feel the need to create private spaces for
each newborn, though the emphasis on the use of Isolettes delineated more ‘privatize’
space for each infant within a mini-environment that separated each from his or her
neighbors.382
Nurses had complete visual access to their patients, but did not have unlimited
physical access to their patients. They learned to perform their skills through small
portholes in the sides of the Isolettes.383 One of the more common incubators used at the
time, the Isolette, incorporated a Plexiglass box with holes on the side of the incubator
382
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through which a nurse could put her hands to provide care. Photographs from hospitals
across the country beginning in the 1940s reveal the act of nurses caring for their patients
while separated from them by Plexiglass. The nurses learned to provide an incredible
amount of care through these ‘portholes’ and would have done everything from changing
diapers and weighing the patient, to learning to reposition the patient for assessment.
Even today, this practice is a hallmark skill learned by new NICU nurses; the experience
can be cumbersome initially but it served (and still does) to maintain a temperature and
humidity regulated environment for each patient. This porthole policy reinforced the
careful intentionality of safe practices for avoiding hospital-acquired infections, as well
as dictated how the nurses could provide care. Hospital administration valued the skill the
nurses who worked in premature infant units brought to the intensive care.
Even as the Boston Children’s and the Infants’ Hospital consolidated the care of
sick newborns, the institutions still struggled to meet the rising expenditures of patient
care, and for the fiscal years 1961 and 1962, the hospitals experienced deficits in their
annual budgets across the hospital. They shifted their focus to increasing occupancy384 in
a healthcare world where patients could choose where they wanted to go and hospitals
were only paid for the beds they filled.385 By 1963, the hospital made drastic changes in
their infrastructure by closing of the Infants’ Hospital. The newborn nursery was
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completely moved into Boston Children’s Medical Center (BCMC) and within two years
of this shift BCMC was referring to the unit as their neonatal intensive care (NICU).386
While what we label a space matters, it might not necessarily clearly define points
when a particular type of care was given. The care provided in the Newborn Nursery in
the Infant’s Hospital reflected early tenents of what we consider ‘intensive care’ today.
Fairman and Lynaugh argue that although “critical care” is a more modern concept, its
roots lie in established and older practice that sick patients be grouped together with hope
of survival. While the label critical or intensive care defines what we consider to occur in
ICUs today, the concept of a place where skilled caregivers “kept watch by intensive
observation” evolved in settings that included a variety of names.387 The newborn
nursery’s move into the hospital’s main building and the renaming of the unit as an ICU
reflect the degree of value placed on this particular patient population. There is no
evidence in the hospital archival documents that any significant changes occurred during
the transition from “Newborn Nursery” to NICU – the equipment, though it continued to
grow and change, still included the same basic machines, the specialized nursing staff
continued to provide intensive constant care, and the hospital continued to keep space set
apart for their newborns. Both the premature infant unit and the newborn nursery were
intensive care units in their own right, and delivered particular types of care that were
intensive in nature. The transition to NICU reflected the emerging state of intensive care
medicine that had already been labeled in adult units beginning in the 1950s. By 1963
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and the birth and transfer of Patrick Kennedy to BCMC, the unit was introduced as a
“neonatal intensive care unit” establishing importance and garnering confidence in the
public eye.
Diving Babies: Critical Care and Hyperbaric treatments
In 1963, President John F. Kennedy’s son Patrick arrived at Boston Children’s
Hospital from Cape Cod, Massachusetts suffering from severe respiratory distress
secondary to his prematurity. He was so ill the neonatal specialists offered him a
treatment still considered highly experimental: hyperbaric oxygen therapy.388 Hyperbaric
oxygen therapy had proven in some studies to be of value when oxygenating tissue as
well as for treating ‘the bends’ - a common problem among SCUBA divers. 389
Hyperbaric oxygen therapy was based on a limited body of research suggesting its
use with neonates requiring respiratory support. As of November 1962, the Boston
Lying-In Hospital, a sister hospital of Boston Children’s, did consider the use of
hyperbaric medicine for newborns and purchased “a small hyperbaric tank” the size of
most incubators of the time for use in research related to hyperbaric medicine used for
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neonates.390 The hospital used the chambers, produced by the Emerson Company, with
newborn and prematurely born infants suffering from severe hypoxia.391 The basic
premise suggested that since many infants struggled with oxygen intake, the hyperbaric
oxygenation would allow for optimal oxygen transfer for these infants who often
presented with severe cyanosis.392 Dr. William Bernhard, physician at Boston Children’s,
considered hyperbaric medicine for use in studies related to long-term therapy for infants
with hyaline membrane disease.393 Boston Children’s did not have the hyperbaric
isolettes that Boston Lying-In had, but they used a large chamber on site that fit multiple
adults and was used for broader research purposes.
When Baby Kennedy arrived the physicians were desperate. The life of the
President’s son was on the line and they were willing to do whatever they could, even if it
was not a standard practice at the time, particularly since he was a famous baby; such
treatments would probably not have been afforded to other less high profile patients
admitted. While Baby Kennedy was treated in the hospital’s newborn intensive care
nursery, the physicians made a critical decision to transport him through the hospital to
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the facility’s hyperbaric chamber in a desperate attempt to save his life.394 When baby
Kennedy entered the chamber, a cadre of specialists accompanied him, including two
nurses.395 They aimed to increase his oxygenation with the hope that given extra time, his
breathing could improve. Other researchers were doing studies on hyperbaric medicine
and newborns in 1963; a seminal article published just a year later did achieve limited
success using hyperbaric treatments with neonates.
Researcher and physician James Hutchison and his team in Glasgow achieved
limited success in newborn resuscitation by exposing asphyxiated newborns to greater
atmospheric pressures.396 Using Perspex pressure chambers,397 designed by the Vickers
Group Research Establishment, infants who did not respond to traditional positive
pressure ventilatory interventions were placed in a small pressure chamber and immersed
in pure oxygen at 2-4 atmospheres of pressure.398 Slightly over half of the infants who
received this intervention survived; such statistics were comparable, if not slightly better,
394
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than contemporary modes of positive pressure ventilation used with neonates during this
time period. Hyperbaric medicine did not carry the same risks such as pneumothorax399
(though it carried other risks), and was based off of the concept of using the oxygen
already in the blood stream to optimal effect.
Hyperbaric Medicine and newborn physiology
Hyperbaric oxygenation works on the physics of Henry’s Law. Hemoglobin,
located in red blood cells, binds to oxygen in the blood that transports it to body tissue as
needed, but oxygen can also be transported, though much less efficiently, when the gas is
dissolved in the blood. At one atmosphere of pressure (the state we function in every day)
not enough oxygen can be dissolved in the blood to meet body requirements. When the
atmospheric pressure on the body is increased, greater amounts of oxygen can be
dissolved in the blood and thus transported to the tissues. When the oxygen concentration
in breathed air increases from 20.9% to 100%, the amount of oxygen dissolved into the
blood increases proportional to the increase in atmospheric pressure.
During the early 1960s, respiratory distress plagued newborn populations with no
viable treatment methods or standards of care for newborns with respiratory distress as
premature infants’ lungs are incompletely developed. Positive pressure ventilation had
not yet become the standard of practice and in lieu of the abysmal survival rates for
newborns with respiratory distress researchers attempted other ways to treat respiratory
distress among newborns. Ultimately the goal remained the same: to get much needed
399
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oxygen to the tissues of infants whose lungs did not work properly yet. Physicians and
researchers at Boston Children’s Hospital focused their efforts and resources on
hyperbaric medicine - a branch of therapy and medical specialty that some believed
might be a viable approach to making strides in the treatment of hyaline membrane
disease400 and respiratory distress.
Hutchinson and his team were careful to articulate the importance of
understanding his negative pressure resuscitation method not as a response to RDS, as it
could not treat respiratory acidosis, but as a possible method of treating newborns for
whom they could not establish initial breathing patterns.401 Hutchinson argued that
placing an infant in a chamber might be a better alternative to positive pressure
ventilation, as tracheal intubation as part of PPV “requires a degrees of skill not always
easily at hand in smaller maternity units and in areas where paediatricians have far-flung
commitments. Hyperbaric oxygen can be used by any doctor after a brief course of
instruction.”402 Hutchinson believed this technological innovation required less skill than
that required to intubate and establish positive pressure ventilation in newborns.
The idea of treating patients under hyperbaric conditions was not new, but came
as a piece of a larger general interest in hyperbaric medicine.403 Harvard School of Public
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Health owned a hyperbaric chamber available for research purposes. Newborns joined a
long and varied list of the chamber’s occupants. Because the chamber existed as the only
one of its kind at an academic institution in the United States, both governmental and
private agencies used the chamber for an array of research.404 The U.S. Navy researched
the physiological effects of high atmospheric pressure on the human body.405 In
September 1962, the newborn surgical service at Boston Children’s received permission
from the trustees at the Harvard School of Public Health to use the hyperbaric oxygen
chamber to research on the effects of hyperbaric oxygenation on newborns undergoing
cardiovascular surgery.406 Before July of the following year, they proceeded to perform
21 successful cardiovascular operations in the chamber on infants less than 6 months of
age who would have died without the procedures.407
On August 5, 1963, just days before Baby Kennedy arrived to Boston for
treatment, doctors at Boston Children’s successfully performed open-heart surgery on a
baby who suffered from aortic stenosis, a condition in which the aorta carrying blood
from the heart to the body is narrowed, preventing oxygenated blood from entering
posted by “BCH Archives.” Accessed April 15, 2014, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d9mSYHQrgg&feature=youtube_gdata_player.
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systematic circulation and often leaving the heart overworked. Inside the chamber, the
doctors proceeded to successfully repair the newborn’s cardiac condition under a pressure
of 3.4 atmospheres (over three times the usual limit).408 Blue babies, a common name for
a group of infants born with a complex cardiac malformation that impaired their blood
oxygen levels leaving them severely cyanotic, comprised the largest group of infants who
received surgical treatment in the chamber.
According to a memo sent in 1962 from Murial Vesey, head of nursing at Boston
Children’s at the time, nurses were not required to be present in the hyperbaric chamber
during surgical procedures, though they accompanied the infant before the procedure. A
team of nurses were trained to work in the chamber and often did, but were not always
required. Documents specify that nursing roles were performed by one of the surgeons or
physicians in the chamber: “Since there is no nurse in there [the chamber] as a rule, this
would mean that either the surgeon or the anesthetist would have to take the
responsibility…”409 Such a ‘rule’ highlights both a gendered and power tension as to who
was important to enter the chamber even when a particular job needed to be done. The
surgeons and other physicians would not have easily taken over the role of the nurse in a
ward or unit setting during this time, but their power over the technology trumped their
need for a nurse present and made them willing to perform a job otherwise not theirs.
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Another possible reason for nurse exclusion might have been related to the
mechanics of how the chamber and pressurization worked. Each person who entered the
chamber when it was in use would have been put at risk for the bends. The hospital took
out an additional insurance policy for those staff that were trained and approved to work
in the chamber, a costly addition to overall expenditures related to the chamber. In
addition, each person who entered the chamber would have had to experience a period of
decompression lasting from 15 to 45 minutes depending on the duration of time spent in
the chamber; this would have meant anyone who entered the chamber would have not
been available to care for patients for a significant amount of time.410
Even so, Miss Vesey still participated in the preparation of the policies as the
head of nursing by initiating memos outlining aspects of patient care and the process that
traditionally would have fallen on nurses present in the surgical suit. We still might
consider the chamber’s use as an extension of the care delivered in the intensive care unit
even if it did not become standard treatment, and it is important to consider that the value
placed on nursing staff in the units by the hospital did not fully translate to the chamber
setting.
The chamber itself had a separate and fascinating history that has yet to be
explored in the scholarly literature. The hyperbaric chamber was just one treatment
modality in the story of Boston’s NICU in the early 1960s affected by the intense search
for a solution to the problem of RDS. The use of hyperbaric medicine with newborn
410
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infants for both surgical and respiratory issues might have stayed a footnote in a letter
buried in the archives were it not for its use with baby Patrick Kennedy. The willingness
of his physicians to use this highly experimental form of treatment fits with what we
know of the broader story of newborn medicine; traditional options of the time did not
reliably work, so they were willing to try even a highly experimental treatment in the
hope it would. There is no proof in the archives that BCMC placed any other prematurely
born infants in the chamber or offered this care to other premature patients, so this
treatment given to Baby Patrick raises a complicated dilemma.
We usually consider those on whom extremely experimental treatments are
performed to be the marginalized and vulnerable, but Patrick came from a powerful
family and these physicians knew the entire country was watching what they did. On the
other hand, these physicians and hospital team would have wanted to offer Patrick
whatever they thought might benefit him, and consequently he might have had access to
what they thought of as a life saving device (even if the chance of it working was small).
An oral history with a neonatal physician Dr. Don Null411 who practiced in the NICU
setting in the 1960s as part of the team working with the early prototypes of the BabyBird
Ventilator suggests a broader theme. Null believed their early prototype ventilator was
indeed a life saving device even if it was only a prototype. Null spoke of the process of
putting the infants on ventilators and how the parents were approached (when possible)
about the process: “…if that baby was doing poorly, then it [using the ventilator] was
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considered a life saving treatment just like you can in an emergency room today.”412 He
articulated a thought process that considered life-saving treatments - even if they were
still in the research and prototype stages - the only alternative to death and operated on
the premise that these newborns could be saved. Perhaps the physicians caring for Patrick
felt the hyperbaric chamber fell into the category of lifesaving treatment and chose to
offer the state of the art therapy to him simply because it was available. In this sense,
Patrick was both a research subject like many newborns during this time period and a
patient for whom the most advanced and expensive therapies medicine had to offer were
attempted.413 The Patrick Kennedy case fueled the impetus to save prematurely born
babies and broaden NICU infrastructure across the country.
“One Nursery in Three Locations”: A Joint Neonatology Program
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s several factors contributed to the increases in
numbers of newborns requiring intensive care as well as the patient acuity among those
admitted to the units. The increased use of drugs and medications as well as the ability to
treat infection and respiratory distress were just some of the larger factors contributing to
the increased survival and acuity of the neonatal population. Beginning in the 1950s, the
production of medications by the pharmaceutical industry increased drastically;
Americans medicated to treat everything from slight discomfort and pain to infection and
412
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sepsis. Pregnant women also participated in this increase in medication use. By the
1970s, America was overmedicated and the abuse of addictive drugs had become a
growing problem particularly as it related to neonatology.414
One such example cited by historian Murdina Desmond is Thalidomide, a
sedative that gained popularity in the late 1950s whose use proved to be associated with
malformations of the skeleton, external ear, heart and gastrointestinal tract. While the
drug was eventually withdrawn from the market, extensive litigation ultimately resulted
in monetary compensation to affected children and their families. This legal case laid
precedence for a massive body of literature that emerged relating to perinatal
pharmacology, and the NIH establishing a branch devoted to testing the effects of certain
drugs during the perinatal period.415 While congenital malformations had always been a
concern for those focused on decreasing infant mortality rates, the increased use of drugs
for which physicians had little understanding of their fetal side effects played an
increasing role in the emergence of congenital malformations that, if they did not prove
fatal, had life-long side effects and implications. With increases in the numbers of people
using ‘street drugs’ neonatal nurses had to learn to manage newborns suffering from drug
withdrawal. These newborns required intensive monitoring and, if they survived, could
have potentially drastic lifelong conditions. Drug effects emerged as a condition that
contributed to morbidity and the need for critical care beds.416
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Advances were made in the treatment of neonatal sepsis and respiratory distress.
The changes in surgical interventions for previously fatal neonatal congenital
malformations also increased the numbers of newborns requiring intensive pre and postoperative monitoring and management. During the early days of the use of sulfonamides
and antibacterial agents, little was known about the effects of drugs developed for adults
had on children, much less newborns.417 While sulfonamides and later antibiotics
contributed to decreases in maternal infection and thus in neonatal mortality, they did not
initially appear in the literature as a common treatment modality in early premature infant
units or newborn nurseries. By the mid-1970s antibiotics such as ampicillin and
gentamicin were used on sick newborns to treat sepsis and thus contributed to decreases
in death due to infection.418 Both babies who contracted infections in the hospital as well
as infants who were exposed in utero survived in greater numbers as antibiotics came
onto the market and both medical and surgical patients would have benefitted from their
use of antibiotics.419 By the 1970s, strides were being made in the treatment of respiratory
illness for newborns. Infants who died of RDS just a decade before, had better chances
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for survival by the mid-1970s with the improvement of the understanding of newborn
respiratory physiology and adoption of ventilators made for the neonatal population.420
With increases in the projected rates of sick newborns requiring care,421 Boston
Children’s found their resources were inadequate to meet the need for the number of
patients transferred to them. As intensive care units continued to be costly to hospitals,
not all hospitals in the Boston area could afford to establish units. While some
community hospitals did, they may or may not have had sufficient resources to care for
the sickest infants born there and were unable to give the highest level of critical care.
They would have kept the more stable patients that they could manage and transferred the
sickest to BCMC for care as the numbers of more medically fragile newborns grew –
those suffering from respiratory distress, infection, and requiring complex surgical
treatments. With a limited number of NICU beds available across the state, the beds for
the most critically ill, located at BCMC became important to the state’s ability to provide
NICU care and decisions about how many beds were needed and who would fill them
became critical aspects of the Boston Children’s considerations regarding their unit.
The state of Massachusetts only had eighty-seven NICU beds among its hospitals,
far below the projected need for 141 NICU beds determined by the state’s department of
public health. Boston Children’s Hospital refused beds to an average of five newborns a
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week due to lack of space in their 12 bed unit.422 By 1976 the hospital applied for a
certificate of need423 with the Public Health Department to add six beds to their NICU.
They did not ask for additional beds added to the overall hospital census, but for the
purposes of consolidating their newborn patients who were sent to other units throughout
the hospital when the NICU could not accept further patients.424 The specialization of
care for neonates again became an important factor in the creation of the NICU and space
needed for these newborns to receive such particularized care from trained nursing and
medical staff.
With lack of space in the NICU, infants occupied beds throughout the hospital
necessitating they receive care from nursing personnel who might or might not
understand their unique physiologic needs. Neonates were cared for in departments such
as neurosurgery, cardiology, and surgery and such spreading of this patient population
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was considered a problem by hospital administrative teams who believed the newborns
received the best care when cared for in a unit by specialized nurses and physicians.425
Consolidating newborn patients throughout the hospitals while continuing to
manage those transported to the hospital became a challenge for BCMC’s administration.
Boston Hospital for Women, located less than a mile from the Children’s Medical Center,
was one such hospital that sent their sickest newborns to BCMC. Their special care
nursery lacked the resources to treat for the infants requiring the most intensive care such
as those needing extensive ventilator support and between 1970 and 1972 they transferred
an average of 21 infants annually to the Children’s Medical Center, mostly surgical and
cardiac patients requiring advanced treatment and post-operative care426. Physicians and
hospital administrators decided to form a Joint Program in Neonatology through
collaboration among Harvard Medical School, Boston Hospital for Women, the Boston
Children’s Medical Center, and Beth Israel Hospital.427 The three hospitals considered
their program “one nursery in three locations”428 with the purpose of triaging infants
needing care among three hospitals with varying degrees of intensive care capabilities.
Infants needing general newborn care could be cared for in the general nursery at Beth
Israel, while those who required more specialized care were transferred to Boston
425
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Women’s Hospital that had a basic neonatal intensive care unit capable of providing care
for more stable newborns that still required close monitoring. The sickest of the sick were
transferred to Boston Children’s. This relationship allowed for the management of
newborn care based on acuity and enabled the hospitals to allocate beds and resources –
financial and personnel – to most appropriately and efficiently care for the greatest
number of newborns.
A senior neonatologist with five neonatal fellows rotated through the units
supervising and training residents. Dr. William Taeusch, Jr. served as the program’s first
director. Within the first year, the program grew exponentially and required additional
instructors and neonatal fellows before the end of the first year. The program served as an
organization point for the training of fellows and opportunities for funded research
project related to neonatal medicine. The National Institute of Health (NIH), and the
American Thoracic Society funded the fellows during the initial year, and research
money came from NIH as well as the Charles Hood Foundation.429, 430 The program
attempted to provide efficient resource allocation in care of patients, but it also sought to
provide intensive and quality education to a cadre of burgeoning neonatologists. As the
specialty of neonatology gained momentum in the 1970s, demands for training programs
grew in tandem with demands for care.
Despite this strategic combination of resources, by 1975 Boston Children’s faced
serious challenges in caring for the numbers of critically ill newborns; advances in
429
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respiratory treatments improved and surgical interventions for more complex congenital
malformations became widespread, resulting in the survival of sicker patients. Initially
the hospital did not have the equipment or nursing staff to adequately care for the
numbers of infants who needed the highest levels of acute BCMC could give. In the
month of June 1975, the census of the unit was at maximum with no room for more
admissions. Over the summer months records were not kept, but by October, not only
was space at a premium but inadequate number of nursing staff and respiratory
ventilators also contributed to their inability to receive further patients even if beds were
free in the event that the unit experienced higher acuity than its nursing staff could
cover.431, 432 BCMC refused greater and greater numbers of patients. Tausch recorded by
date the reasons for refusal for patients applying to transfer to Boston Children’s, where
the joining neurology program served the sickest of the infants. The reasons for refusing
admission fell into two categories: lack of an adequate nursing workforce and
technology.
The analysis of expenditures for expanding BCMC’s neonatal intensive care unit
covered a long list that still included the Isolettes and oxygen equipment, bilirubin lights,
431
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and new EKG recorders, but also listed a variety of monitors now standard at each
patient’s bedside. For the addition of six beds to the unit the hospital needed an additional
$117,000 for equipment alone.433 Interestingly, even as nursing care remained one of the
largest expenditures, it was not included in the lists of increased cost of care most likely
because by this time, though the hospital documented increasing costs for new and
complex equipment, the necessity of nursing staff was assumed and a non-negotiable
expense. Though hospital documents do not reference nurses directly in the increased
cost demands, they would have become a part of the assumed necessary infrastructure.
The theme of resource allocation and the importance of grouping infants together to
receive care required the hospital to make decisions about their unit and how to best
organize it whether they were debating closing the premature infant unit, or creating an
infrastructure of individual units connected by established programming for triage
purposes.
Conclusion

The Neonatal Intensive Care Unit at Boston Children’s Medical Center emerged
in the 1960s as the culmination of a series of decisions that established sick newborns as
valued and in need of particular intensive care. The premature infant unit, established by
BCMC’s sister institution in the 1930s, proved that care for prematurely born neonates
could be given effectively, and influenced the creation of a broader space where the
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hospital’s newborn population could receive the skilled and intensive care premature
infants had previously received. The unit, named an ICU by the early 1960s, accepted
Patrick Kennedy whose story highlights the aspects of a complex system of care that
included a unit, advanced medical technology, and desperate attempts to save a baby who
suffered from RDS. While the Baby Kennedy case shows us the complexities of a unit
where intensive care could be given, it raises questions about the use of unproven
methods of treatment and who could receive them. Newspaper clippings, press reports,
and hospital documents do not highlight nursing as a foundational aspect of his care
perhaps because nurses were understood to be necessary and foundational to NICU care
and thus an assumed part of the infrastructure.
Like the Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia, Boston placed importance on their
nursing personnel when forming the unit; they consistently attempted to organize the
patients together where specific specially trained nurses could give the care the newborns
needed. Nursing was an incredible cost for these units and the hospitals made critical
decisions to commit financial resources to ensuring the presence of nursing personnel.
Once demand outpaced their ability to provide care to the many infants who needed it,
like CHOP, Boston Children’s recognized the need to partner with other units to provide
acute care to a the sickest of patients through a transfer agreement among hospitals.
BCMC specifically focused on the multifaceted care they could give and formalized a
program that also functioned to educate residents and nursing personnel as part of the
partnerships among hospitals through their Joint Neonatology Program.
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What BCMC uniquely shows us is the progression of the care models that
eventually contributed to the establishment of an ICU. While adult ICUs might have
progressed out of a grassroots movement, not all ICU spaces followed this model.
BCMC’s NICU emerged as a premature infant unit, then a newborn nursery where
similar care could be given to all neonatal patients, then was labeled an ICU by the mid
1960s. Nurses played key roles that necessitated the allocation of spatial and financial
resources so good nursing care could be delivered. This case study reminds us that
premature infant units and the specific care newborns require contributed to the nuanced
ways ICU spaces develop. These decisions are not necessarily made in a traditionally
rational manner, but encompass complex combinations of values, external limitations and
trends, and developing technologies.
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Chapter 6:

Conclusion
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Conclusion
Newborns are a unique patient population with particular needs and physiology,
and thus require unique nursing care. Early models of intensive care in the 1960s built on
the premise of special environments and particular nursing care. These factors were
historically continuous as ideas about how and where to care for sick newborns formed
and were broadened from premature infants to sick newborns in general. I argue the
social value of newborns as a unique patient population fueled the establishment of
premature infant units that in turn influenced the later development of neonatal intensive
care units. Hospital administrators recognized the importance of particularly trained
nursing workforce; the nurses and their skill both influenced how the hospitals grouped
patients based on their need for nursing care as well as how they allocated space to units
within the hospitals.
Nurses who worked in NICUs demonstrated similar skills the nurses in premature
infant units did, but they built on those skills as increasingly complex equipment and
more medically fragile patients filled their ICUs. The nurses in the early NICUs believed
they knew when changes in care, treatment, equipment helped or hindered their patients
and served as the gateways and gatekeepers to their severely ill patients. When the
machines such as the ventilators did not work, the nurses were the frontline of defense
communicating to the physicians and researchers what worked and what did not work for
the patients. Nurses were integral to the formation of neonatal intensive care units at both
the Boston Children’s Medical Center and the Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia.
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Nurses were not the only influential force in these developments, but they were ever
present when everyone else was busy or went home.
Both Boston Children’s Medical Center and The Children’s Hospital of
Philadelphia opened their intensive care units during a time when foundations had been
laid for grouping newborns together to receive particular nursing care. Both hospitals
received infants transferred from a broader network of NICUs, and thus they relied on
these transfers to keep their beds filled. Both hospitals had hospital administration that
valued good nursing care and made decisions about how to group patients in units based
on the value of good nursing care particular to these patients. But the impetus for the
formation of units at each hospital differed. BCMC had a unique track record of
developing a unit rooted in past premature infant nursing care, influenced by economic
decisions and the social value of sick newborns. CHOP formed their unit through Koop’s
tenacity and a hospital administration that valued the nurses and used them to portray the
human element of intensive care.
Innovators who invent technologies do not solely determine if that technology
works. Demonstration that the technology is valuable requires what historian Jeffrey
Baker calls “system builders”434 who are people other than inventors that address
barriers. They contribute to the process of growth. By the late 1970s, neonatal intensive
care units had grown in part because hospital administrators, physicians, and nurses
thought creatively and hospitals reflected the social value of the patient population. The
434
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NICUs of the early 1960s did not emerge because of decisions made in the 1960s, but
built on decisions made about the social value of newborns as early as the Progressive
Era and the tenacity of physicians, nurses, activists and researchers who made a million
small decisions along the way that influenced why NICUs emerged as they did and when
they did.
Eugene Peters wrote, “Every complex problem has an answer that is clear, simple,
and wrong.”435 The data does not suggest the nurses were the only reason the NICU
worked. They were part of a system, a complicated system, and a system that this work
has only begun to define; much more work is needed, but in the midst of the complexity,
the data is clear that the nurses were vital contributors among other economic, social, and
technological factors that influenced why the NICU worked and developed when it did.
A nuanced view of the development of intensive care:
This work builds off of the work of nursing historians Julie Fairman and Joan
Lynaugh that outlined the ways that critical care for adult populations developed. My
research on neonates, combined with Fairman and Lynaugh’s analysis, informs a history
of critical care spaces in hospitals. In the development of adult ICU’s nurses made
decisions about who required particular types of care and closer observation. The process
did not happen the same ways for all patient populations and we must consider the
newborn population as a unique population that had its own trajectory in how ICUs
435
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formed to meet newborns’ particular needs. Spaces at the CHOP and BCMC formed, in
part, because hospital administrators and physicians believed nurses were a critical piece
of the system required for good patient care. Fairman and Lynaugh argue that nurses
created grassroots influences within adult ICUs. The data related to newborn intensive
care units reveals particular confidence of hospital administrators, researchers, and
physicians in nursing staff that suggests NICUs involved significant administrative
influence as they formed.
Alternative possibilities:
The neonatal intensive care unit progressed to become the standard of care during
a time when sicker patients could be saved with intensive care and more complex
treatment. Other options could have become standard – surgical infants could have been
cared for in general post-operative units or in available beds throughout the hospitals.
Premature infant units could have remained the standard. But neither of these ways of
caring for sick newborns remained standard. NICUs emerged, admitted sick newborns,
either surgical or medical, and included premature infants in their ranks. How we group
sick patients in hospitals today is not just based on social value placed on a particular
patient population, the equipment and technology we have at our disposable, or the most
fiscally efficient way to provide care. Our decisions about the creation of units where
certain patients receive care and who has access to that care rest on the convergence of all
of these factors. In a medical environment where healthcare costs were increasing,
premature infant units such as the one at Boston Children’s Medical Center chose to
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balance the increased costs of patient care in a premature infant unit where census did not
always remain high enough, by grouping all newborns together. In this new unit, all sick
newborns received the kinds of nursing care the premature infants had received. It
worked because both premature infants and newborn infants had the unique physiology
and required the same basic newborn care, and thus the nurses who had the knowledge to
work with premature newborns could also easily transfer their knowledge (and build on
it) to care for medically fragile full term newborns.
Limitations to this study:
This work only speaks to general trends in the literature and the voices of
particular people and is not meant to be a complete nor generalizable account of what
happened in all NICUs across the country. My work only speaks to the broad trends in
the scholarly literature, and to what was happening in two children’s hospitals on the east
coast in the United States. Though race is an important factor when we ask any questions
about systems and historical analysis, as I worked with scholars and mentors to ask
questions about race, I did not ultimately choose to focus on it in this work. Though I did
include families and the ways nurses worked with parents in the early units in this
analysis, this work does not seek to expound upon the roles families played nor is it
meant to be a critical analysis of family centered care throughout the 20th century. This
work is based on an analysis of scholarly literature, general oral histories, and hospital
archives that focus on administrative documentation and records and thus the data must
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be understood to speak only to those arenas and not to the patient and family experiences
that undoubtedly would be a rich vein of future work.
Future work to be done:
This work has laid a foundation for future scholarship and the necessity to ask
further questions to gain a broader picture. More work needs to be done to understand
what influences played key roles in community hospitals. Since my work focuses on two
children’s hospitals, more work should be done to understand how hospitals with
maternity services worked out the challenges of establishing these units and what roles
nurses played in those environments. More work needs to be done to understand more
fully how hospitals elsewhere in the country formed their units and what key influencers
converged in the establishment of NICUs in Denver, Seattle, and Dallas or other larger
cities in different parts of the country.
This future work should include examining the relation of the development of
neonatal care within the context of maternal and perinatal care. Due to the nature of my
historical lens using the history of pediatrics as an influencing framework, I did not
address the ways perinatal units emerged in the late 1970s nor the experiences families
had with the care given in these units. This work would be critical to understanding a
broader conception of the development of the NICU and the ways we formed what we
know today as family centered care.
Further work also needs to be done to better understand the unintended
consequences and how society, legislators, families, and physicians and nurses chose to
	
  

221	
  

meet those concerns on the ground. While I acknowledged that important ethical issues
emerged in the late 1970s, due to the nature of this work I chose to end my time period
just prior to the Baby Doe legislation and the public, legislative, and broad ethical
dialogue during the 1980s.
While I did begin to collect oral histories for this project, I believe more oral
histories should be collected and a more encompassing oral history database of nurses
and physicians who worked in these units, remember the environment, tensions, and
decisions that were made. This would provide a strong historical database of experience
from which future researchers could mine data and themes for further work.
Informing our current understanding:
Neonatal Intensive Care Units today still face many of the same issues the early
units faced – increasing costs, infection rates resulting in sepsis, and nurse staffing issues.
Infants requiring intensive care are among the most nurse-intensive patients in hospitals
today. They require skilled nurses who know how to assess the patients, work with the
plethora of increasingly complex bedside equipment, and function as collectors and
communicators of vital patient data. Recent studies done by nursing researchers suggest
that NICUs today are not staffed to guidelines and associate inadequate staffing rates
with increased infection rates.436 Bedside nursing continues to be an important factor in
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patient outcomes and remains a central aspect of the intensive care environment for
critically ill newborns.437
This work challenges us to think about how we develop systems of care for
vulnerable patient populations and how we group patients with particular needs. In a
healthcare system where specialization creates intensely fragmented and
compartmentalized healthcare, we must be cognizant of how we group patients; highly
trained nurses can be utilized in traditional and nuanced ways, and do make a difference.
We also might think how we make those decisions based on the knowledge and expertise
nurses have and how that might be used with particular patient populations to optimal
effect within highly complicated technological systems that require extensive financial
and caregiver resources. When we consider the NICU a technological system of care, we
recognize a model that required complex equipment and broader infrastructure consisting
of relationships among units. It also was influenced by economic factors, social values,
and complex decisions made by an array of hospital administrators and influencers, as
well as the nurses who functioned at the bedside at the heart of the system – next to their
patients.
With the recent edition of TIME magazine, on May 22, 2014 neonatal intensive
care was once again thrust into the spotlight and America was introduced to a tiny baby
boy named David.438 He was born 2 pounds 11 ounces at 29 weeks gestation (11 weeks
437
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premature). He fought hard and took on the surmountable task of survival when, even by
today’s standards, the odds were stacked against him; but this tenacious little baby boy
was not alone in his fight.439 As we learn more and more about David, we learn about all
of the pieces of equipment, the healthcare workers, the diseases and health issues he
faced secondary to his prematurity, and the factors that influenced the kinds of care and
medicine he received. Photographs of David include his parents and often the nurses,
similar to those published by the Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia just decades before.
The nurses care for tiny David amidst a plethora of machines. They bring the human
element to his story in a world where the equipment and intensity of his medically fragile
state can sometimes seem overwhelming. His story is familiar. Fifty years ago, we heard
a similar story when Patrick Kennedy was born and his family experienced the early days
of neonatal intensive care; now we marvel at a small ‘normal’ little boy benefits from this
care. Both stories present the same infrastructure and both remind the American society
of the how far we have come, but also about the challenges posed by that progress.
On one hand, this patient population can be used as a case study to explore a
plethora of healthcare problems today and challenge us to think in different ways. On the
other hand we have not yet preserved the stories of these nurses, the technological
systems where they worked, and the patients whose lives they played a role in saving. If
we really do value the work they did, we must continue to value their stories, the meaning
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they gave their work, and the ways that work impacted the lives of countless newborns
over the second half of the 20th century.
If we are to build on our current infrastructure of critical care for newborns, we
must continue to think about the NICU as a technology and how it developed, grew, and
changed over its short fifty-year history in the American healthcare system. We must
understand its roots, how nurses have contributed to and played an important role in
shaping it, and how it reflects our social values. We will continue to formulate care for
vulnerable newborn patient populations in the midst of economic factors, social values,
and increasingly complex medical conditions and treatments. The story of the NICU
should also challenge us to think about broader patient populations and what influences
the decisions we make that create and influence the technologic systems we create. We
continue to value and care for infants like David, and we imagine his struggles and how
we might contribute to the reduction of morbidity and mortality among critically ill
newborns as well as other established and developing vulnerable patient populations. The
NICU is a complex technological system composed of, ‘an army of people and a
mountain of infrastructure caring for a pound of life,’ that has made a world of difference
to our society’s tiniest babies.440
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